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SUMMARY
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical component of the Internet. DNS
provides the ability to map human-readable and memorable domain names to machine-
level IP addresses and other records. These mappings lie at the heart of the Internet’s
success and are essential for the majority of core Internet applications and protocols.
The critical nature of DNS means that it is often the target of abuse. Cyber-
criminals rely heavily upon the reliability and scalability of the DNS protocol to
serve as an agile platform for their illicit operations. For example, modern malware
and Internet fraud techniques rely upon DNS to locate their remote command-and-
control (C&C) servers through which new commands from the attacker are issued,
serve as exfiltration points for information stolen from the victims’ computers, and
to manage subsequent updates to their malicious toolset.
The research described in this thesis scientifically addresses problems in the area of
DNS-based detection of illicit operations. In detail, this research studies new methods
to quantify and track dynamically changing reputations for DNS based on passive
network measurements. The research also investigates methods for the creation of
early warning systems for DNS. These early warning systems enables the research
community to identify emerging threats (e.g., new botnets and malware infections)




The Domain Name System (DNS) [55, 56] maps domain names to IP addresses, and
provides an important service to Internet applications. DNS is one of the core proto-
cols in the Internet, which is often used to provide an agile and reliable infrastructure
for Internet-based applications (i.e., e-commerce, on-line education etc.).
Internet-scale attacks often use DNS as well because they are essentially Internet-
scale malicious applications. For example, spyware uses anonymously registered do-
mains to exfiltrate private information to drop sites. Disposable domains are used
by adware to host malicious or false advertising content. Botnets make agile use of
short-lived domains to evasively move their command-and-control (C&C) infrastruc-
ture [19, 38, 39, 104]. Fast-flux networks [43, 70, 90] rapidly change DNS records to
evade blacklists and resist takedowns [84,89, 90].
To date, the security community mainly fights DNS abuse using statically com-
piled domain blacklists. The e"ectiveness of such static domain blacklists is increas-
ingly limited, due to the overwhelming number of new domain names appearing on
the Internet every day. DNS abusers frequently employ domain-fluxing techniques
to run their malicious activities, thus making it di!cult to keep domain blacklists
up-to-date.
The security community is in need of methods that would enable DNS operators to
defend against DNS abuse. Such methods should be able to provide both situational
awareness, and the ability to proactively detect and respond to DNS-based Internet
threats.
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Improving the situational awareness of DNS resolutions would require us to quan-
tify the notion of dynamically changing reputation for domain names. Law enforce-
ment agencies have been using reputation-based methods for years, in order to predict
crime events in certain areas over certain periods of the year. Their prediction abil-
ities are based on historical observations of reports recorded by law enforcement. It
is unlikely (in the near future) that the law enforcement o!cers would have to deal
with many criminal incidents in historically safe parts of the city. In the same sense,
there are areas notorious for their criminal activity.
By the systematic passive analysis of historic data on crime, law enforcement
o!cers can more accurately forecast criminal activities. This clearly enables them
to better organize their work force (i.e., frequency and schedule of patrols) but also
the experience level of the law enforcement o!cers that will deal with potentially
high-risk situations.
DNS reputation is directly linked with the historic evidence that operators can
attribute to a domain name. For example, a domain name should have a low DNS
reputation if it is pointing to a network for which we have proof that historically
has been associated with certain levels of DNS abuse and there is no homogeneity in
the domain names that can be associated with hosts in the same network. On the
contrary, if a domain name is pointing to a network for which we have no evidence
of historic DNS abuse and the domain names (in the same network) have a lot of
consistency in their DNS structure (i.e., few e"ective second level domains etc.) it is
very likely that it is benign.
The properties of historically related domain names in a network are very impor-
tant to DNS reputation. Adversaries’ key goal is the evasion of statically compiled
DNS blacklists. Therefore, it is very likely that they will structure their DNS infras-
tructure in such a way that blacklisting one domain name (or the e"ective second
level domain) will not a"ect the rest of the domain names used by them.
2
On the other hand, legitimate Internet applications desire a fairly stable DNS
infrastructure. The main reason behind that is the quality of service and availability
that legitimate professional Internet services have to provide to their users. These
fundamentally di"erent motivational observations can be used in order to systemati-
cally infer relational features for DNS.
The second goal of this thesis is to enable operators to proactively act against
DNS-based Internet threats. Such early warning systems would have the potential to
reduce the response time against emerging Internet threats. As in reputation systems,
passive observations will be important in this e"ort as well.
Maybe the best examples of successful early warning systems can be found in
meteorology. Historic weather patterns along with up-to-the-minute observations are
used in order to obtain more accurate weather forecasts. The same analogy can be
made in DNS, with one main di"erence: di"erent points in the DNS hierarchy would
enable the detection of di"erent “families” of Internet threats.
In the upper layers of the DNS hierarchy, for example, top level domain (TLD)
operators and authoritative name server (ANS) operators should be able to indepen-
dently detect the rise of new malware related domain names. This should be made
possible by the passive collection of observation from the DNS resolution requests.
To achieve the quantification of such a system we study the DNS properties that can
be observed in the higher levels of the DNS hierarchy as a byproduct of the malware’s
daily life cycle and their infection campaigns.
Domain names used for benign purposes typically have a very stable “audience”
that visits them over a period of a time. It is very unlikely that a large number of
new users visit benign domain names for a short period of time and then suddenly
disappear 1. However, domain names related with malware have to go through the
malware infection and propagation stage. Social engineering tricks [48, 51, 53] or
1There could be exceptions in this claim like flash crowd type of tra!c [46].
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malware delivery mechanisms [14, 68, 69] may be used for the propagation of a new
malware “on-the-rise”.
This infection phase cannot be instant. Typically, it would be a gradual process
observable over a period of time. Authoritative DNS and TLD operators are able
to observe this alteration in the DNS resolution patterns. This change in the DNS
resolution behavior can be used along with historic observations from malware-related
domain names to enable the early warning of new malware-related domain names on
the rise.
A single malware family can evade detection at the upper layer of the DNS hier-
archy. Malware that employ domain name generation algorithms (DGA) to establish
their command and control (C&C) communication make use of disposable domain
names. Typically such disposable domain names are active for a small period of time,
leaving very limited historic traces at the TLD or ANS operators. A byproduct of the
normal DGA operation is the generation of Name Error responses or NXDomains,
which are observable at the recursive levels of the DNS hierarchy. In order to provide
a complete early warning system for malware related domain names across the DNS
hierarchy, we need to be able to detect DGAs on the rise at the recursive DNS levels.
As discussed previously, we make use of passive observations of NXDomains and we
model new DGAs on the rise by observing properties of the generated NXDomains.
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
The e"ectiveness of static domain blacklists is increasingly limited. The main reason
for this limitation is the overwhelming number of new domain names appearing on
the Internet every day. Attackers frequently switch to di"erent domains to run their
malicious activities, thus making it di!cult to keep blacklists up-to-date. Attack-
ers now make very aggressive use of DNS agility, which provides a straightforward
technique to evade static domain name blacklisting.
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To overcome the limitations of static domain blacklists, the security community
needs a new generation of DNS-based detection systems that will be able to:
• Dynamically assign reputation scores to domain names according to their suc-
cessful DNS resolutions.
• Dynamically detect new malware-related domains in various parts of the DNS
hierarchy.
• Dynamically identify the rise of “Domain Name Generation Algorithm”-based
(or DGA) botnets, using properties of the DGA-based botnets communication
cycle observable at the local recursive DNS level.
1.1.1 DNS Reputation
Over the years, Internet miscreants have used DNS to build malicious network infras-
tructures. For example, botnets and other types of malicious software make use of
domain names to locate their command and control (C&C) servers and communicate
with attackers, e.g., to exfiltrate stolen private information, wait for commands to
perform attacks on other victim machines, etc.
In response to this malicious use of DNS, network operators use static domain
blacklists to contain known malware domains to flag DNS queries originating from
malware-infected machines. Such static domain name blacklists try to e"ectively
block the communication channel between infected machines and the attackers. Un-
fortunately, static blacklists, which typically still are manually compiled, cannot keep
pace with the level of network agility of modern Internet threats.
1.1.2 Early Detection of Malware Outbreaks
DNS reputation systems at the recursive level or at the edge of the monitored network
can identify potentially malicious domain names according to their successful DNS
resolutions. In order to achieve early domain name detection on new malware-related
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domain names on the rise, we need to be able to classify domain names at the higher
levels of the DNS hierarchy, not only at the recursive level.
Only one known malware family could potentially evade detection systems that
operate at the higher levels of the DNS hierarchy. Malware that make use of domain
name generation algorithms (DGAs) for connecting back to their C&Cs typically
utilize multiple (di"erent) authorities and domain names. It would require an unre-
alistically wide deployment of DNS sensors across multiple di"erent DNS authorities
to model the domain names that such a malware would use, at the authority level.
However, at the recursive or local network level, such DGA-based malware inevitably
leave network traces of non-successful DNS resolutions (NXDomains) as part of their
normal C&C discovery cycle. This DNS behavior is yet to be harvested by classifica-
tion systems for early detection of new DGAs “on-the-rise”.
1.1.2.1 Leveraging the Higher Levels of The DNS Hierarchy
While domain reputation systems at the recursive DNS level represent an important
advancement, they have limited, local capabilities in that they can detect new ma-
licious domains only after the corresponding malicious activities have propagated to
their monitored (or cooperative) networks. Domain name reputation systems classify
primarily based on resource records, the domain name and its resolved IP address.
By leveraging the properties of resource records, current domain reputation systems
are heavily dependent on historic observations about the domain names and the IP
addresses they point to.
Given the nature of emerging Internet threats, it is important that we develop
global monitoring capabilities to stop impending attacks on our networks. Further-
more, there is a need for a variety of classification signals that enable early detection
of malicious domain names. Such a system should not rely heavily upon a single
class of detection signals (e.g., historic IP reputation). This is because evading a
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detector that uses a variety of detection signals becomes significantly harder and the
detector will no longer be prone to sudden changes in its main detection signals (e.g.,
transition from IPv4 to IPv6 reputation).
1.1.2.2 Leveraging the Unsuccessful DNS Resolutions at the Recursive Level
DGA-based botnets (i.e., Srizbi, Conficker, Murofet etc.) force the defenders to: (i)
reverse-engineer the DGA algorithm; (ii) use the obtained DGA to pre-compute future
candidate C&C domains; (iii) register the generated domains before the botmaster
does. While the botmaster only needs to register a few domains per day to maintain
control over the botnet (with high probability), a comprehensive take down e"ort
would require security operators to pre-register a very large number of domains per
day, which quickly becomes very costly.
Alternatively, security operators may seek the collaboration of domain registrars
to stop anybody, including the botmaster, from registering domains produced by the
DGA. Unfortunately, while this is an appealing solution that has been implemented
to counter Conficker, the fact that Conficker may use 110 di"erent TLDs made this
solution fairly laborious and requires the collaboration between network operators
(e.g., country-code TLD administrators) across many di"erent national boundaries.
Unfortunately, the security community typically discovers new malware weeks, or
even months after the first infection takes place [8]. To address the early detection
of new emerging DGA-based botnets without requiring malware samples, we need
to invent new detection systems. Such systems should be able to accurately detect
machines within a network that are compromised with DGA-based bots by analyzing
streams of unsuccessful DNS resolutions. Such detection systems should be able to
operate at the local recursive level or at the edge of a network so operators can
independently identify DGA-based compromised machines in their networks.
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1.2 Contributions
Dynamic Reputation for DNS: To address the limitation of static domain name
blacklists we developed Notos [7], a dynamic reputation system for DNS. Notos uses
passive DNS evidence from recursive DNS servers to distinguish between benign and
malicious domain names using historical learning techniques. Notos allows us to
statistically correlate the two planes in DNS: the name space and the address space.
The primary goal of Notos is to automatically assign a low reputation score to a
domain that is involved in malicious activities, such as malware C&C, “phishing”,
and spam campaigns. Conversely, we want to assign a high reputation score to
domains that are used for legitimate purposes.
DNS-based Malware Detection at the DNS Authority Level: The first com-
ponent of the early warning system we developed is named Kopis [8]. Kopis operates
in the upper layers of the DNS hierarchy and is capable of detecting malware-related
domain names “on-the-rise”. This early warning system can be independently de-
ployed and operated by the top-level domain (TLD) and authoritative DNS (ANS)
operators. The system enables TLD and ANS operators to detect malware-related
domains from within their authority zones without the need for data from other
networks or other inter-organizational coordination. The detection of such malware
related domain names typically comes days or even weeks before the domains appear
in public blacklists.
DNS-based Malware Detection at the DNS Recursive Level: Pleiades [9]
is the second component of our early warning system against rising malware threats.
In particular Pleiades is able to detect the rise of DGA botnets in a local network by
statistical modeling of the unsuccessful DNS resolutions at the recursive DNS level
of the monitored network. Pleiades is able to learn models from tra!c generated by
8
already known DGA-based malware and to detect active infections in the monitored
networks.
1.3 Dissertation overview
In Chapter 2, we introduce the basic terms that we will use in the thesis. We also
discuss the necessary background material and we discuss the related work.
In Chapter 3, we elaborate on Notos, the dynamic reputation system for DNS.
Section 3.2 describes in detail our passive DNS collection strategy and other white-
list and blacklist inputs. We also describe three feature extraction modules that
measure key network, zone and evidence-based features. Finally, we describe how
these features are clustered and incorporated into the final reputation engine. To
evaluate the output of Notos, we gathered an extensive amount of network trace data.
Section 3.3 describes the data collection process, while in Section 3.4 we present the
statistical feature analysis. The sensitivity of each module and the analysis on the
experiment results can be found in Section 3.5.
In Chapter 4, we provide an in-depth analysis of Kopis, the early warning system
for malware-related domain names that operates in the upper layers of the DNS
hierarchy. In Section 4.2, we introduce Kopis, and in Section 4.3, we elaborate in
detail how we compute Kopis’ statistical features. Section 4.4 presents an analysis
of the characteristics of the DNS tra!c we used to evaluate our detection system.
Additionally, we report all detection results and discoveries made possible through
Kopis.
In Chapter 5, we introduce Pleiades, an early warning system capable of detecting
DGAs on the rise at the recursive DNS levels. We provide an overview of Pleiades
in Section 5.2. The DGA discovery process is described in Section 5.3. Section 5.4
describes the DGA classification and C&C detection processes. We elaborate on
the properties of the datasets used and the way we obtained the ground truth in
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Section 5.5. The experimental results are presented in Section 5.6.
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6. Section 6.1 summaries the contributions. In
Section 6.2 we discuss the operational aspects of all systems presented in this thesis
along with the possible evasion techniques against them. Next, in Section 6.3 we
discuss the open research problems that are related with the research presented in
this thesis. We conclude in Section 6.4 with the closing remarks.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
2.1 Background
2.1.1 The Domain Name System
In the Domain Name System (DNS), domain names are composed of labels, separated
by periods, which correspond to namespaces in a hierarchical tree structure. Each do-
main name is a node, and the bottom-up concatenation of node names creates a fully
qualified domain name. A zone is a collection of such nodes, constituting a separate
tree structure, with the zone’s start of authority, or SOA, at the apex. The contents
of the zone (either mappings of labels to hosts, or further downward delegation), is
available from DNS authority name servers (or ANS). In DNS nomenclature, these
authority servers are sometimes called the SOA or ANS.
A recursive DNS resolver (or RDNS) is what one normally thinks of as a “DNS
server”. Such resolvers accept queries from users, understand the zone hierarchy
system, and properly implement the various rules and RFCs to obtain and cache
answers.
DNS initiators on host machines are called stub resolvers. They typically don’t
interact with the zone hierarchy, and with a few exceptions, don’t cache answers.
Instead, they implement enough DNS logic to pose basic queries to recursive DNS
servers.
The domain name space is structured like a tree. A domain name identifies a node
in the tree. For example, the domain name F.D.B.A. identifies the path from the
root “.” to a node F in the tree (see Figure 1(a)). The set of resource information
associated with a particular name is composed of resource records (RRs) [55, 56].
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The depth of a node in the tree is sometimes referred to as domain level. For
example, A. is a top-level domain (TLD), B.A. is a second-level domain (2LD), D.B.A.
is a third-level domain (3LD), and so on.
The information related to the domain name space is stored in a distributed
domain name database. The domain name database is partitioned by “cuts” made
in the name space between adjacent nodes. After all cuts are made, each group of
connected nodes represent a separate zone [55]. Each zone has at least one node, and
hence a domain name, for which it is authoritative. For each zone, a node which is
closer to the root than any other node in the zone can be identified. The name of
this node is often used to identify the zone.
The RRs of the nodes in a given zone are served by one or more authoritative
name servers (ANS or AuthNSs). AuthNSs that have complete knowledge about a
zone (i.e., they store the RRs for all the nodes related to the zone in question in its
zone files) are said to have authority over that zone [55, 56]. AuthNSs will typically



















Figure 1: Example of DNS tree and domain resolution process.
DNS queries are usually initiated by a stub resolver on a user’s machine, which
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relies on a recursive DNS resolver (RDNS) for obtaining a set of RRs owned by a
given domain name. The RDNS is responsible for directly contacting the AuthNSs
on behalf of the stub resolver to obtain the requested information, and return it to
the stub resolver. The RDNS is also responsible for caching the obtained information
no longer than a certain period of time, called the Time To Live (TTL), so that if
the same or another stub resolver queries again for the same information within the
TTL time window, the RDNS will not need to contact the authoritative name servers
(thus improving e!ciency). Figure 1(b) enumerates the steps involved in a typical
query resolution process, assuming an empty cache.
Briefly, in step one the stub resolver requests a resolution for www.example.com.
Assuming the RDNS server has no cached information whatsoever, it starts the itera-
tive process from step two. In this step it requests from the root servers a referral for
the www.example.com. The root servers (in step three) provides back the delegation
for www.example.com pointing the recursive to the .com TLD servers. Following the
same iteration (steps four and five) the .com TLD servers refers the RDNS server to
the authoritative DNS server (AuthNS) for the zone example.com.
The final iterative steps will happen in steps six and seven where the RDNS
receives the DNS resolution for the domain name www.example.com. Finally, in step
eight the RDNS server provides back to the stub the DNS resolution for the domain
name www.example.com. From the AuthNS point of view we call as the left hand
DNS the IP address of the RDNS looking up the domain name www.example.com. In
the same sense, we will call as the right hand DNS the IP address that the domain
name www.example.com points to — in this case the IP address will be 192.0.32.10.
In the interest of space, we refer the reader to [55,56,93] for more detailed information
on the DNS and special cases of the query resolution process.
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2.2 Previous Work
2.2.1 Passive DNS Replication
By aggregating all unique, successfully resolved A-type DNS answers at the recursive
level, one can build a passive DNS database. This passive DNS (pDNS) database is
e"ectively the DNS fingerprint of the monitored network and typically contains unique
A-type resource records (RRs) that were part of monitored DNS answers. A typical
RR for the domain name example.com has the following format: {example.com.
78366 IN A 192.0.2.10}, which lists the domain name, TTL, class, type, and rdata.
For simplicity, we will refer to an RR as just a tuple of the domain name and IP
address.
Passive DNS data collection was first proposed by Florian Weimer [95]. His system
was among the first that appeared in the DNS community with its primary purpose
being the conversion of historic DNS tra!c into an easily accessible format. Zdrnja et
al. [106] with their work in “Passive Monitoring of DNS Anomalies” discuss how pDNS
data can be used for gathering security information from domain names. Although
they acknowledge the possibility of creating a DNS reputation system based on passive
DNS measurement, they do not quantify a reputation function.
Notos [7] uses the idea of building passive DNS information only as a seed for
computing statistical DNS properties for each successful DNS resolution. The analysis
of these statistical properties is the basic building block for our dynamic domain name
reputation function. Plonka et al. [63] introduced Treetop, a scalable way to manage
a growing collection of passive DNS data and at the same time correlate zone and
network properties. Their cluster zones are based on di"erent classes of networks
(class A, class B and class C). Treetop di"erentiates DNS tra!c based on whether
it complies with various DNS RFCs and based on the resolution result. Plonka’s
proposed method, despite being novel and highly e!cient, o"ers limited DNS security
information and cannot assign reputation scores to records.
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2.2.2 TLD Measurements
To the best of our knowledge, Wessels et al. [96] were the first to analyze DNS query
data as seen from the upper DNS hierarchy. The authors focused on examining the
DNS caching behavior of recursive DNS servers from the point of view of AuthNS
and TLD servers, and how di"erent implementations of caching systems may a"ect
the performance of the DNS.
Recently, Hao et al. [40] released a report on DNS lookup patterns measured from
the .com TLD servers. Their preliminary analysis shows that the resolution patterns
for malicious domain names are sometimes di"erent from those observed for legitimate
domains. While [40] only reports some preliminary measurement results and does not
discuss how the findings may be leveraged for detection purposes, it does hint that a
malware detection system may be built around TLD-level DNS queries. We designed
Kopis [8] to do just that, namely monitor query streams at the upper DNS hierarchy
and be able to detect previously unknown malware domains.
2.2.3 Malware Propagation
Several studies provide deep understanding behind the properties of malware propa-
gation and botnet’s lifetime [20, 81, 94]. An interesting observation among all these
research e"orts is the inherent diversity of the botnet’s infected population. Collins
et al. [16] introduced and quantified the notion of “network uncleanliness” from the
temporal and spatial network point of view, showing that it is very probable to have
a large number of infected bots in the same network over an epoch. They also discuss
that this could be a direct e"ect of the network policy enforced at the edge. Kopis [8]
directly uses the intuition behind these past research e"orts in the requester diversity
and requester profile statistical feature families.
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2.2.4 DNS and IP Address Space Reputation
Several research studies, e.g., Sinha et al. [78] have studied the e"ectiveness of IP
blacklists. Zhang, et al. [109] showed that the hit rate of highly predictable blacklists
(HBLs) decreases significantly over a period of time. Notos [7] addresses the dynamic
DNS blacklisting problem that makes it significantly di"erent from the highly pre-
dictable blacklists. Importantly, Notos [7] does not aim to create IP blacklists. By
using properties of the DNS protocol, Notos [7] can rank a domain name as potentially
malicious or not. Garera et al. [34] discussed “phishing” detection predominately us-
ing properties of the URL and not statistical observations about the domains or the
IP address. The statistical features used by Holz et al. [43] to detect fast flux networks
are similar to the ones we used in our work, however, Notos [7] utilizes a more com-
plete collection of network statistical features and is not limited to fast flux networks
detection.
Researchers have attempted to use unique characteristics of malicious networks to
detect sources of malicious activity. Anderson et al. [6] proposed Spamscatter as the
first system to identify and characterize spamming infrastructure by utilizing layer
7 analysis (i.e., web sites and images in spam). Hao et al. [73] proposed SNARE,
a spatio-temporal reputation engine for detecting spam messages with very high ac-
curacy and low false positive rates. The SNARE reputation engine is the first work
that utilized statistical network-based features to harvest information for spam de-
tection. Notos [7] is complementary to SNARE and Spamscatter, and extends both
to not only detect spam, but also identify other malicious activity such as phishing
and malware hosting. Qian et al. [105] present their work on spam detection using
network-based clustering. In this work, they show that network-based clusters can
increase the accuracy of spam-oriented blacklists. Our work is more general, since we
try to identify various kinds of malicious domain names. Nevertheless, both works
leverage network-based clustering for identifying malicious activities.
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Felegyhazi et al. [27] proposed a DNS reputation blacklisting methodology based
on WHOIS observations. Our systems does not use WHOIS information making our
approaches complementary by design. Sato et al. [75] proposed a way to extend
current blacklists by observing the co-occurrence of IP address information. Notos [7]
is a more generic approach than the proposed system by Sato and is not limited
to botnet related domain name detection. Finally, Notos [7] builds the reputation
function mainly based upon passive information from DNS tra!c observed in real
networks — not tra!c observed from honeypots.
2.2.5 NXDomain Analysis
Dynamic domain generation has been used by malware to evade detection and com-
plicate mitigation, e.g., Bobax, Kraken, Torpig, Srizbi, and Conficker [65]. To uncover
the underlying domain generation algorithm (DGA), researchers often need to reverse
engineer the bot binary. Such a task can be time consuming and requires advanced
reverse engineering skills [52].
The infamous Conficker worm is one of the most aggressive pieces of malware with
respect to domain name generation. The “C” variant of the worm generated 50,000
domains per day. However, Conficker-C only queried 500 of these domains every 24
hours. In older variants of the worm, A and B, the worm cycled through the list
of domains every three and two hours, respectively. In Conficker-C, the length of
the generated domains was between four and ten characters, and the domains were
distributed across 110 TLDs [66].
Stone-Gross et al. [84] were the first to introduce domain fluxing. In the past,
malware used IP fast-fluxing, where a single domain name pointed to several IP
addresses to avoid being taken down easily. However, in domain fluxing malware
uses a domain generation algorithm to generate several domain names, and then
attempt to communicate with a subset of them. The authors also analyzed Torpig’s
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DGA and found that the bot utilizes Twitter’s API. Specifically, it used the second
character of the most popular Twitter search and generated a new domain every day.
It was updated to use the second character of the 5th most popular Twitter search.
Srizbi [99] is another example of a bot that utilizes a DGA by using unique magic
number. Researchers identified several unique magic numbers from multiple copies
of the bot. The magic number is XOR’ed with the current date and a di"erent set of
domains is generated. Only the characters “q w e r t y u i o p a s d f” are used in
the generated domain names.
Yadav et. al. proposed a technique to identify botnets by finding randomly gen-
erated domain names [102], and improvements that also include NXDomains and
temporal correlation [101]. They evaluated their approaches by automatically detect-
ing Conficker botnets in an o#ine dataset from a Tier-1 ISP in South Asia in the
first research study [102], and both the ISP dataset and a university’s DNS logs in
the second [101].
Villamarin-Salomon and Brustoloni [92] compared two approaches to identify bot-
net C&Cs. In their first approach, they identified domains with high query rates or
domains that were temporally correlated. They used Chebyshev’s inequality and
Mahalanobis distance to identify anomalous domains. In their second approach, they
analyzed recurring “dynamic” DNS replies with NXDomain responses. Their experi-
ments showed that the first approach was ine"ective, as several legitimate services use
DNS with short time-to-live (TTL) values. However, their second approach yielded
better detection and identified suspicious C&C domains.
Pleiades [9] di"ers from the approaches described above in the following ways.
(A) Our work models five di"erent types of bot families including Conficker, Murofet,
Sinowal, and Bobax. (B)Wemodel these bot families using two clustering techniques.
The first utilizes the distribution of the characters and 2-grams in the domain name.
The second relies on historical data that shows the relationship between hosts and
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domain names. (C) We build a classification model to predict the maliciousness of
domains that deviate from the two clustering techniques.
Unlike previous work, Pleiades [9] does not require active probing to maintain a
fresh list of legitimate domains. Our approach does not rely on external reputation
databases (e.g., DNSBLs); instead, it only requires access to local DNS query streams
to identify new clusters of DGA NXDomains. Not only does our approach identify new
DGAs, but it also builds models for these DGAs to classify hosts that will generate
similar NXDomains in the future. Furthermore, among the list of identified domains





The Domain Name System (DNS) [55, 56] maps domain names to IP addresses, and
provides a core service to applications on the Internet. DNS is also used in network
security to distribute IP reputation information, e.g., in the form of DNS-based Block
Lists (DNSBLs) used to filter spam [24,67] or block malicious web pages [59, 91].
Internet-scale attacks often use DNS as well because they are essentially Internet-
scale malicious applications. For example, spyware uses anonymously registered do-
mains to ex-filtrate private information to drop sites. Disposable domains are used
by adware to host malicious or false advertising content. Botnets make agile use of
short-lived domains to evasively move their command-and-control (C&C) infrastruc-
ture. Fast-flux networks rapidly change DNS records to evade blacklists and resist
take downs [90]. In an attempt to evade domain name blacklisting, attackers now
make very aggressive use of DNS agility. The most common example of an agile
malicious resource is a fast-flux network, but DNS agility takes many other forms
including disposable domains (e.g., tens of thousands of randomly generated domain
names used for spam or botnet C&C), domains with dozens of A records or NS records
(in excess of levels recommended by RFCs, in order to resist takedowns), or domains
used for only a few hours of a botnet’s lifetime. Perhaps the best example is the Con-
ficker.C worm [60]. After Conficker.C infects a machine, it will try to contact its C&C
server, chosen at random from a list of 50,000 possible domain names created every
day. Clearly, the goal of Conficker.C was to frustrate blacklist maintenance and take-
down e"orts. Other malware that abuse DNS include Sinowal (a.k.a. Torpig) [37],
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Kraken [72], and Srizbi [74]. The aggressive use of newly registered domain names is
seen in other contexts, such as spam campaigns and malicious flux networks [70,90].
This strategy delays takedowns, degrades the e"ectiveness of blacklists, and pollutes
the Internet’s name space with unwanted, discarded domains.
In this Chapter we study the problem of dynamically assigning reputation scores
to new, unknown domains. Our main goal is to automatically assign a low reputation
score to a domain that is involved in malicious activities, such as malware spreading,
phishing, and spam campaigns. Conversely, we want to assign a high reputation
score to domains that are used for legitimate purposes. The reputation scores enable
dynamic domain name blacklists to counter cyber attacks much more e"ectively. For
example, with static blacklisting, by the time one has su!cient evidence to put a
domain on a blacklist, it typically has been involved in malicious activities for a
significant period of time. With dynamic blacklisting our goal is to decide, even
for a new domain, whether it is likely used for malicious purposes. To this end, we
propose Notos, a system that dynamically assigns reputation scores to domain names.
Our work is based on the observation that agile malicious uses of DNS have unique
characteristics, and can be distinguished from legitimate, professionally provisioned
DNS services. In short, network resources used for malicious and fraudulent activities
inevitably have distinct network characteristics because of their need to evade security
countermeasures. By identifying and measuring these features, Notos can assign
appropriate reputation scores.
Notos uses historical DNS information collected passively from multiple recursive
DNS resolvers distributed across the Internet to build a model of how network re-
sources are allocated and operated for legitimate, professionally run Internet services.
Notos also uses information about malicious domain names and IP addresses obtained
from sources such as spam-traps, honeynets, and malware analysis services to build a
model of how network resources are typically allocated by Internet miscreants. With
21
these models, Notos can assign reputation scores to new, previously unseen domain
names, therefore enabling dynamic blacklisting of unknown malicious domain names
and IP addresses. While previous work on dynamic reputation systems mainly fo-
cused on IP reputation [6,73,78,109]. To the best of our knowledge, Notos is the first
comprehensive dynamic reputation system around domain names.
3.1.1 Contributions
To summarize, our main contributions are as follows. We designed Notos, a dynamic,
comprehensive reputation system for DNS that outputs reputation scores for domains.
We constructed network and zone features that capture the characteristics of resource
provisioning, usages, and management of domains. These features enable Notos to
learn models of how legitimate and malicious domains are operated, and compute
accurate reputation scores for new domains.
We implemented a proof-of-concept version of our system, and deployed it in a
large ISP’s DNS network in Atlanta, GA and San Jose, CA, USA, where we observed
DNS tra!c from 1.4 million users. We also used passive DNS data from the Security
Information Exchange (SIE) project [17].
This extensive real-world evaluation shows Notos can correctly classify new do-
mains with a low false positive rate (0.38%) and high true positive rate (96.8%).
Notos can detect and assign a low reputation score to malware- and spam-related
domain names several days or even weeks before they appear on public blacklists.
3.2 A Dynamic Reputation System for DNS
The goal of the Notos reputation system is to dynamically assign reputation scores
to domain names. Given a domain name d, we want to assign a low reputation score
if d is involved in malicious activities (e.g., if it has been involved with botnet C&C
servers, spam campaigns, malware propagation, etc.). On the other hand, we want























Figure 2: High level overview of Notos.
Notos’ main source of information is a passive DNS (pDNS) database, which
contains historical information about domain names and their resolved IPs. Our
pDNS database is constantly updated using real-world DNS tra!c from multiple
geographically diverse locations as shown in Figure 2. We collect DNS tra!c from
two ISP recursive DNS servers (RDNS) located in Atlanta and San Jose. The ISP
nodes witness 30,000 DNS queries/second during peak hours. We also collect DNS
tra!c through the Security Information Exchange (SIE) [17], which aggregates DNS
tra!c received by a large number of RDNS servers from authoritative name servers
across North America and Europe. In total, the SIE project processes approximately
200 Mbit/s of DNS messages, several times the total volume of DNS tra!c in a single
US ISP.
Another source of information we use is a list of known malicious domains. For
example, we run known malware samples in a controlled environment and we classify
as suspicious all the domains contacted by malware samples that do not match a
pre-compiled white list. In addition, we extract suspicious domain names from spam
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emails collected using a large spam-trap. Again, we discard the domains that match
our whitelist and consider the rest as potentially malicious. Furthermore, we collect
a large list of popular, legitimate domains from alexa.com (we discuss our data
collection and analysis in more details in Section 3.3). The set of known malicious and
legitimate domains represents our knowledge base, and is used to train our reputation
engine, as we discuss in Section 3.3.
Intuitively, a domain name d can be considered suspicious when there is evidence
that d or its IP addresses are (or were in previous months) associated with known
malicious activities. The more evidence of “bad associations” we can find about d,
the lower the reputation score we will assign to it. On the other hand, if there is
evidence that d is (or was in the past) associated with legitimate, professionally run
Internet services, we will assign it a higher reputation score.
3.2.1 System Overview
Before describing the internals of our reputation system, we introduce some basic
terminology. A domain name d consists of a set of substrings or labels separated
by a period; the rightmost label is called the top-level domain, or TLD. The second-
level domain (2LD) represents the two rightmost labels separated by a period; the
third-level domain (3LD) analogously contains the three rightmost labels, and so
on. As an example, given the domain name d=“a.b.example.com”, TLD(d)=“com”,
2LD(d)=“example.com”, and 3LD(d)=“b.example.com”.
Let s be a domain name (e.g., s=“example.com”). We define Zone(s) as the set
of domains that include s and all domain names that end with a period followed by
s (e.g., domains ending in “.example.com”).
Let D = {d1, d2, ..., dm} be a set of domain names. We call A(D) the set of IP
addresses ever pointed to by any domain name d " D.
Given an IP address a, we define BGP (a) to be the set of all IPs within the BGP
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prefix of a, and AS(a) as the set of IPs located in the autonomous system in which a
resides. In addition, we can extend these functions to take as input a set of IPs: given
IP set A = a1, a2, ..., aN , BGP (A) =
!
k=1..N BGP (ak); AS(a) is similarly extended.
To assign a reputation score to a domain name d we proceed as follows. First, we
consider the most current set Ac(d) = {ai}i=1..m of IP addresses to which d points.
Then, we query our pDNS database to retrieve the following information. Related
Historic IPs (RHIPs): RHIPs consist of the union of A(d), A(Zone(3LD(d))), and
A(Zone(2LD(d))). In order to simplify the notation we will refer toA(Zone(3LD(d)))
and A(Zone(2LD(d))) as A3LD(d) and A2LD(d), respectively. Related Historic
Domains (RHDNs): RHDNs comprise the entire set of domain names that ever
resolved to an IP address a " AS(A(d)). In other words, RHDNs contain all the
domains di for which A(di) # AS(A(d)) $= %.
After extracting the above information from our pDNS database, we measure a
number of statistical features. Specifically, for each domain d we extract three groups
of features, as shown in Figure 3:
• Network-based features: The first group of statistical features is extracted
from the set of RHIPs. We measure quantities such as the total number of IPs
historically associated with d, the diversity of their geographical location, the
number of distinct autonomous systems (ASs) in which they reside, etc.
• Zone-based features: The second group of features we extract are those from
the RHDNs set. We measure the average length of domain names in RHDNs,
the number of distinct TLDs, the occurrence frequency of di"erent characters,
etc.
• Evidence-based features: The last set of features includes the measurement
of quantities such as the number of distinct malware samples that contacted

























Figure 3: Computing network-based, zone-based, evidence-based features.
pointed by d, etc.
Once extracted, these statistical features are fed to the reputation engine. Notos’
reputation engine operates in two modes: an o"-line “training” mode and an on-
line “classification” mode. During the o"-line mode, Notos trains the reputation
engine using the information gathered in our knowledge base, namely the set of known
malicious and legitimate domain names and their related IP addresses. Afterwards,
during the on-line mode, for each new domain d, Notos queries the trained reputation
engine to compute a reputation score for d (see Figure 5). We now explain the details
about the statistical features we measure, and how the reputation engine uses them
during the o"-line and on-line modes to compute a domain names’ reputation score.
3.2.2 Statistical Features























Figure 4: (a) Network profile modeling in Notos. (b) Network and zone based
clustering in Notos.
3.2.2.1 Network-based Features
Given a domain d we extract a number of statistical features from the set RHIPs
of d, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1. Our network-based features describe how the
operators who own d and the IPs that domain d points to, allocate their network
resources. Internet miscreants often abuse DNS to operate their malicious networks
with a high level of agility. Namely, the domain names and IPs that are used for
malicious purposes are often short-lived and are characterized by a high churn rate.
This agility avoids simple blacklisting or removals by law enforcement. In order to
measure the level of agility of a domain name d, we extract eighteen statistical features
that describe d’s network profile. Our network features fall into the following three
groups:
• BGP features. This subset consists of a total of nine features. We measure the
number of distinct BGP prefixes related to BGP (A(d)), the number of countries
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in which these BGP prefixes reside, and the number of organizations that own
these BGP prefixes; the number of distinct IP addresses in the sets A3LD(d) and
A2LD(d); the number of distinct BGP prefixes related to BGP (A3LD(d)) and
BGP (A2LD(d)), and the number of countries in which these two sets of prefixes
reside.
• AS features. This subset consists of three features, namely the number of dis-
tinct autonomous systems related to AS(A(d)), AS(A3LD(d)), andAS(A2LD(d)).
• Registration features. This subset consists of six features. We measure the num-
ber of distinct registrars associated with the IPs in the A(d) set; the diversity in
the registration dates related to the IPs in A(d); the number of distinct regis-
trars associated with the IPs in the A3LD(d) and A2LD(d) sets; and the diversity
in the registration dates for the IPs in A3LD(d) and A2LD(d).
While most legitimate, professionally run Internet services have a very stable net-
work profile, which is reflected into low values of the network features described above,
the profiles of malicious networks (e.g., fast-flux networks) usually change relatively
frequently, thus causing their network features to be assigned higher values. We ex-
pect a domain name d from a legitimate zone to exhibit a small values in its AS
features, mainly because the IPs in the RHIPs should belong to the same organiza-
tion or a small number of di"erent organizations. On the other hand, if a domain
name d participates in malicious activities (i.e., botnet activities, flux networks), then
it could reside in a large number of di"erent networks. The list of IPs in the RHIPs
that correspond to the malicious domain name will produce AS features with higher
values. In the same sense, we measure that homogeneity of the registration informa-
tion for benign domains. Legitimate domains are typically linked to address space
owned by organizations that acquire and announce network blocks in some order.
This means that the registration-feature values for a legitimate domain name d that
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owned by the same organizations will produce a list of IPs in the RHIPs that will
have small registration feature values. If this set of IPs exhibits high registration
feature values, it means that they very likely reside in di"erent registrars and were
registered on di"erent dates. Such registration-feature properties are typically linked
with fraudulent domains.
3.2.2.2 Zone-based Features
The network-based features measure a number of characteristics of IP addresses his-
torically related to a given domain name d. On the other hand, the zone-based
features measure the characteristics of domain names historically associated with
d. The intuition behind the zone-based features is that while legitimate Internet
services may be associated with many di"erent domain names, these domain names
usually have strong similarities. For example, google.com, googlesyndication.com,
googlewave.com, etc., are all related to Internet services provided by Google, and
contain the string “google” in their name. On the other hand, malicious domain
names related to the same spam campaign, for example, often look randomly gener-
ated and share few common characteristics. Therefore, our zone-based features aim
to measure the level of diversity across the domain names in the RHDNs set. Given a
domain name d, we extract seventeen statistical features that describe the properties
of the set RHDNs of domain names related to d. We divide these seventeen features
into two groups:
• String features. This group consists of twelve features. We measure the number
of distinct domain names in RHDNs, and the average and standard deviation
of their length; the mean, median, and standard deviation of the occurrence
frequency of each single character in the domain name strings in RHDNs; the
mean, median and standard deviation of the distribution of 2-grams (i.e., pairs
of characters); the mean, median and standard deviation of the distribution of
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3-grams.
• TLD features. This group consists of five features. For each domain di in
the RHDNs set, we extract its top-level domain TLD(di) and we count the
number of distinct TLD strings that we obtain; we measure the ratio between
the number of domains di whose TLD(di)=“.com” and the total number of
TLD di"erent from “.com”; also, we measure the mean, median, and standard
deviation of the occurrence frequency of the TLD strings.
It is worth noting that whenever we measure the mean, median and standard
deviation of a certain property, we do so in order to summarize the shape of its
distribution. For example, by measuring the mean, median, and standard deviation
of the occurrence frequency of each character in a set of domain name strings, we
summarize what the distribution of the character frequency looks like.
3.2.2.3 Evidence-based Features
We use the evidence-based features to determine to what extent a given domain d is
associated with other known malicious domain names or IP addresses. As mentioned
above, Notos collects a knowledge base of known suspicious, malicious, and legitimate
domain names and IPs from public sources. For example, we collect malware-related
domain names by executing large numbers of malware samples in a controlled envi-
ronment. Also, we check IP addresses against a number of public IP blacklists. We
elaborate on how we build Notos’ knowledge base in Section 3.3. Given a domain
name d, we measure six statistical features using the information in the knowledge
base. We divide these features into two groups:
• Honeypot features. We measure three features, namely the number of dis-
tinct malware samples that, when executed, try to contact d or any IP ad-
dress in A(d); the number of malware samples that contact any IP address
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in BGP (A(d)); and the number of samples that contact any IP address in
AS(A(d)).
• Blacklist features. We measure three features, namely the number of IP ad-
dresses in A(d) that are listed in public IP blacklists; the number of IPs in
BGP (A(d)) that are listed in IP blacklists; and the number of IPs in AS(A(d))
that are listed in IP blacklists.
Notos uses the blacklist features from the evidence vector so it can identify the re-
use of known malicious network resources like IPs, BGP prefixes or even ASs. Domain
names are significantly cheaper than IPv4 addresses; so malicious users tend to reuse
address space with new domain names. We should note that the evidence-based
features represent only part of the information we used to compute the reputation
scores. The fact that a domain name was queried by malware does not automatically
mean that the domain will receive a low reputation score.
3.2.3 Reputation Engine
Notos’ reputation engine is responsible for deciding whether a domain name d has
characteristics that are similar to either legitimate or malicious domain names. In
order to achieve this goal, we first need to train the engine to recognize whether d
belongs (or is “close”) to a known class of domains. This training can be repeated
periodically, in an o"-line fashion, using historical information collected in Notos’
knowledge base (see Section 3.3). Once the engine has been trained, it can be used in
on-line mode to assign a reputation score to each new domain name d.
In this section, we first explain how the reputation engine is trained, and then we


































Figure 5: Notos’ modes. The Off-Line Mode is necessary for training Notos. In the
On-Line Mode Notos can dynamically assign reputation score to new RRs observed
by our system.
3.2.3.1 O!-Line Training Mode
During o"-line training (Figure 5), the reputation engine builds three di"erent mod-
ules. We briefly introduce each module and then elaborate on the details.
• Network Profiles Model: a model of how well known networks behave. For
example, we model the network characteristics of popular content delivery net-
works (e.g., Akamai, Amazon CloudFront), and large popular websites (e.g.,
google.com, yahoo.com). During the on-line mode, we compare each new do-
main name d to these models of well-known network profiles, and use this in-
formation to compute the final reputation score, as explained below.
• Domain Name Clusters: we group domain names into clusters sharing similar
characteristics. We create these clusters of domains to identify groups of do-
mains that contain mostly malicious domains, and groups that contain mostly
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legitimate domains. In the on-line mode, given a new domain d, if d (more
precisely, d’s projection into a statistical feature space) falls within (or close
to) a cluster of domains containing mostly malicious domains, for example, this
gives us a hint that d should be assigned a low reputation score.
• Reputation Function: for each domain name di, i = 1..n, in Notos’ knowledge
base, we test it against the trained network profiles model and domain name
clusters. Let NM(di) and DC(di) be the output of the Network Profiles (NP)
module and the Domain Clusters (DC) module, respectively. The reputation
function takes in input NM(di), DC(di), and information about whether di and
its resolved IPs A(di) are known to be legitimate, suspicious, or malicious (i.e.,
if they appeared in a domain name or IP blacklist), and builds a model that
can assign a reputation score between zero and one to d. A reputation score
close to zero signifies that d is a malicious domain name while a score close to
one signifies that d is benign.
We now describe each module in detail.
3.2.3.2 Modeling Network Profiles
During the o"-line training mode, the reputation engine builds a model of well-known
network behaviors. An overview of the network profile modeling module can be seen
in Figure 4(a). In practice we select five sets of domain names that share similar
characteristics, and learn their network profiles. For example, we identify a set of
domain names related to very popular websites (e.g., google.com, yahoo.com, ama-
zon.com) and for each of the related domain names we extract their network features,
as explained in Section 3.2.2.1. We then use the extracted feature vectors to train a
statistical classifier that will be able to recognize whether a new domain name d has
network characteristics similar to the popular websites we modeled.
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In our current implementation of Notos we model the following classes of domain
names:
• Popular Domains. This class consists of a large set of domain names un-
der the following DNS zones: google.com, yahoo.com, amazon.com, ebay.com,
msn.com, live.com, myspace.com, and facebook.com.
• Common Domains. This class of domains includes domain names under the
top one hundred zones, according to alexa.com. We exclude from this group
all the domain names already included in the Popular Domains class (which we
model separately).
• Akamai Domains. Akamai is a large content delivery network (CDN), and the
domain names related to this CDN have very peculiar network characteristics.
To model the network profile of Akamai’s domain names, we collect a set of
domains under the following zones: akafms.net, akamai.net, akamaiedge.net,
akamai.com, akadns.net, and akamai.com.
• CDN Domains. In this class we include domain names related to CDNs
other than Akamai. For example, we collect domain names under the follow-
ing zones: panthercdn.com, llnwd.net, cloudfront.net, nyud.net, nyucd.net and
redcondor.net. We chose not to aggregate these CDN domains and Akamai’s
domains in one class, since we observed that Akamai’s domains have a very
unique network profile, as we discuss in Section 3.3. Therefore, learning two
separate models for the classes of Akamai Domains and CDN Domains allows
us to achieve better classification accuracy during the on-line mode, compared
to learning only one model for both classes (see Section 3.2.3.5).
• Dynamic DNS Domains. This class includes a large set of domain names
registered under two of the largest dynamic DNS providers, namely No-IP
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(no-ip.com) and DynDNS (dyndns.com).
For each class of domains, we train a statistical classifier to distinguish between
one of the classes and all the others. Therefore, we train five di"erent classifiers.
For example, we train a classifier that can distinguish between the class of Popular
Domains and all other classes of domains. That is, given a new domain name d,
this classifier is able to recognize whether d’s network profile looks like the profile
of a well-known popular domain or not. Following the same logic, we can recognize
network profiles for the other classes of domains.
3.2.3.3 Building Domain Name Clusters
In this phase, the reputation engine takes the domain names collected in our pDNS
database during a training period, and builds clusters of domains that share simi-
lar network and zone based features. The overview of this module can be seen in
Figure 4(b). We perform clustering in two steps. In the first step we only use the
network-based features to create coarse-grained clusters. Then, in the second step, we
split each coarse-grained cluster into finer clusters using only the zone-based features,
as shown in Figure 6.
Network-based Clustering The objective of network-based clustering is to group
domains that share similar levels of agility. This creates separate clusters of domains
with “stable” network characteristics and “non-stable” networks (like CDNs and ma-
licious flux networks).
Zone-based Clustering After clustering the domain names according to their
network-based features, we further split the network-based clusters of domain names
into finer groups. In this step, we group domain names that are in the same network-














Figure 6: Network & zone based clustering process in Notos, in the case of a Akamai
[A] and a malicious [B] domain name.
the zone-based clustering works, consider the following examples of zone-based clus-
ters:
Cluster 1:
..., 72.247.176.81 e55.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.94 e68.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.146 e120.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.65
e39.na.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.242 e216.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.33 e7.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.156 e130.g.akamaiedge.net,
72.247.176.208 e182.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.198 e172.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.217 e191.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.200
e174.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.99 e73.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.103 e77.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.59 e33.c.akamaiedge.net,
72.247.176.68 e42.gb.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.237 e211.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.71 e45.g.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.239
e213.na.akamaiedge.net, 72.247.176.120 e94.g.akamaiedge.net, ...
Cluster 2:
..., 90.156.145.198 spzr.in, 90.156.145.198 vwui.in, 90.156.145.198 x9e.ru, 90.156.145.50 v2802.vps.masterhost.ru, 90.156.145.167
www.inshaker.ru, 90.156.145.198 x7l.ru, 90.156.145.198 c3q.at, 90.156.145.198 ltkq.in, 90.156.145.198 x7d.ru, 90.156.145.198 zdlz.in,
90.156.145.159 www.designcollector.ru, 90.156.145.198 x7o.ru, 90.156.145.198 q5c.ru, 90.156.145.159 designtwitters.com, 90.156.145.198
u5d.ru, 90.156.145.198 x9d.ru, 90.156.145.198 xb8.ru, 90.156.145.198 xg8.ru, 90.156.145.198 x8m.ru, 90.156.145.198 shopfilmworld.cn,
90.156.145.198 bigappletopworld.cn, 90.156.145.198 uppd.in, ...
Each element of the cluster is a domain name - IP address pair. These two groups
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of domains belonged to the same network cluster, but were separated into two dif-
ferent clusters by the zone-based clustering phase. Cluster 1 contains domain names
belonging to Akamai’s CDN, while the domains in Cluster 2 are all related to malicious
websites that distribute malicious software. The two clusters of domains share sim-
ilar network characteristics, but have significantly di"erent zone-based features. For
example, consider domain names d1=“e55.g.akamaiedge.net” from the first cluster,
and d2=“spzr.in” from the second cluster. The reason why d1 and d2 were clustered
in the same network-based cluster is because the set of RHIPs (see Section 3.2.1) for
d1 and d2 have similar characteristics. In particular, the network agility properties of
d2 make it look like if it was part of a large CDN. However, when we consider the set
of RHDNs for d1 and d2, we can notice that the zone-based features of d1 are much
more “stable” than the zone-based features of d2. In other words, while the RHDNs
of d1 share strong domain name similarities (e.g., they all share the substring “aka-
mai”) and have low variance of the string features (see Section 3.2.2.2), the strong
zone agility properties of d2 a"ect the zone-based features measured on d2’s RHDNs
and make d2 look very di"erent from d1.
One of the main advantages of Notos is the reliable assignment of low reputation
scores to domain names participating in “agile” malicious campaigns. Less agile ma-
licious campaigns, e.g., Fake anti-virus campaigns may use domain names structured
to resemble CDN related domains. Such strategies would not be beneficial for the
Fake anti-virus campaign, since domains like virus-scan1.com, virus-scan2.com,
etc., can be trivially blocked by using simple regular expressions [62]. In other words,
the attackers need to introduce more “agility” at both the network and domain name
level in order to avoid simple domain name blacklisting. Notos would only require a
few labeled domain names belonging to the malicious campaign for training purposes,
and the reputation engine would then generalize to assign a low reputation score to




















Figure 7: The output from the network profiling module, the domain clustering mod-
ule and the evidence vector will assist the reputation function to assign the reputation
score to the domain d.
campaign.
3.2.3.4 Building the Reputation Function
Once we build a model of well-known network profiles (see Section 3.2.3.2) and the
domain clusters (see Section 3.2.3.3), we can build the reputation function. The rep-
utation function will assign a reputation score in the interval [0, 1] to domain names,
with 0 meaning low reputation (i.e., likely malicious) and 1 meaning high reputation
(i.e., likely legitimate). We implement our reputation function as a statistical clas-
sifier. In order to train the reputation function, we consider all the domain names
di, i = 1, .., n in Notos’ knowledge base, and we feed each domain di to the network
profiles module and to the domain clusters module to compute two output vectors
NM(di) and DC(di), respectively. We explain the details of how NM(di) and DC(di)
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are computed later in Section 3.2.3.5. For now it su!cient to consider NM(di) and
DC(di) as two feature vectors. For each di we also compute an evidence features
vector EV (di), as described in Section 3.2.2.3. Let v(di) be a feature vector that
combines the NM(di), DC(di), and EV (di) feature vectors. We train the reputation
function using the labeled dataset L = {(v(di), yi)}i=1..n, where yi = 0 if di is a known
malicious domain name, otherwise yi = 1.
3.2.3.5 On-Line Mode
After training is complete; the reputation engine can be used in on-line mode (Fig-
ure 5) to assign a reputation score to new domain names. For example, given an input
domain name d, the reputation engine computes a score S " [0, 1]. Values of S close
to zero mean that d appears to be related to malicious activities and therefore has a
low reputation. On the other hand, values of S close to one signify that d appears to
be associated with benign Internet services, and therefore has a high reputation. The
reputation score is computed as follows. First, d is fed into the network profiles mod-
ule, which consists of five statistical classifiers, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.2. The
output of the network profiles module is a vector NM(d) = {c1, c2, ..., c5}, where c1 is
the output of the first classifier, and can be viewed as the probability that d belongs
to the class of Popular Domains, c2 is the probability that d belongs to the class of
Common Domains, etc. At the same time, d is fed into the domain clusters module,
which computes a vector DC(d) = {l1, l2, ..., l5}. The elements li of this vector are
computed as follows. Given d, we first extract its network-based features and identify
the closest network-based cluster to d, among the network-based clusters computed
by the domain clusters module during the o"-line mode (see Section 3.2.3.3). Then,
we extract the zone-based statistical features and identify the zone-based cluster clos-
est to d. Let this closest domain cluster be Cd. At this point, we consider all the
zone-based feature vectors vj " Cd, and we select the subset of vectors Vd & Cd for
39
which the two following conditions are verified: i) dist(zd, vj) < R, where zd is the
zone-based feature vector for d, and R is a predefined radius; ii) vj " KNN(zd),
where KNN(zd) is the set of k nearest-neighbors of zd.
The feature vectors in Vd are related to domain names extracted from Notos’
knowledge base. Therefore, we can assign a label to each vector vi " Vd, according
to the nature of the domain name d from which vi was computed. The domains
in Notos’ knowledge base belong to di"erent classes. In particular, we distinguish
between eight di"erent classes of domains, namely Popular Domains, Common Do-
mains, Akamai, CDN, and Dynamic DNS, which have the same meaning as explained
in Section 3.2.3.2, and Spam Domains, Flux Domains, and Malware Domains.
In order to compute the output vector DC(d), we compute the following five
statistical features: the majority class label L (e.g., L may be equal to Malware
Domain), i.e., the label that appears the most among the vectors vi " Vd; the standard
deviation of label frequencies, i.e., given the occurrence frequency of each label among
the vectors vi " Vd we compute their standard deviation; given the subset V
(L)
d & Vd
of vectors in Vd that are associated with label L, we compute the mean, median




3.2.3.6 Assigning Reputation Scores
Given a domain d, once we compute the vectors NM(d) and DC(di) as explained
above, we also compute the evidence vector EV (d) as explained in Section 3.2.2.3.
At this point, we concatenate these three feature vectors into a sixteen dimensional
feature vector v(d), and we feed v(d) in input to our trained reputation function (see
Section 3.2.3.4). The reputation function computes a score S = 1' f(d), where f(d)
can be interpreted as the probability that d is a malicious domain name. S varies in
























































(c) Akamai Class Growth













(d) CDN Class Growth














(e) Pop Class Growth













(f) Dyn. DNS Class Growth












(g) Common Class Growth










 0.01  0.1  1
(h) CDF Of RR Growth 






Figure 8: Various RRs growth trends observed in the pDNS DB over a period of 68
days
3.3 Data Collection
This section summarizes observations from passive DNS measurements, and how pro-
fessional, legitimate DNS services are distinguished from malicious services. These
observations provided the ground truth for our dynamic domain name reputation
system. We also provide an intuitive example to illustrate these properties, using a
few major Internet zones like Akamai and Google.
3.3.1 Data Collection
The basic building block for our dynamic reputation rating system is the historical
or “passive” information from successful A-type DNS resolutions. We use the DNS
tra!c from two ISP-based sensors, one located on the US east coast (Atlanta) and
one located on the US west coast (San Jose). Additionally we use the aggregated
DNS tra!c from the di"erent networks covered by SIE [17]. In total, our database
collected 27,377,461 unique resolutions from all these sources over a period of 68 days,
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from 19th of July 2009 to 24th September 2009.
Simple measurements performed on this large data set demonstrate a few impor-
tant properties leveraged by our selected features. After just a few days the rate of
new, unique pDNS entries leveled o". The graph in Figure 8(b) shows only about
100,000 to 150,000 new domains/day (with a brief outage issue on the 53rd day),
despite very large numbers of RRs arriving each day (shown in Figure 8(a)). This
suggests that most RRs are duplicates, and approximately after the first few days,
94.7% – on average – from the unique RRs observed in daily base at the sensor
level are already recorded by the passive DNS database. Therefore, even a relatively
small pDNS database may be used to deploy Notos. In Section 3.5, we measure the
sensitivity of our system to tra!c collected from smaller networks.
The remaining plots in Figure 8 show the daily growth of our passive DNS
database, from the point of view of five di"erent zone classes. Figure 8(c) and (d) show
the growth rate associated with CDN networks (Akamai, and all other CDNs). The
number of unique IP addresses stays nearly constant with the number of unique do-
mains (meaning that each new RR is a new IP address and a new child domain of the
CDN). In a few weeks, most of the IP addresses became known—suggesting that one
can fully map CDNs in a modest training set. This is because CDNs, although large,
always have a fixed number of IP addresses used for hosting their high-availability
services. Intuitively, we believe this would not be the case with malicious CDNs (e.g.,
flux networks), which use randomly spreading infections to continually recruit new
IP addresses.
The ratio of new IP addresses to domains diverges in Figure 8(e), a plot of the
rate of newly discovered RRs for popular websites (e.g., Google, Facebook). Facebook
notably uses unique child domains for their Web-based chat client, and other top
Internet sites use similar strategies (encoding information in the domain, instead
of the URI), which explains the growth in domains shown in Figure 8(e). These
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popular sites use a very small number of IP addresses, however, and after a few weeks
of training our pDNS database identified all of them. Since these popular domains
make up a large portion of tra!c in any trace, our intuition is that simple whitelisting
would significantly reduce the workload of a classifier.
Figure 8(f) shows the rate of pDNS growth for zones in Dynamic DNS providers.
These services, sometimes used by botmasters, demonstrate a nearly matched ratio
of new IP addresses to new domains. The data excludes non-routable answers (e.g.,
dynamic DNS domains pointing to 127.0.0.1), since this contains no unique network
information. Intuitively, one can think of dynamic DNS as a nearly complete bijection
of domains to IP addresses. Figure 8(g) shows the growth of RRs for the alexa.com
top 100 domains. Unlike dynamic DNS domains, these point to a small set of unique
addresses, and most can be identified in a few weeks’ worth of training.
A comparison of all the zone classes appears in Figure 8(h), which shows the
cumulative distribution of the unique RRs detailed in Figure 8(c) through 8(g). The
di"erent rates of change illustrate how each zone class has a distinct pattern of RR
use: some have a small IP address space and highly variable domain names; some
pair nearly every new domain with a new IP address. Learning approximately 90%
of all the unique RRs in each zone class, however, only requires (at most) tens of
thousands of distinct RRs. The intuition from this plot is that, despite the very large
data set we used in our study, Notos could potentially work with data observed from
much smaller networks.
3.3.2 Building The Ground Truth
To establish ground truth, we use two di"erent labeling processes. First, we assigned
labels to RRs at the time of their discovery. This provided an initial static label
for many domains. Blacklists, of course, are never complete and always dynamic.
So our second labeling process took place during evaluation, and monitored several
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well-known domain blacklists and whitelists.
The data we used for labeling came from several sources. Our primary source of
blacklisting came from services such asmalwaredomainlist 1 andmalwaredomains 2. In
order to label IP addresses in our pDNS database we also used the Sender Policy Block
(SBL) list from Spamhaus [67]. Such IP addresses are either known to send spam
or distribute malware. We also collected domain name and IP address blacklisting
information from the Zeus tracker [108]. All this blacklisting information was gathered
before the first day of August 2009 (during all the 15 days in which we collected passive
DNS data). Since blacklists traditionally lag behind the active threat, we continued
to collect all new data until the end of our experiments.
Our limited whitelisting was derived from the top 500-alexa.com domain names,
as of the 1st of August 2009. We reasoned that, although some malicious domains
become popular, they do not stay popular (because of remediation), and never break
into the top tier of domain rankings. Likewise, we used a list of the 18 most common
2LDs from various CDNs, which composed the main corpus of our CDN labeled RRs.
Finally a list of 464 dynamic DNS second level domains allowed us to identify and label
domain name and IP addresses coming from zones under dynamic DNS providers. We
label our evaluation (or testing) data-set by aggregating updated blacklist information
for new malicious domain names and IP addresses from the same lists.
To compute the honeypot features (presented in Section 3.2.2.3) we need a mal-
ware analysis infrastructure that can process as many “new” malware samples as
possible. Our honeypot infrastructure is similar to “Ether” [22] and is capable of
processing malware samples in a queue. Every malware sample was analyzed in a
controlled environment for a time period of five minutes. This process was repeated




Table 1: Network-based features (NF) description
NF1 The freq. count of unique ASs in RHIPSd
NF2 The freq. count of unique CIDRs in RHIPSd
NF3 The freq. count of unique CCs in RHIPSd
NF4 The freq. count of unique registrars in RHIPSd
NF5 The freq. count of unique registration dates in RHIPSd
NF6 The freq. count of unique owners in RHIPSd
NF7 The freq. count of unique IPs in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF8 The freq. count of unique IPs in the RHIPS3LD(d)
NF9 The freq. count of unique CIDRs in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF10 The freq. count of unique CIDRs in the RHIPS3LD(d)
NF11 The freq. count of unique ASs in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF12 The freq. count of unique ASs in the RHIPS3LD(d)
NF13 The freq. count of unique owners in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF14 The freq. count of unique owners in the RHIPS3LD(d)
NF15 The freq. count of unique CCs in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF16 The freq. count of unique CCs in the RHIPS3LD(d)
NF17 The freq. count of unique registration dates in the RHIPS2LD(d)
NF18 The freq. count of unique registration dates in the RHIPS3LD(d)
of successful DNS resolutions (domain names and IP addresses) that each malware
looked up. We chose to execute malware and collect DNS evidence through the same
period of time in which we aggregate the passive DNS database. Our virtual ma-
chines are equipped with five popular commercial anti-virus engines. If one of the
engines identifies an executable as malicious, we capture all domain names and the
corresponding IP addresses mappings that the malware used during execution. Af-
ter excluding all domain names that belong to the top 500 most popular alexa.com
zones, we assemble the main corpus of our “honeypot data”. We automated the
crawling and collection of black list information and honeypot execution.
The reader should note that we chose to label our data in as transparent a way
as possible. We used public blacklisting information to label our training dataset
before we build our models and train the reputation function. Then we assigned the
reputation scores and validated the results again using the same publicly available
blacklist sources. It is safe to assume that private IP and DNS blacklist will contain
significantly more complete information with lower FP rates than the public blacklists.
By using such a type of private blacklist the accuracy of Notos’ reputation function
should improve significantly.
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3.4 Statistical Feature Analysis
Next we provide an in-depth analysis of all statistical features used in Notos. The first
step towards evaluating the importance of each feature used by Notos is to compute
the mutual information matrix [25] for each di"erent statistical vector (Section 3.2.1,
Figure 3 Network, Zone and Reputation Vectors). Each matrix measures the mutual
dependence of pairs of statistical features in the vector.
The 18-dimensional network vector is used during the clustering and classification
process. Detailed description of the statistical features we used can be found in
Table 1. As a quick reminder, with this vector we try to capture a number of di"erent
network properties for each RR and its e"ective 2LD and 3LD (if available). We need
to capture these characteristics by the 18 statistical features selected in the network-
based vector. The Table 2 and the upper left heat-plot from Figure 9 we can see
that almost all selected features in our network vector are strongly independent.
One of the most interesting observation we can make from the mutual information
matrix is that the features computed based on IP-based properties (features 1 to 6)
are strongly independent from the features that have been computed based on the
CIDR and AS information (features 7-18). Also there is some level of dependence
between features computed on CIDR and AS information. This implies that we could
reduce the number of features computed based on CIDR and AS information without
significantly a"ecting the discriminatory ability of the network-based features.
With the 17-dimensional zone based vector we try to capture characteristics about
the zones that have been historically hosted in an IP address. Several characteristics
around the observed zones will help us create a profile about the address space uti-
lization with respect to the zones hosted in that space (i.e., the number of distinct
2LDs and 3LDs historically can be associated with an IP). Detailed description of


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Zone-based features (ZF) description
ZF1 The average domain length in RHDNS
ZF2 The standard deviation of the domain length in RHDNS
ZF3 The number of unique TLDs in the RHDNS
ZF4 The number of unique characters in the 2LDs in the RHDNS
ZF5 The median of the unique character freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF6 The average of the unique character freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF7 The standard deviation of the unique character freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF8 The median of the unique 2-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF9 The average of the unique 2-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF10 The standard deviation of the unique 2-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF11 The ratio of non-COM TLDs over all TLDs in the RHDNS
ZF12 The median of the unique 3-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF13 The average of the unique 3-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF14 The standard deviation of the unique 3-grams freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF15 The median of the unique TLDs freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF16 The median of the unique TLDs freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
ZF17 The standard deviation of the unique TLDs freq. of the domains in the RHDNS
In the Table 3 and the second upper right heat-plot from Figure 9 we observe
the mutual information between features in the zone based vectors. We can see that
the set of features, 1 to 4, which have been computed based on observation from
the stricture of domain names (in the RHDN) shows strong independence from the
features, 4-15, that have been computed based on 2LD and 3LD observations. The
exceptions in these observations are feature 11 (the ratio of non-COM TLDs over all
TLDs) and feature 17 (the standard deviation of the unique TLDs frequency). From
the heat-maps in Figure 9 it is clear that the network based features shows a larger
degree of independence than the zone based features. This observation was one of
reason that motivated our decision to make the first level clustering based on network
based and not with the zone based vectors.
In Table 5 and the lower heat-plot in Figure 9 we can see the mutual information
between the features in the reputation vector. The results shows that almost all
features are independent. The only exception in this is the features (12-16) that hold











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Heat map for mutual information matrix
 computed from network vectors




































(b) Heat map for mutual information matrix
 computed from domain name vectors




































(c) Heat map for mutual information matrix
 computed from reputation vectors
















Figure 9: The mutual information from all di"erent vectors used in Notos in heat-
map projection.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental results of our evaluation. We show that
Notos can identify malicious domain names sooner than public blacklists, with a
low false positive rate (FP%) of 0.38% and high true positive rate (TP%) of 96.8%.
As a first step, we computed vectors based on the statistical features (described in
Section 3.2.2) from 250,000 unique RRs. This volume corresponds to the average
volume of new – previously unseen – RRs observed at two recursive DNS servers in
a major ISP in one day, as noted in Section 3.3, Figure 8(b). These vectors were
computed based on historic passive DNS information from the last two weeks of DNS
tra!c observed on the same two ISP recursive resolvers in Atlanta and San Jose.
3.5.1 Accuracy of Network Profile Modeling
The accuracy of the Meta-Classification system (Figure 10) in the network profile
















































TP over All Pos. vs Threshold
Figure 10: ROC curves for all network profile classes shows the Meta-Classifier’s
accuracy.
mode, Notos will receive unlabeled vectors which must be classified and correlated
with what is already present in our knowledge base. For example, if the classifier
receives a new RR and assigns to it the label Akamai with very high confidence,
that implies the RR which produced this vector will be part of a network similar
to Akamai. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is part of the actual
Akamai CDN. We will see in the next section how we can draw conclusions based
on the proximity between labeled and unlabeled RRs within the same zone-based
clusters. Furthermore, we discuss the accuracy of the Meta-Classifier when modeling
each di"erent network profile class (profile classes are described in Section 3.2.3.2).
Our Meta-Classifier consists of five di"erent classifiers, one for each di"erent class
of domains we model. We chose to use a Meta-Classification system instead of a tra-
ditional single classification approach because Meta-Classification systems typically
perform better than a single statistical classifier [13, 44]. Throughout our experi-
ments this proved to be also true. The ROC curve in Figure 10, shows that the
Meta-Classifier can accurately classify RRs for all di"erent network profile classes.
The training dataset for the Meta-Classifier is composed of sets of 2,000 vectors












































TP over All Pos. vs Threshold
ROC
Figure 11: The ROC curve from the reputation function indicating the high accuracy
of Notos.
of 10,000 vectors, 2,000 from each of the five network profile classes. The classifica-
tion results for the domains in the Akamai, CDN, dynamic DNS and Popular classes
showed that the supervised learning process in Notos is accurate, with the excep-
tion of a small number of false positives related to the Common class (3.8%). After
manually analyzing these false positives, we concluded that some level of confusion
between the vectors produced by Dynamic DNS domain names and the vectors pro-
duced by domain names in the Common class still remains. However, this minor
misclassification between network profiles does not significantly a"ect the reputation
function. This is because the zone profiles of the Common and Dynamic DNS domain
names are significantly di"erent. This di"erence in the zone profiles will drive the
network-based and zone-based clustering steps to group the RRs from Dynamic DNS
class and Common class in di"erent zone-based clusters.
Despite the fact that the network profile modeling process provides accurate re-
sults, it doesn’t mean this step can independently designate a domain as benign or
malicious. The clustering steps will assist Notos to group vectors not only based their
network profiles but also based on their zone properties. In the following section we
show how the network and zone profile clustering modules can better associate similar
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Figure 12: With the 2-step clustering step, Notos is able to cluster large trends of
DNS behavior.
vectors, due to properties of their domain name structure.
3.5.2 Network and Zone-Based Clustering Results
In the domain name clustering process (Section 3.2.3.3, Figure 4(b)) we used X-Means
clustering in series, once for the network-based clustering and again for the zone-based
clustering. In both steps we set the minimum and maximum number of clusters to one
and the total number of vectors in our dataset, respectively. We run these two steps
using di"erent numbers of zone and network vectors. Figure 13 shows that after the
first 100,000 vectors are used, the number of network and zone clusters remains fairly
stable. This means that by computing at least 100,000 network and zone vectors—
using a 15-day old passive DNS database—we can obtain a stable population of zone
and network based clusters for the monitored network. We should note that reaching
this network and cluster equilibrium does not imply that we do not expect to see any
new type of domain names in the ISP’s DNS recursive. This just denotes that based
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on the RRs present in our passive DNS database, and the daily tra!c at the ISP’s
recursive, 100,000 vectors are enough to reflect the major network profile trends in
the monitored networks.
Figure 13 indicates that a sample set of 100,000 vectors may represent the major
trends in a DNS sensor. It is hard to safely estimate the exact minimum number
of unique RRs that is su!cient to identify all major DNS trends. An answer to
this should be based upon the type, size and utilization of the monitored network.
Without data from smaller corporate networks it is di!cult for us to make a safe
assessment about the minimum number of RRs necessary for reliably training Notos.
The evaluation dataset we used consisted of 250,000 unique domain names and
IP addresses. The cluster overview is shown in Figure 12 and in the following para-
graphs we discuss some interesting observations that can be made from these network-
based and zone-based cluster assignments. As an example, network clusters 0 and 1
are predominantly composed of zones participating in fraudulent activities like spam
campaigns (yellow) and malware dropping or C&C zones (red). On the other hand,
network clusters 2 to 5 contain Akamai, dynamic DNS, and popular zones like Google,
all labeled as benign (green). We included the unlabeled vectors (blue) based on which
we evaluated the accuracy of our reputation function. We have a sample of unlabeled
vectors in almost all network and zone clusters. We will see how already labeled
vectors will assist us to characterize the unlabeled vectors in close proximity.
Before we describe two sample cases of dynamic characterization within zone-based
clusters, we need to discuss our radius R and k value selection (see Section 3.2.3.5).
In Section 3.2.3.5, we discuss how we build domain name clusters. At that point we
introduced the dynamic characterization process that gives Notos the ability to uti-
lize already labeled vectors in order to characterize a newly obtained unlabeled vector
by leveraging our prior knowledge. After looking into the distribution of Euclidean



























Number of Vectors Used
1st Level (Network Based) Clusters
2nd Level (Zone Based) Clusters
Figure 13: By using di"erent number of network and zone vectors we observe that
after the first 100,000, there is no significant variation in the absolute number of
produced clusters during the 1st and 2nd level clustering steps.
concluded that in the majority of these cases the distances were between 0 and 1000.
We tested di"erent values of the radius R and the value of k for the K-nearest neigh-
bors (KNN) algorithm. We observed that the experiments with radius values between
50 and 200 provided the most accurate reputation rating results, which we describe in
the following sections. We also observed that if k > 25 the accuracy of the reputation
function is not a"ected for all radius values between 50 and 200. Based on the results
of these pilot experiments, we decided to set k equal to 50 and the radius distance
equal to 100.
Figures 14 and 15 show the e"ect of this radius selection on two di"erent types of
clustering problems. In Figure 14, unknown RRs for akamaitech.net are clustered
with a labeled vector akamai.net. As noted in Section 3.3, CDNs such as Akamai
tended to have new domain names with each RR, but to also reuse their IP addresses.
By training with only a small set of labeled akamai.net RRs, our classifier put
the new, unknown RRs for akamaitech.net into the existing Akamai class. IP-
specific features therefore brought the new RRs close to the existing labeled class.

















Clustering akamai.net and akamaitech.net Vectors
akamai.net akamaitech.net
Figure 14: An example of characterizing the akamaitech.net unknown vectors as
benign based on the already labeled vectors (akamai.net) present in the same cluster.
visual representation), but it is clear the unknown RRs were all within a distance of
100 to the labeled set.
This result validates our assumptions from Section 3.3, where just a few weeks’
worth of labeled data was necessary for training. Thus, one does not have to ex-
haustively discover all whitelisted domains. Notos is resilient to changes in the zone
classes we selected. Services like CDNs and major web sites can add new IP addresses
or adjust domain formats, and these will be automatically associated with a known
labeled class.
The ability of Notos to associate new RRs based on limited labeled inputs is
demonstrated again in Figure 15. In this case, labeled Zeus domains (approximately
2,900 RRs from three di"erent Zeus-related BLs) were used to classify new RRs. Fig-
ure 15 plots the distance between the labeled Zeus-related RRs and new (previously
unknown) RRs that are also related Zeus botnets. As we can see from Section 3.3,
most of the new (unlabeled) Zeus RRs lay very close, and often even overlap, to known
Zeus RRs. This is a good result, because Zeus botnets are notoriously hard to track,
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Clustering The Zeus Botnet
Labeled Zeus Unlabeled Zeus
Figure 15: An example of how the Zeus botnet clusters during our experiments. All
vectors are in the same network cluster and in two di"erent zone clusters.
and malwaredomainlist.com have limited visibility into the botnet, and often pro-
duce disjoint blacklists. Notos addresses this problem, by leveraging a limited amount
of training data to correctly classify new RRs. During our evaluation set, Notos cor-
rectly detected 685 new (previously unknown) Zeus RRs.
3.5.3 Accuracy of the Reputation Function
The first thing that we address in this section is our decision to use a Decision
Tree using Logit-Boost strategy (LAD) as the reputation function. Our decision
is motivated by the time complexity, the detection results and the precision (true
positives over all positives) of the classifier. We compared the LAD classifier to several
other statistical classifiers using a typical model selection procedure [25]. LAD was
found to provide the most accurate results in the shortest training time for building
the reputation function. As we can see from the ROC curve in Figure 11, the LAD
classifier exhibits a low false positive rate (FP%) of 0.38% and true positive rate
(TP%) of 96.8%. It is was noting that these results were obtained using 10-fold
cross-validation, and the detection threshold was set to 0.5. The dataset using for
the evaluation contained 10,719 RRs related to 9,530 known bad domains. The list
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of known good domains consisted of the top 500 most popular domains according to
Alexa.
We also benchmarked the reputation function on other two datasets containing
a larger number of known good domain names. We experimented with both the
top 10,000 and top 100,000 Alexa domain names. The detection results for these
experiments are as follows. When using the top 10,000 Alexa domains, we obtained a
true positive rate of 93.6% and a false positive rate of 0.4% (again using 10-fold cross-
validation and a detection threshold equal to 0.5). As we can see, these results are
not very di"erent from the ones we obtained using only the top 500 Alexa domains.
However, when we extended our list of known good domains to include the top 100,000
Alexa domain names, we observed a significant decrease in the true positive rate and
an increase in the false positives. Specifically, we obtained a TP% of 80.6% and
a FP% of 0.6%. We believe this degradation in accuracy may be due to the fact
that the top 100,000 Alexa domains include not only professionally run domains and
network infrastructures, but also include less good domain names, such as file-sharing,
porn-related websites, etc., most of which are not run in a professional way and have
disputable reputation3.
We also wanted to evaluate how well Notos performs, compared to static blacklists.
To this end, we performed a number of experiments as follows. Given an instance
of Notos trained with data collected up to July 31, 2009, we fed Notos with 250,000
distinct RRs found in DNS tra!c we collected on August 1, 2009. We then computed
the reputation score for each of these RRs. First, we set the detection threshold to
0.5, and with this threshold we identified 54,790 RRs that had a low reputation (lower
than the threshold). These RRs where related to a total of 10,294 distinct domain
names (notice that a domain name may map to more than one IP address, and this
3A quick analysis of the top 100,000 Alexa domains reported that about 5% of the domains
appeared in the SURBL (www.surbl.org) blacklist, at a certain point in time. A more rigorous
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Figure 16: Dates in which various blacklists confirmed that the RRs were malicious
after Notos assigned low reputation to them on the 1st of August.
explains the higher number of RRs). Of these 10,294 domains, 7,984 (77.6%) appeared
in at least one of the public blacklists we used for comparison (see Section 3.3) within
60 days after August 1, and were therefore confirmed to be malicious. Figure 16(a)
reports the number and date in which RRs classified as having low reputation by
Notos appeared in the public blacklists. The remaining three plots (Figure 16(b),
(c) and (d)), report the same results organized according to the type of malicious
domains. In particular, it is worth noting that Notos is able to detect never-before-
seen domain names related to the Zeus botnet several days or even weeks before they
appeared in any of the public blacklists.
For the remaining 22.4% of the 10,294 domains we considered, we were not able to
draw a definitive conclusion. However, we believe many of those domains are involved
in some kind of more or less malicious activities. We also noticed that 7,980 or the
7,984 confirmed bad domain names were assigned a reputation score lower or equal to
0.15, and that none of the other non-confirmed suspicious domains received a score
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Table 6: Sample cases form Zeus domains detected by Notos and the corresponding
days that appeared in the public BLs. All evidence information in this table were
harvested from zeustracker.abuse.ch.














lower than this threshold. In practice, this means that an operator who would like
to use Notos as a stand-alone dynamic blacklisting system while limiting the false
positives to a negligible (or even zero) amount may fine-tune the detection threshold
and set it around 0.15.
The plots (b),(c) and (d) in Figure 16 present the number and type of malicious do-
main names we identified with Notos on the 1st of August. The plots also include the
latency between our identification and the actual date that these domains appeared in
the various public blacklists. We identified all spam and flux networks (Figure 16(b))
in our dataset within 30 days. Domain names from malicious infrastructure used for
malware dropping, rogue AV [18] and various exploits (e.g., iframes [68, 85]) showed
up in the public lists up to almost 45 days after we identified them (Figure 16(c)).
In plot (d) from Figure 16 we can see the dates that botnet domain names appeared
in the various blacklists we used. Using variants of the Zeus botnet as an example,
once we have enough domain names labeled as Zeus C&Cs in our knowledge base,
Notos can identify new previously unseen domain names as new Zeus C&Cs several
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Table 7: Anecdotal cases of malicious domain names detected by Notos and the
corresponding days that appeared in the public BLs . [1]: hosts-file.net, [2]: mal-
wareurl.com, [3] siteadvisor.com, [4] virustotal.com, [5] ddanchev.blogspot.com, [6]
malwaredomainlist.com
Domain Name IP Type Src Date
lzwn.in 94.23.198.97 MAL [1] 08-26
3b9.ru 213.251.176.169 MAL [2] 08-30
antivirprotect.com 64.40.103.249 RAV [3] 09-05
1speed.info 212.117.163.165 CWS [2] 09-05
spy-destroyer.com 67.211.161.44 CWS [4] 09-05
free-spybot.com 63.243.188.110 RAV [2] 09-05
a3l.at 89.171.115.10 MAL [2] 09-09
gidromash.cn 211.95.79.170 BOT [2] 09-13
iantivirus-pro.com 188.40.52.180 KBF [5] 09-19
ericwanhouse.cn 220.196.59.19 EXP [6] 09-22
1165651291.com 212.117.165.126 RAV [2] 10-06
days before they appear in the various public blacklists. This indicates that the accu-
racy of the reputation function remains high for the Zeus botnet since we manage to
provide enough training data using the information obtained from Zeus tracker [108].
Anecdotal cases from early detection cases using Notos can be found in Tables 6
and 7.
If we are able to provide enough ground truth for a given class of a fraudulent
activity (e.g., RBN, flux, botnets), Notos will be able to “learn” this new malicious
behavior and will be able to utilize the reputation function to rate any future RRs
that resembles that malicious behavior with the appropriate score. Our experiment
showed that if the pDNS database contains enough historic DNS data, the reputation
function will be able to assign the appropriate score to new RRs with high accuracy
and very few false positives.
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3.6 Summary
The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential protocol used by both legitimate
Internet applications and cyber attacks. For example, botnets rely on DNS to support
agile command and control infrastructures. An e"ective way to disrupt these attacks
is to place malicious domains on a “blocklist” (or “blacklist”) or to add a filtering
rule in a firewall or network intrusion detection system.
To evade such security countermeasures, attackers have used DNS agility, e.g., by
using new domains daily to evade static blacklists and firewalls. In this Chapter we
proposed Notos, a dynamic reputation system for DNS. The premise of this system is
that malicious, agile use of DNS has unique characteristics and can be distinguished
from legitimate, professionally provisioned DNS services.
Notos uses passive DNS query data and analyzes the network and zone features
of domains. It builds models of known legitimate domains and malicious domains,
and uses these models to compute a reputation score for a new domain indicative of
whether the domain is malicious or legitimate.
We have evaluated Notos in a large ISP’s network with DNS tra!c from 1.4
million users. Our results show that Notos can identify malicious domains with high
accuracy (true positive rate of 96.8%) and low false positive rate (0.38%), and can
identify these domains weeks or even months before they appear in public blacklists.
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CHAPTER IV
DETECTING MALWARE OUTBREAKS IN THE UPPER
LAYERS OF THE DNS HIERARCHY
4.1 Motivation
Over the years Internet miscreants have used the DNS to build malicious network
infrastructures. For example, botnets [2,70,84] and other types of malicious software
make use of domain names to locate their command and control (C&C) servers and
communicate with attackers, e.g., to exfiltrate stolen private information, wait for
commands to perform attacks on other victim machines, etc. In response to this
malicious use of DNS, static domain blacklists containing known malware domains
have been used by network operators to detect DNS queries originating from malware-
infected machines and block their communications with the attackers [54, 59].
Unfortunately, the e"ectiveness of static domain blacklists are increasingly limited
because there are now an overwhelming number of new domain names appearing on
the Internet every day and attackers frequently switch to di"erent domains to run
their malicious activities, thus making it di!cult to keep blacklists up-to-date.
To overcome the limitations of static domain blacklists, we need a detection system
that can dynamically detect new malware-related domains. This detection system
should:
(1) Have global visibility into DNS request and response messages related to large
DNS zones. This enables “early warning”, whereby malware domains can be
detected before the corresponding malware infections reach our local networks.
(2) Enable DNS operators to independently deploy the system and detect malware-
related domains from within their authority zones without the need for data from
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Figure 17: Overview of the levels at which Kopis, Notos, and Exposure perform
DNS monitoring.
other networks or other inter-organizational coordination. This enables practical,
low-cost, and time-e!cient detection and response.
(3) Accurately detect malware-related domains even in the absence of reputation
data for the IP address space pointed to by the domains. IP reputation data is
often di!cult to accumulate and is fragile. This issue may become particularly
important as IPv6 is deployed in the near future, due to the more expansive
address space.
Recently researchers have proposed two dynamic domain reputation systems, No-
tos [7] and Exposure [11]. Unfortunately, while the results reported in [7, 11] are
promising, neither Notos nor Exposure can meet all the requirements stated above,
as Notos and Exposure rely on passive monitoring of recursive DNS (RDNS) tra!c.
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As shown in Figure 17, they monitor the DNS queries from a (limited) number of
RDNS servers (e.g., RDNS 3 and 4), and have only partial visibility on DNS messages
related to large DNS zones. To obtain truly global visibility into DNS tra!c related
to a given DNS zone, these systems need access to a very large number of RDNS
sensors in many diverse locations. This is not easy to achieve in practice in part
due to operational costs, privacy concerns related to sharing data across organiza-
tional boundaries, and di!culties in establishing and maintaining trust relationships
between network operators located in di"erent countries, for example. For the same
reasons, Notos and Exposure have not been designed to be independently deployed
and run by single DNS operators, because they rely on data sharing among several
networks to obtain a meaningful level of visibility into DNS tra!c.
On the other hand, monitoring DNS tra!c from the upper DNS hierarchy, e.g.,
at top-level domain (TLD) server A, and authoritative name servers (AuthNSs) B and
C, o"ers visibility on all DNS messages related to domains on which A, B, and C have
authority or are a point of delegation. For example, assuming B is the AuthNS for
the example.com zone, monitoring the DNS tra!c at B provides visibility on all DNS
messages from all RDNS servers around the Internet that query a domain name under
the example.com zone.
DNS visibility from TLDs servers (i.e., server A) and authoritative DNS servers
(i.e., servers B and C) allows us to analyze global query patterns regarding the domains
in large DNS zones, thus providing a new “signal” that can be harvested to detect
malware-related domain names.
Following this intuition, in this Chapter we present a novel detection system called
Kopis, which takes advantage of the global visibility available at the upper levels of the
DNS hierarchy to detect malware-related domains. In order for Kopis to satisfy the
three requirements outlined above, it needs to deal with a number of new challenges.
Most significantly, the higher up we move in the DNS hierarchy, the stronger the
66
e"ects of DNS caching [47]. As a consequence, moving up in the hierarchy restricts
us to monitoring DNS tra!c with a coarser granularity. For example, at the TLD
level we will only be able to see a small subset of queries to domains under a certain
delegation point due to the e"ects of the DNS cache.
Kopis works as follows. It analyzes the streams of DNS queries and responses at
AuthNS or TLD servers (see Figure 17) from which are extracted statistical features
such as the diversity in the network locations of the RDNS servers that query a domain
name, the level of “popularity” of the querying RDNS servers (defined in detail in
Section 4.3), and the reputation of the IP space into which the domain name resolves.
Given a set of known legitimate and known malware-related domains as training data,
Kopis builds a statistical classification model that can then predict whether a new
domain is malware-related based on observed query resolution patterns.
Our choice of Kopis’ statistical features, which we discuss in detail in Section 4.3,
is determined by the nature of the information accessible at the upper DNS hierarchy.
As a result these features are significantly di"erent from those used by RDNS-based
systems such as Notos [7] and Exposure [11]. In particular, we were pleasantly sur-
prised to find that, while Notos and Exposure rely heavily on features based on IP
reputation, Kopis’ features enabled it to accurately detect malware-related domains
even in the absence of IP reputation information. This may become a significant
advantage in the near future because the deployment of IPv6 may severely impact
the e"ectiveness of current IP reputation systems due to the substantially larger IP
address space that would need to be monitored.
4.1.1 Contributions
To summarize, with Kopis we make the following contributions. We developed a
novel approach to detect malware-related domain names at the higher levels of the
DNS hierarchy. Our system leverages the global visibility obtained by monitoring
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DNS tra!c at the upper levels of the DNS hierarchy, and can detect malware-related
domains based on DNS resolution patterns.
In addition, Kopis enables DNS operators to independently (i.e., without the need
of data from other networks) detect malware-domains within their scope of authority,
so that action can be taken (in a timely manner) to stop the abuse.
We systematically examined real-world DNS traces from two large AuthNSs and a
country-code level TLD server. We performed a rigorous evaluation of our statistical
features and identified two new feature families that, unlike previous work, enable
Kopis to detect malware domains even when no IP reputation information is available.
We developed a proof-of-concept version of Kopis, and experimented with eight
months of real-world data. Our experimental results show that Kopis can achieve high
detection rates (e.g., 98.4%) and low false positive rates (e.g., 0.3% or 0.5%). More
significantly, Kopis was able to identify previously unknown malware domain names
several weeks before they appeared in blacklists or in security forums. In addition,
using Kopis we detected the rise of a previously unknown DDoS botnet based in
China.
4.2 A Detector for Malware Outbreaks
Kopis monitors streams of DNS queries to and responses from the upper DNS hi-
erarchy, and detects malware domain names based on the observed query/response
patterns. An overview of Kopis is shown in Figure 18.
Our system divides the monitored data streams into epochs {Ei}i=1..m (currently,
an epoch is one day long). At the end of each epoch Kopis summarizes the DNS tra!c
related to a given domain name d by computing a number of statistical features,
such as the diversity of the IP addresses associated with the RDNS servers that
queried d, the relative volume of queries from the set of querying RDNS servers,
historic information related to the IP space pointed to by d, etc. We defer a detailed
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description and motivations regarding the features we measure to Section 4.3. For
now, it su!ces to consider the feature computation module in Figure 18 as a function
F(d,Ei) = vid that maps the DNS tra!c in epoch Ei related to d into a feature vector
vid.
Kopis operates in two modes: a training mode and an operation mode. In train-
ing mode, Kopis makes use of a knowledge base KB, which consists of a set of
known malware-related and known legitimate domain names (and related resolved
IPs) for which the monitored AuthNS and TLD servers are authoritative or a point
of delegation. Kopis’ learning module takes as input the set of feature vectors
Vtrain = {vid}i=1..m, (d " KB, which summarizes the query/response behavior of
each domain in the knowledge base across m days. Each domain in KB, and in turn
each feature vector in Vtrain, is associated with a label, namely legitimate or malware.
We can therefore use supervised learning techniques [12] to learn a statistical classi-
fication model S of DNS query patterns related to legitimate and malware domains
as seen from the upper DNS hierarchy.
In operation mode, Kopis monitors the streams of DNS tra!c and, at the end of
each epoch Ej, maps each domain d! /" KB (i.e., all unknown domains) extracted
from the query/response streams into a feature vector vjd! . At this point, given a do-
main d! the statistical classifier S (see Figure 18) assigns a label ld!,j and a confidence
score c(ld!,j), which express whether the query/response patterns observed for d! dur-
ing epoch Ej resemble either known legitimate or malware behavior, and with what
probability. In order to make a final decision about d!, Kopis first gathers a series of
labels and confidence scores S(vjd!) = {ld!,j, c(ld!,j)}, j = t, .., (t+m) for m consecu-
tive epochs, where t refers to a given starting epoch Et. Finally, Kopis computes the
average confidence scores CM = avgj{c(ld!,j)} for the malware labels assigned to d!















Figure 18: A high-level overview of Kopis.
4.3 Statistical Features
In this section we describe the statistical features that Kopis extracts from the mon-
itored DNS tra!c. In addition, we will evaluate the merit of each statistical feature
family.
4.3.1 Statistical Feature Families
For each DNS query qj regarding a domain name d and the related DNS response
rj, we first translate it into a tuple Qj(d) = (Tj, Rj , d, IPsj), where Tj identifies
the epoch in which the query/response was observed, Rj is the IP address of the
machine that initiated the query qj, d is the queried domain, and IPsj is the set of
resolved IP addresses as reported in the response rj. It is worth noting that since we
are monitoring DNS queries and responses from the upper DNS hierarchy, in some
cases the response may be delegated to a name server which Kopis does not currently
monitor. This is particularly relevant to our TLD-level data feed, since most TLD
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servers are delegation-only1. In all those cases in which the response does not carry
the resolved IP addresses, we can derive the IPs set by leveraging a passive DNS
database [17], or by directly querying the delegated name server.
Given a domain name d and a series of tuples Qj(d), j = 1, ..,m, measured during
a certain epoch Et (i.e., Tj = Et, (j = 1, ..,m), Kopis extracts the following groups
of statistical features:
Requester Diversity (RD) This group of features aims to characterize if the
machines (e.g., RDNS servers) that query a given domain name are localized or are
globally distributed. In practice, given a domain d and a series of tuples {Qj(d)}j=1..m,
we first map the series of requester IP addresses {Rj}j=1..m to the BGP prefix, au-
tonomous system (AS) numbers, and country codes (CC) the IP addresses belong to.
Then, we compute the distribution of occurrence frequencies of the obtained BGP
prefixes (sometimes referred to as classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) prefixes),
the AS numbers and CCs.
For each of these three distributions we compute the mean (three features) , stan-
dard deviation (three features) and variance (three features). Also, we consider the
absolute number of distinct IP addresses (i.e., distinct values of {Rj}j=1..m), the num-
ber of distinct BGP prefixes, AS numbers and CCs (four features in total). Overall,
we obtain thirteen statistical features that summarize the diversity of the machines
that query a particular domain name, as seen from an AuthNS or TLD server.
The choice of the RD features is motivated by the observation that the distri-
bution of the machines on the Internet that query malicious domain names is on
average di"erent from the distribution of IP addresses that query legitimate domains.
Semi-popular legitimate domain names (i.e., small business or personal sites) will not
have a stable diverse population of recursive DNS servers or stubs that will try to
1Delegation-only DNS servers are e"ectively limited to containing NS resource records for sub-
domains, but no actual data beyond its own SOA and NS records.
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systematically contact them. On the other hand popular legitimate domain names
(i.e., zone cuts, authoritative name servers, news/blog forums, etc.) will demonstrate
a very consistent and very diverse pool of IP addresses looking them up on a daily
basis.
Malware-related domain names will have a diverse pool of IP addresses looking
them up in a systematic way (i.e., multiple contiguous days). These IP addresses are
very likely to have a significant network and geographical diversity simply because
with the exception of targeted attacks adversaries will not try to control or restrain
the geographical and network distribution of the machines getting compromised by
drive-by sites and other social networking techniques. Intuitively, the diversity of the
infected population will be di"erent over a given time period, in comparison to that
of benign domain names.
For example, Figure 19(a), which is derived from the dataset described in Sec-
tion 4.4.3, reports the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the AS diversity
of benign and malware-related domain names. In Figure 19(b) we can see the CDFs
from the CC diversity for both classes in our dataset. We note that in both cases the
benign domain names (in our dataset) have a bimodal distribution. They either have
low or very high diversity. On the other hand, the malware-related domain names
cover a larger spectrum of diversities based on the success of the malware distribution
mechanisms they use.
Requester Profile (RP) Not all query sources have similar characteristics. Given
a query tuple Qj(d) = (Tj, Rj , d, IPsj), the requester’s IP address Rj may represent
the RDNS server of a large ISP that queries domains on behalf of millions of clients,
the RDNS of a smaller organization (e.g., an academic network), or a single end-
user machine. We would like to distinguish between such cases, and assign a higher



































Figure 19: Distribution of AS-diversity (a) and CC-diversity (b) for malware-related
and benign domains.
would typically have a larger number of infected machines. While it is not possible
to precisely estimate the population behind an RDNS server, because of the e"ects
of caching [47], we approximate the population measure as follows. Without loss of
generality, assume we monitor the DNS query/response stream for a large AuthNS
that has authority over a set of domains D. Given an epoch Et, we consider all query
tuples {Qj(d)}, (j, d seen during Et. Let R be the set of all distinct requester IP
addresses in the query tuples. For each IP address Rk " R, we count the number ct,k
of di"erent domain names in D queried by Rk during Et. We then define the weight
associated to a requester’s IP address Rk as wt,k =
ct,k
max|R|l=1 ct,l
. In practice, we assign a
higher weight to requesters that query a large number of domains in D.
Now that we have defined the weights wt,j, given a domain name d! we measure
its RP features as follows:
• Let {Qi(d!)}i=1..h be the set of query tuples related to d! observed during an
epoch Et. Also, let R(d!) be the set of all distinct requester IP addresses in
{Qi(d!)}i=1..h. For each Rk " R(d!) we compute the count ct,k as previously
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described. Then, given the set Ct(d!) = {ct,k}k, we compute the average, the
biased and unbiased standard deviation2, and the biased and unbiased variance
of the values in Ct(d!). It is worth noting that the biased and unbiased esti-
mators of the standard deviation and variance have di"erent values when the
cardinality |Ct(d!)| is small.
• Similar to the above, for eachRk " R(d!) we compute the count ct,k. Afterwards,
we multiply each count by the weight wt"n,k to obtain the set WCt(d!) = {ct,k )
wt"n,k}k of weighted counts. It is worth noting that the weights wt"n,k are
computed based on historical data about the resolver’s IP address collected n
epochs (seven days in our experiments) before the epoch Et. We then compute
the average, the biased and unbiased standard deviation, and the biased and
unbiased variance of the values in WCt(d!).
The RD and RP features described above aim to capture the fact that malware-
related domains tend to be queried from a diverse set of requesters with a higher
weight more often than legitimate domains. An explanation for this expected dif-
ference in the requester characteristics is that malware-related domains tend to be
queried from a large number of ISP networks, which usually are assigned a high
weight. The reason is that ISP networks often o"er little or no protection against
malware-related software propagation. In addition, the population of machines in ISP
networks is usually very large, and therefore the probability that a machine in the
ISP network becomes infected by malware is very high. On the other hand, legitimate
domains are often queried from both ISP networks and smaller organization networks
(having a smaller weight), such as enterprise networks, which are usually better pro-
tected against malware and tend to query fewer malware-related domains. As shown
in Section 4.4 both set of features can successfully model benign and malware-related















Resolved-IPs Reputation (IPR) This group of features aims to describe whether,
and to what extent, the IP address space pointed to by a given domain has been his-
torically linked with known malicious activities, or known legitimate services. We
compute a total of nine features as follows. Given a domain name d and the set of
query tuples {Qj(d)}j=1..h obtained during an epoch Et, we first consider the overall
set of resolved IP addresses IPs(d, t) = *hj=1IPsj (where IPsj is an element of the
tuple Qj(d), as explained above). Let BGP(d, t) and AS(d, t) be the set of distinct
BGP prefixes and autonomous system numbers to which the IP addresses in IPs(d, t)
belong, respectively. We compute the following groups of features.
• Malware Evidence: includes the average number of known malware-related do-
main names that in the past month (with respect to the epoch Et) have pointed
to each of the IP addresses in IPs(d, t). Similarly, we compute the average
number of known malware-related domains that have pointed to each of the
BGP prefixes and AS numbers in BGP(d, t) and AS(d, t).
• SBL Evidence: much like the malware evidence features, we compute the av-
erage number of domains from the Spamhaus Block List [67] that, in the past
have pointed to each of the IP addresses, BGP prefixes, and AS numbers in
IPs(d, t), BGP(d, t), and AS(d, t), respectively.
• Whitelist Evidence: We compute the number of IP addresses in IPs(d, t) that
match IP addresses pointed to by domains in the DNSWL [23] 3 or the top
30 domains according to Alexa [5]. Similarly we compute the number of BGP
prefixes in BGP(d, t) and AS numbers in AS(d, t) that include IP addresses
pointed by domains in DNSWL or the top 30 Alexa domains.
3Domain names up to the LOW trustworthiness score, where LOW trustworthiness score follows
the definition by DNSWL [23]. More details can be found at http://www.dnswl.org/tech.
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The IPR features try to capture whether a certain domain d is related to domain
names and IP addresses that have been historically recognized as either malicious
or legitimate domains. The intuition is that if d points into IP address space that
is known to host lots of malicious activities, it is more likely that d itself is also
involved in malicious activities. On the other hand, if d points into a well known,
professionally run legitimate network, it is somewhat less likely that d is actually
involved in malicious activities.
Discussion: While none of the features used alone may allow Kopis to accurately
discriminate between malware-related and legitimate domain names, by combining
the features described above we can achieve a high detection rate with low false
positives, as shown in Section 4.4.
We would like to emphasize that the features computed by Kopis, particularly the
Requester Diversity and Requester Profile features are completely orthogonal from the
statistical features proposed in Notos [7] and Exposure [11], which are heavily based
on IP reputation information. Unlike Notos and Exposure, which leverage RDNS-
level DNS tra!c monitoring, Kopis extracts statistical features specifically chosen
to harvest the “malware DNS resolution signal” as seen from the upper DNS levels
of the DNS hierarchy, and to cope with the coarser granularity of the DNS tra!c
observed at the AuthNS and TLD level. In addition, as we show in Section 4.4 that
unlike previous work, Kopis is able to detect malware-related domains even when no
IP reputation information is available.
The Requester Diversity and Requester Profile features can operate without any
historical IP address reputation information. These two feature families can be com-
puted practically and on-the-fly at each authoritative or TLD server. The main reason
why we identify the six Resolved-IP Reputation features is to harvest part of the al-
























Figure 20: Average ranking for the statistical features based on the information gain
criterion. Note that low values of the rank signify higher information gain.
the false positives (FPs) and at the same time maintain a very high true positives
(TPs). We will elaborate more in Section 4.4 on the di"erent operational modes of
Kopis.
4.3.2 Statistical Feature Analysis
Now that we have defined how Kopis translates streams of DNS query/response into
feature vectors, an interesting question is: what is the merit of the features we de-
fined? In other words, what features are more discriminating than others? While it is
not easy to answer this question, simply because to find the correct answer we would
need to consider all combinations of features, the information gain criteria can give
us a hint on how each single feature may contribute to improving the classification
accuracy.
Assume l " {malicious, legitimate} is a random variable that represents the
possible classes for a domain name, and let Yi be a random variable that represents
the i-th feature in the feature vectors Kopis uses to classify the domains. We can
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compute the information gain as IG(Y i) = H(L)'H(L|Yi). In practice, the value
of IG(Yi) tells us how much a certain feature Yi helps in reducing the uncertainty
about the class label l. We can then rank the features according to their information
gain. Figure 20 plots the rank of each of the features Kopis uses. Notice that lower
values of the rank signify higher information gain. The features are identified by
an ID number, and grouped as reported in the text above the x axes. As we can
see, several features in the Requester Diversity group have high information gain (low
rank number in the graph). Also, some of the Requester Profiling features o"er more
information gain than some of the Resolved-IPs Reputation features.
Kopis is a data-driven system based on machine learning algorithms that gener-
ate accurate models that are not necessarily interpretable. For example the nearest
neighbor classifier gives a result without any further information about the contribu-
tion of each feature. For that reason we used a set of other state of the art machine
learning methods that rank the merit of each feature. It is possible though that two
features might have high merit while being correlated. For that reason we also use
techniques that can identify dependencies between features.
Information gain is a very widely accepted measure for ranking the merit of fea-
tures in classification. We tried three methods based on the information gain illus-
trated in Figure 20.
The gain ratio attribute evaluation method (GRAM) evaluates the worth of an






where H is the entropy, X is the class and Yi is the ith feature in our feature space.
The information gain attribute evaluation method (IGAM) evaluates the merit of
an attribute by measuring the information gain with respect to the class. In other
words IGAM is:
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IGAM(X, Yi) = H(X)'H(X|Yi),
where H,X and Yi follow the same definition as in GRAM.
The last feature evaluation method is the symmetrical uncertainty attribute eval-
uation method (SUAM) that evaluates the worth of an attribute by measuring the
symmetrical uncertainty with respect to the class. In other words SUAM is:




where H,X and Yi follow the same definition as in GRAM.
In Figure 20 we can observe the average ranking of each feature. We should
note that the ranking is made in such order so the most important feature will have
rank zero. We observe that the RDATA reputation features (1-9) do not dominate
in overall merit. We see that both the RDNS profiling features (10-17) and the
RDNS diversity features (18-30) are ranked significantly higher. This implies that our
decision of selecting the two RDNS-based feature families outside the traditional DNS
reputation features looks to be very promising towards our e"ort of discriminating
the benign and malicious domain names. The methods do not necessarily give the
same ranking for the features. For example the top three features for the GRAM and
IGAM methods are the 18,19 and 21 while for the SUAM are the 7,18 and 19. Closer
analysis of the results shows that the sets of top k features from every method might
be di"erent in no more than two positions in the overall ranking.
Finally, if we take the three sets of the top 19 features from each method we will
end up having the following 18 features in common, which we define as the minimum
set of statistical features that Kopis could operate on.
• RD feature set (12): which include the average, variance and standard de-
viation of the resolution request counts per CC, AS and CIDR in a day. Fur-
thermore, we will select the count of the RDNS servers that resolve the domain
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Figure 21: The correlation matrix between features obtained using unsupervised
PCA.
name in a day along with the diversity count of the di"erent CCs and CIDRs
that resolve each domain name in a day.
• RP feature set (4): which include the average, variance, standard deviation
and the population standard deviation of the RVF features.
• IPR feature set (2): which include the white-listed IP address count and the
number of IP addresses that historically were marked as malicious in the same
CIDR as the IP addresses mapped with the domain name .
The next problem we need to address in this section is to ensure that we do not
have any redundant features in our dataset. A simple test is the correlation coe!cient
between the features. If there is any linear dependency between two features then
the magnitude of the correlation coe!cient is one. On the other extreme if they are
independent then it is zero. In Figure 21, we can see the correlation matrix for all
features in our dataset after using principal component analysis (PCA). A closer look
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Figure 22: General observations from the datasets. Plot (i) shows the di"erence
between the raw lookup volume vs. the query tuples that Kopis uses over a period of
107 days. Plots (ii), (iii) and (iv) show the number of unique CCs, ASs and CIDRs
(in which the RDNSs resides) for each domain name that was looked up during one
day.
at the figure shows that there is strong correlation between features 5-9 (Black and
SBL features from the IPR feature family) and 10-14 (RP features).
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we report the results of our evaluation of Kopis. First, we describe
how we collected our datasets and the related ground truth. We then present results
regarding the detection accuracy of Kopis for authoritative NS- and TLD-level de-
ployments. Finally, we present a case study regarding how Kopis was able to discover
a previously unknown DDoS botnet based in China.
4.4.1 Datasets
Our datasets were composed of the DNS tra!c obtained from two major domain
name registrars between the dates of 01-01-2010 and 08-31-2010 and a country code
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top level domain (.ca) between the dates of 08-26-2010 and 10-18-2010. In the case
of the two domain name registrars we were also able to observe the answers returned
to the requester of each resolution. Therefore, it is easy for us to identify the IP
addresses for the A-type of DNS query tra!c. In the case of the TLD we obtained
data only for 52 days and had to passively reconstruct the IP addresses corresponding
to the A-type of lookups observed.
An interesting problem arises when we work with the large data volume from major
authorities and the .ca TLD servers. According to a sample monitoring period of 107
days we can see from Figure 22 (i) that the daily number of lookups to the authorities
was on average 321 million. This was a significant problem since it would be hard to
process such a volume of raw data, especially if the temporal information from these
daily observations were important for the final detection process. On the same set of
raw data we used a data reduction process that maintained only the query tuples (as
defined in Section 4.3). This reduced the daily observations, as we can observe from
Figure 22 (i), to a daily average of 12,583,723 unique query tuples. The signal that
we missed with this reduction was the absolute lookup volume of each query tuple
in the raw data. Additionally, we missed all time sensitive information regarding the
periods within a day that each query tuple was looked up. As we will see in the
following sections, this reduction does not a"ect Kopis’ ability to model the profile of
benign and malware-related domains.
Figures 22 (ii), (iii) and (iv) report the number of CIDR (i.e., BGP prefixes),
Autonomous Systems (AS), Country Code (CC), respectively, for the RDNSs (or
requesters) that looked up each domain name every day. The domains are sorted
based on counts of ASs, CCs and CIDRs corresponding to the RDNSs that look
them up (from left to right with the leftmost having the largest count). We observe
that roughly the first 100,000 domain names were the only domains that exhibit any
diversity among the requesters that looked them up. We can also observe that the
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first 10,000 domain names are those that have some significant diversity. In particular
only the first 10,000 domain names were looked up by at least five CIDRs, or five ASs
or two di"erent CCs. In other words, the remaining domains were looked up from
very few RDNSs, typically in small sets of networks and a small number of countries.
Using this observation we created statistical vectors only for domain names in the
sets of the 100,000 most diverse domains from the point of view of the RDNS’s CC,
AS and CIDR.
4.4.2 Obtaining the Ground Truth
We collected more than eight months of DNS tra!c from two DNS authorities and
the .ca TLD. All query tuples derived from these DNS authorities were stored daily
and indexed in a relational database. Due to some monitoring problems we missed
tra!c from 3 days in January, 9 days in March and 6 days in June 2010.
Some of our statistical features require us to map each observed IP address to the
related CIDR (or BGP prefix) AS number and country code (Section 4.3). To this
end, we leveraged Team CYMRU’s IP-to-ASN mapping [88].
Kopis’ knowledge base contained malware information from two malware feeds
collected since March 2009. We also collected public blacklisting information from
various publicly available services (e.g., Malwaredomains [54], Zeus tracker [108]).
Furthermore, we collected information regarding domain names residing in benign
networks from DNSWL [23] and also the address space from the top 30 Alexa [5]
domains verified using the assistance of the Dihe’s IP address index browser [21].
Overall, we were able to label 225,429 unique RRs that correspond to 28,915 unique
domain names. From those we had 1,598 domain names labeled as legitimate and
27,317 domain names labeled as malware-related.
All collected information was placed in a table with first and last seen timestamps.
This was important since we computed all IPR features for day n based only on data
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Figure 23: ROCs from datasets with di"erent sizes assembled from di"erent time
windows.
we had until day n. Finally, we should note that we labeled all the data based on
black-listing and white-listing information collected until October 31st 2010.
4.4.3 Model Selection
As described in Section 4.2, Kopis uses a machine learning algorithm to build a detec-
tor based on the statistical profiles of resolution patterns of legitimate and malware-
related domains. As with any machine-learning task, it is important to select the
appropriate model and important parameters. For Kopis, we need to identify the
minimal observation window of historic data necessary for training. The observation
window here is the number of epochs from which we assemble the training dataset.
In Figure 23, we see the detection results from four di"erent observation windows.
The ROCs in Figure 23 were computed using 10-fold cross validation. The classifier
that produced these results was a random forest [82] (RF) classifier under a two,
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Figure 24: The distribution of TPrate for combination of features and features families
in comparison with Kopis observed detection accuracy.
made using a model selection process [25], a common method used in the machine
learning community, which identified the most accurate classifier that could model
our dataset. Besides the RF, during model selection we also experimented with Naive
Bayes [45], k-nearest neighbors [4] (IBK), Support Vector Machines [15], MLP Neural
Network [25] and Random (Tree) Committee [25] (RC) classifiers. The best detection
results reported during the model selection were from the RF classifier. Specifically,
the RF classifier achieved a TPrate = 98.4% and a FPrate = 0.3% using a five day
observation window. When we increased the observation window beyond the mark of
five days we did not see a significant improvement in the detection results.
We should note that this parameter and model methodology should be used every
time Kopis is being deployed in a new AuthNS or TLD server because the characteris-
tics of the domains, and hence the resolution patterns, may vary in di"erent AuthNS
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Figure 25: The distribution of FPrate for combinations of features and features
families in comparison with Kopis observed detection accuracy.
4.4.4 Overall Detection Performance
In order to evaluate the detection performance of Kopis and in particular the validity
and strength of its statistical features and classification model, we conducted a long-
term experiment with five months of data. We used 150 di"erent datasets created over
a period of 155 days (first 15 days for bootstrap). These datasets were composed by
using a fifteen-day sliding window with a one-day step (i.e., two consecutive windows
overlap by 14 days). We then used 10-fold cross validation4 to obtain the FPrates
and TPrates from every dataset. We picked three classification algorithms, namely,
RF, RC, and IBK, which performed best in the model selection process (described in
Section 4.4.3) because we wanted to use their detection rates during the long-term
experiment.
In Figure 24 and Figure 25 we observe the distribution of the TPrates and FPrates
for the RF classifier over the entire evaluation period. The average, minimum and
4To avoid overfitting our dataset we report the evaluation results using 10-fold cross validation
that implies that 90% of dataset is used for training and 10% for testing — in each of the 10 folds.
This technique is known [41] to yield a fair estimation of classification performance over a dataset.
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maximum FPrates for the RF were 0.5% (8 domains), 0.2% (3 domains) and 1.1% (18
domains), respectively, while the average, minimum and maximum TPrates were 99.1%
(27,072 domains), 98.1% (27.071 domains) and 99.8% (27,262 domains), respectively.
The RF classifier’s FPrates were almost consistently around 0.6% or less. The TPrate
of the RF classifier, with the exception of six days, was above 96% and typically in the
range of 98%. With the IBK classifier being the exception, the RF and RC classifiers
had similar longterm detection accuracy. This experiment showed that Kopis overall
has a very high TPrate and very low FPrate against all new and previously unclassified
malware-related domains.
As described in Section 4.3, we define three main types of features. Next we show
how Kopis would operate if trained on datasets assembled by features from each fam-
ily, first separately and then combined. To derive the results from the experiments,
we used as input the 150 datasets created in the previously described longterm eval-
uation mode. Then, for each one of these 150 datasets, we isolated the features from
the RD, RP and IPR feature families into three additional types of datasets. In Fig-
ure 24 and Figure 25 we present the longterm detection rates obtained using 10-fold
cross validation of these three di"erent types of datasets. Additionally, we present
the detection results from:
• The combination of RP and RD features (RD+RP Features).
• The combination of RD, RP and the features from the IPR feature family that
describe the Autonomous System properties of the IP address that each domain
name d points at (RD+RP+IRP(AS) Features).
• The detection results from the combination of all features (All Features).
The longterm FPrates and TPrates in Figure 24 and Figure 25 respectively, we show
the detection accuracies from each di"erent feature set. One may tend to think that
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Figure 26: TPrates for di"erent observation periods using an 80/20 train/test dataset
split.
the combination of RD and RP features, mainly because there are many resources
that currently contribute to the quantification and improvement of IP reputation
(i.e., spam block lists, malware analysis, dynamic DNS reputation etc.). However,
Figure 24 and Figure 25 show that with respect to both the FPrates and TPrates, the
combination of the RD and RP sets of features performs almost equally to the IPR
features used in isolation from the remaining features. At the same time, using all
features performs much better than using each single feature subset in isolation. This
shows that the combination of the RP and RD features contribute significantly to
the overall classification accuracy and can enable the correct classification of domains
in environments where IP reputation is absent or in cases where we cannot reliably
compute IP reputation features “on-the-fly” (e.g., in some TLD-level deployments).
4.4.5 New and Previously Unclassified Domains
While the experiments described in Section 4.4.4 showed that Kopis can achieve
very good overall detection accuracy, we also wanted to evaluate the “real-world
value” of Kopis, and in particular its ability to detect new and previously unclassified
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malware domains. To this end, we conducted a set of experiments in which we trained
Kopis based on one month of labeled data from which we randomly excluded 20%
of both benign and malware-related domains (i.e., we assumed that we did not know
anything about these domain names during training). This excluded 997 benign and
4,792 malware-related unique, deduplicated domain names from the training datasets.
Then we used the next three weeks of data as an evaluation dataset, which contained
the domains excluded from the training set mentioned above, as well as all other
newly seen domain names. In other words, the classification model learned using the
training data was not provided with any knowledge whatsoever about the domains
in the evaluation dataset.
We then classified the domains in the evaluation dataset, with the assistance of a
Random Forest classifier, as we already discussed in Section 4.2.
We used a training period of 30 consecutive days and a testing period of m = 21
days immediately following the training period. The detection threshold " was set
to 0.9 to obtain a good operational trade-o" between false positives and detection
rate. Our primary reasoning behind setting the threshold " to 0.9 was to keep the
FPrates as low as possible so that an operator would only have to deal with a very
small number of FPs on a daily basis. We repeated this evaluation four times during
di"erent months within our eight months of tra!c monitoring.
In Figure 26 and Figure 27, we can see the results of these experiments. From left
to right, we can see the evaluation on 21 days of tra!c in February, March, May and
June of 2010. We trained the system based on one month of tra!c from January,
February, March and May 2010, respectively. We chose these months because we
had continuous daily observations (i.e., no data gaps) from both training and testing
datasets. As in the longterm 10-fold evaluation, we performed the experiments using
six di"erent datasets obtained using di"erent feature subsets.
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Figure 27: FPrates for di"erent observation periods using an 80/20 train/test dataset
split.
features we observed the average FPrates was 0.53% ( , two domains), while the
average TPrates was 73.62% (3,528 domain names). For the RP+RD Features and
IPR Features the average FPrates were 0.54% (, two domains) and 0.79% (, two
domains), respectively; while the average TPrates were 69.19% (3,315 domain names)
and 87.25% (4,181 domain names), respectively. The RP+RD+AS(IPR) Features, gave
average FPrates = 0.66% (or , two domain names) and average TPrates = 65.05% (or
3,117 domain names).
When we used the combination of all features we see that for the first 42 days
of evaluation (February and March of 2010) Kopis had a virtually zero FPrates and
an average TPrates = 68%. In the following 42 days of evaluation, Kopis, had better
TPrates but with some extra false positives, always below 0.5%. Investigating the
nature of the false positives, we observed that the domain names responsible are re-
lated to BitTorrent services, on-demand web-TV services and what appeared to be
on-line gaming sites. We suspect that the main reason why these domains cause false
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Figure 28: Kopis early detection results. The deltas in days between the Kopis
classification dates and the date we’ve received a corresponding malware sample for
the domain name.
positives is because the population of similar legitimate services was insu!ciently rep-
resented during training, and therefore, the RF classifier failed to learn this behavior
as being legitimate in training.
This experiment showed that Kopis — with all features used — can detect new and
previously unclassified domains with an average TPrate of 73.62% and average FPrate
of 0.53%. Although this is worse than the overall detection performance reported in
Section 4.4.4, it is actually a good result considering that Kopis has no knowledge of
the domains in the testing dataset. It implies that Kopis has good “real-world value”
thanks to its ability to detect new, previously unseen attacks is at a premium.
Figure 28 shows the di"erence in days between the time that Kopis identifies a
true positive domain as being malware-related, and the day we first obtained the
malware sample associated with the malware-related domain from our malware feed.
To perform this measurement, we used malware from a commercial malware feed with
volume between 400 MB to 2 GB of malware samples every day. Additionally, we
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used malware captured from two corporate networks. As we can see, Kopis was able
to identify domain names on the rise even before a corresponding malware sample
is accessible to the security community. This result shows that Kopis can provide the
ability to registrars and TLD operators to preemptively block or take down malware
related domains and remove botnets from the Internet before they become a large
security threat.
4.4.6 Canadian TLD
Thus far, the experiments we have reported were all using data available at AuthNSs.
A TLD server is one level above AuthNS servers in the DNS hierarchy, and as such, it
has a greater global visibility but with less granular data on DNS resolution behaviors.
In this section we report our experiments of Kopis at the TLD level.
We evaluated Kopis on query data obtained from the Canadian TLD. We used
the same evaluation method introduced in Section 4.4.5 but with di"erent training
window sizes, testing epochs and classification thresholds. Before we describe the
results, we should note that all TLD tra!c needs passive reconstruction of the query
data to identify the IPs addresses in the A-type resource records. We used a passive
DNS database composed of data from four ISP sensors and the passive DNS database
from SIE [17]. The Canadian TLD’s tra!c was harvested from SIE [17] (channel
three).
Unfortunately, due to the fact that we obtained tra!c from only 52 days (2010-
08-26 until 2010-10-18) we had to use a smaller training epoch of 14 days (instead
of one month). We evaluated Kopis using the RF classifier, 14 consecutive days as
the training epoch, 14 days following the training epoch as the evaluation epoch,
and setting the threshold " = 0.9. Two sequential training epochs had seven days
in common. The exact training epochs were 08-27 to 09-11, 09-04 to 09-18, 09-11
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Figure 29: TPrates achieved during evaluation of tra!c obtained from .ca TLD.
to 09-26, 09-19 to 10-03, 09-26 to 10-10 and 10-03 to 10-17, respectively. Without
changing the data labeling methodology, we assembled a dataset with 2,199 malware
related and 1,018 benign unique deduplicated domain names.
In Figure 29 and Figure 30, we can see the results of this experiment. As with
the experiments in Section 4.4.5, we evaluated Kopis in six modes, using as threshold
" = 0.5. We should note here that the evaluation of the RD+RP Features reflects the
evaluation mode with datasets that were composed only by the combination of RD
and RP features. Such dataset can be extracted directly from data readily available
at a TLD server (in other words, the RD+RP Features is the most “e!cient” mode
that Kopis can operate in and can be computed on the fly at a TLD server).
When we used all features we observed the average FPrates was 0.52% (, six
domain names), while the average TPrates was 94.68% (2,082 domain names). For the
RP+RD Features and IPR Features the average FPrates were 3.18% (, 33 domain
names) and 0.36% (, four domain names), respectively; while the average TPrates
were 63.63% (1,399 domain names) and 10.84% (238 domain names), respectively.
The RP+RD+AS(IPR) Features, gave the average FPrates = 1.03% (or ten domain
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names) and average TPrates = 78.95% (or 1,736 domain names).
During the RP+RD Features evaluation, we observed that the average TPrates
reached 63.63% while the average FPrates were in the range of 3.18%. These were
very promising results despite the relatively high FPrates because we can operate
Kopis using a sequential classification mode, starting with RP+RD Features followed
by All Features. Kopis in this “in-series” classification mode can achieve a good
balance of e!ciency and accuracy.
More specifically, at the first step in the sequential process, Kopis is a “coarse
filter” that operates in RP+RD Features with only the RP and RD statistical features
and threshold " = 0.5. Any domain name that passes this filter (i.e., with a “malware-
related” label) then requires additional feature computation, i.e., reconstructing the
resolved IP address records, and further classification at the next step in the sequential
process. On the other hand, domains that are dropped by this filter (i.e., with a
“legitimate” label) are no longer analyzed by Kopis. Thus, the first step filter is
essentially a data reduction tool, and the sequential classification process is a way to
delay the expensive computation until the data volume is reduced. This technique is
very important at the TLD level given the potentially huge volume of data.
In our experiments Kopis operating at the first step with RP+RD Features (and
threshold " = 0.5) yielded an average data reduction rate5 of 87.95% on the orig-
inal dataset. After this reduction, at the second step, we evaluated Kopis on the
(remaining) dataset using all features, and keeping the same threshold " = 0.5. The
average FPrates reported at this step by Kopis were zero while the average TPrates
were 94.44%. The overall FPrates and TPrates for this “in-series” mode were zero and
60.09% (1,321 domain names), respectively.
At this point we should note that the threshold " was set again with the intention
5We define the reduction rate as follows: 1' TPmalware+FPmalware
ALL
, where TPmalware is the true
positives for the malware-related class, FPmalware is the mis-classified as malware-related benign
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Figure 30: FPrates achieved during evaluation of tra!c obtained from .ca TLD.
to have the FPrates as close to 1.0% as possible but also not to sacrifice much of the
TPrate produced from the first classification process in the “in-series” mode. As we
saw previously, even when we had some FPs created by the RP+RD Features (the first
classification process in the “in-series” mode), the combination of statistical features
in the second “in-series” mode was able to prune away these FPs. An operator
may choose to lower the threshold " even more and have as an immediate e"ect, the
increase of domain names that will be forwarded to the second “in-series” classification
process, with a potential increase in the overall TPrate and FPrates. The experiments
in this section showed that by using an “in-series” classification process where di"erent
steps can use di"erent (sub)sets of features and thresholds, Kopis can achieve a good
balance of detection performance and operation e!ciency at the TLD level.
4.4.7 DDos Botnet Originated in China
As discussed in Section 4.1, Kopis was designed to have global visibility so that it
can detect domains associated with malware activities running in an uncooperative
country or networks before the attacks propagate to networks that it protects. In this
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Figure 31: Various growth trends for the DDoS botnet. Day zero is 03-20-2010.
section, we report a case study to demonstrate Kopis’s global detection capability.
Kopis was able to identify a commercial DDoS botnet in the first few weeks of its
propagation in China and well before it began propagating within other countries,
including the US. We alerted the security community, and the botnet was finally
removed from the Internet in the middle of September 2010. Next we provide some
intuition behind this discovery and why Kopis was able to detect this threat early.
This DDoS botnet was controlled through 18 domain names, all of which were
registered by the attacker under the same authority (although with di"erent 2LDs).
Kopis was deployed at the AuthNS server and was able to observe resolution requests
to these domains (even when the infected machines were initially not in the US) and
classify them as malware-related because their resolution patterns fit the profiles of
known malware domains in its knowledge base.
These domain names were linked with six IP addresses located in the following
autonomous systems: 14745 (US), two in 4837 (CN), 37943 (CN) and two in 4134
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(CN), throughout the lifetime of the botnet. We show the di"erence between the
absolute DNS lookups versus the daily volume of unique query tuples in Figure 31
(i). The average lookup volume every day was 438,471 with average de-duplicated
query tuples in the range of 3,883. Despite this significant data reduction, Kopis was
still able to track and identify this emerging threat. In Figures 31 (ii), (iii) and (iv),
we can see the daily growth of unique CIDRs, AS and CCs related to the RDNSs
that queried the domain names used in the botnet.
An interesting observation can be made from Figure 32. In this figure we can see
the daily lookup volume for the domain names of this botnet. Instantly we can see
that the first big infection happened in Chinese networks in a relatively short period
of time (in the first 2-3 days). After this initial infection, a number of machines from
several other countries were also infected but nowhere close to the volume of the
infected population in the Chinese networks. As an example we can see in Figure 32
that the first time more than 1,000 daily lookups were observed from the United
States was more than 20 days after the botnet was launched. Also, other countries
such as Poland and Thailand had the first infection 21 and 25 days after the botnet
were lunched. Furthermore, large countries such as Italy, Spain and India reached
the 100 daily lookup threshold 15 days later than the start of this botnet. Clearly,
for countries like Poland and Thailand (and even Italy, Spain and India to a large
extent) localized DNS reputation techniques could not have been able to observe a
resolution request (or a strong enough signal) for any of the domain names related to
this botnet, until the botnet had reached global scale, which was several weeks after
it was launched. Figure 33 shows the volume of samples correlated with this botnet
as they appeared in our malware feeds. We observe that the first malware sample
related to this botnet appeared two months after the botnet became active.
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Figure 32: A snapshot from the first 70 days of the botnet’s growth with respect
to the country code-based resolution attempts for the DDoS botnet’s domain names.
Day zero is 03-20-2010.
of the domain names that were part of this botnet we conducted the following ex-
periment. We trained Kopis with 30 days of data before the 5th of May 2010. Then
we computed vectors for all the domain names that were part of the botnet. We
computed one vector every day for each domain name based on the information we
had on the domain name and IP address up until that day. We classified each vec-
tor against four trained classifiers with the following set of features; All Features,
RD+RP Features, IPR Features, and RD+RP+AS(IPR) Features. We then marked
the first day that each classifier detected a domain name as malware-related, while
setting the threshold " = 0.9. By doing so we identified the earliest day that the
classifier would have detected the domain name without human forensic analysis on
the results. The detection results from this experiment can be found in Table 8.
What the results show is that only the combination of all features can detect all
the domain names until the end of August. On the other hand the IPR and the
combination of RD+RP features detected more than half of the domain names by
the middle of July, when the botnet was in its peak. We should also note that in
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Figure 33: Volume of malware samples related with the DDoS botnet as they ap-
peared in our feeds. Day zero is 05-20-2010.
the middle of July we saw the biggest volume of malware samples related to the
botnet’s domain names surfacing in the security community. Finally, we should also
note that these 18 domain names appeared in public blacklists after the take-down of
the botnet was publicly disclosed (September 2010). Obviously, this was not exactly
how we detected the botnet. After the initial identification of the 7 domain names
in the beginning of May and with some very basic forensic analysis, we managed to
quickly discover the entire corpus of the related domains.
In an e"ort to place Kopis’ early detection abilities in comparison with recursive-
based reputation systems (like Notos and Exposure) we check in the passive DNS
database at ISC when these 18 domain names first appeared. Fifteen of them never
showed up in the RDNSs that supply ISC with DNS data. The remaining three
domain appeared for the first time on the following dates: 2010-06-24 06:56:34,
2010-07-01 14:06:47 and 2010-09-08 04:32:36. This means that the first domain
99
name related with this botnet appeared three months after the botnet was created
and this would have been the earliest possible time that either Notos or Exposure
could have detected these domain names assuming they were operating on passive
DNS data from ISC — one of biggest passive DNS repositories worldwide. This
clearly shows the need of detection systems like Kopis that can operate higher in the
DNS hierarchy and provide Internet with an early global warning system for DNS.
Table 8: Number of the botnet related domain names that each feature family would
have detected up-until the specified date assuming that the system was operating
unsupervised.
Features/Dates 5/20 6/1 7/15 8/31
All 7 9 15 18
RD+RP 3 5 12 16
IPR 3 5 13 17
RD+RP+AS(IPR) 3 5 12 16
4.5 Summary
In recent years Internet miscreants have been leveraging the DNS to build malicious
network infrastructures for malware command and control. In this Chapter we pro-
posed a novel detection system called Kopis for detecting malware-related domain
names. Kopis passively monitors DNS tra!c at the upper levels of the DNS hier-
archy, and is able to accurately detect malware-related domains by analyzing global
DNS query resolution patterns.
Compared to previous DNS reputation systems such as Notos [7] and Expo-
sure [11], which rely on monitoring tra!c from local recursive DNS servers, Kopis
o"ers a new vantage point and introduces new tra!c features specifically chosen to
leverage the global visibility obtained by monitoring network tra!c at the upper DNS
hierarchy. Unlike previous work Kopis enables DNS operators to independently (i.e.,
without the need of data from other networks) detect malware domains within their
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authority, so that action can be taken to stop the abuse.
As a result, whereas previous systems can detect a malware-related domain only
when there is an infected machine within the monitored network, Kopis can detect any
domain within the monitored DNS zone. Kopis can thus enable network operators to
take preemptive actions (e.g., blocking) even before any machine within their network
is infected. Moreover, unlike previous work, Kopis can detect malware domains even
when no IP reputation information is available.
We developed a proof-of-concept version of Kopis, and experimented with eight
months of real-world data. Our experimental results show that Kopis can achieve
high detection rates (e.g., 98.4%) and low false positive rates (e.g., 0.3% or 0.5%).
In addition Kopis is able to detect new malware domains days or even weeks before
they appear in public blacklists and security forums, and allowed us to discover the
rise of a previously unknown DDoS botnet based in China.
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CHAPTER V
DETECTING THE RISE OF DGA-BASED BOTNETS AT
THE RECURSIVE LEVELS OF THE DNS HIERARCHY
5.1 Motivation
Malicious software, or malware, is the basis of most modern cyber-crimes. Cyber-
criminals leverage malware-compromised machines to, for example, send spam, steal
private information, host phishing webpages, perform denial of service (DoS) attacks,
etc. In particular, Botnets are groups of malware-compromised machines, or bots,
that can be remotely controlled by an attacker (the botmaster) through a command
and control (C&C) communication channel.
Botnets have become the main platform for cyber-criminals to send spam, steal
private information, host phishing web-pages, etc. Over time, attackers have devel-
oped C&C channels with di"erent network structures. Most botnets today rely on
a centralized C&C server, whereby bots query a predefined C&C domain name that
resolves to the IP address of the C&C server from which commands will be received.
Such centralized C&C structures su"er from the single point of failure problem be-
cause if the C&C domain is identified and taken down, the botmaster loses control
over the entire botnet.
To overcome this limitation, attackers have used P2P-based C&C structures in
botnets such as Nugache [86], Storm [97], and more recently Waledac [98], Zeus [3],
and Alureon (a.k.a. TDL4) [36]. While P2P botnets provide a more robust C&C
structure that is di!cult to detect and take down, they are typically harder to imple-
ment and maintain. In an e"ort to combine the simplicity of centralized C&Cs with
the robustness of P2P-based structures, attackers have recently developed a number of
102
botnets that locate their C&C server through automatically generated pseudo-random
domains names. In order to contact the botmaster, each bot periodically executes
a domain generation algorithm (DGA) that, given a random seed (e.g., the current
date), produces a list of candidate C&C domains. The bot then attempts to resolve
these domain names by sending DNS queries until one of the domains resolves to the
IP address of a C&C server. This strategy provides a remarkable level of agility be-
cause even if one or more C&C domain names or IP addresses are identified and taken
down, the bots will eventually get the IP address of the relocated C&C server via
DNS queries to the next set of automatically generated domains. Notable examples
of DGA-based botnets (or DGA-bots, for short) are Bobax [83], Kraken [72], Sinowal
(a.k.a. Torpig) [84], Srizbi [74], Conficker-A/B [65], Conficker-C [60] and Murofet [77].
A defender can attempt to reverse engineer the bot malware, particularly its DGA
algorithm, to pre-compute current and future candidate C&C domains in order to
detect, block, and even take down the botnet. However, reverse engineering is not
always feasible because the bot malware can be updated very quickly (e.g., hourly)
and obfuscated (e.g., encrypted, and only decrypted and executed by external triggers
such as time).
With the research presented in this this Chapter, we propose a novel detection sys-
tem, called Pleiades, to identify DGA-based bots within a monitored network without
reverse engineering the bot malware. Pleiades is placed “below” the local recursive
DNS (RDNS) server or at the edge of a network to monitor DNS query/response
messages from/to the machines within the network. Specifically, Pleiades analyzes
DNS queries for domain names that result in Name Error responses [55], also called
NXDOMAIN responses, i.e., domain names for which no IP addresses (or other resource
records) exist. We will refer to these domain names as NXDomains.
The focus on NXDomains is motivated by the fact that modern DGA-bots tend to
query large sets of domain names among which relatively few successfully resolve to
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the IP address of the C&C server. Therefore, to automatically identify DGA domain
names, Pleiades searches for relatively large clusters of NXDomains that (i) have
similar syntactic features, and (ii) are queried by multiple potentially compromised
machines during a given epoch.
The intuition is that in a large network, like the ISP network where we ran our
experiments, multiple hosts may be compromised with the same DGA-bots. There-
fore, each of these compromised assets will generate several DNS queries resulting in
NXDomains, and a subset of these NXDomains will likely be queried by more than
one compromised machine. Pleiades is able to automatically identify and filter out
“accidental”, user-generated NXDomains due to typos or mis-configurations. When
Pleiades finds a cluster of NXDomains, it applies statistical learning techniques to
build a model of the DGA. This is used later to detect future compromised machines
running the same DGA and to detect active domain names that “look similar” to
NXDomains resulting from the DGA and therefore probably point to the botnet C&C
server’s address.
Pleiades has the advantage of being able to discover and model new DGAs with-
out labor-intensive malware reverse-engineering. This allows our system to detect
new DGA-bots before any sample of the related malware family is captured and ana-
lyzed. Unlike previous work on DNS tra!c analysis for detecting malware-related [8]
or malicious domains in general [7,11], Pleiades leverages throw-away tra"c (i.e., un-
successful DNS resolutions) to (1) discover the rise of new DGA-based botnets, (2)
accurately detect bot-compromised machines, and (3) identify and block the active
C&C domains queried by the discovered DGA-bots. Pleiades achieves these goals
by monitoring the DNS tra!c in local networks, without the need for a large-scale
deployment of DNS analysis tools required by prior work.
Furthermore, while botnet detection systems that focus on network flow anal-
































Figure 34: A high level overview of Pleiades.
detecting compromised machines within a local network, they do not scale well to
the overwhelming volume of tra!c typical in large ISP environments. On the other
hand, Pleiades employs a lightweight DNS-based monitoring approach, and can de-
tect DGA-based malware by focusing on a small fraction of all DNS tra!c in an ISP
network. This allows Pleiades to scale well to very large ISP networks, where we
evaluated our prototype system.
5.1.1 Contributions
Pleiades is the first DGA-based botnet identification system that e!ciently analyzes
streams of unsuccessful domain name resolutions, or NXDomains, in large ISP net-
works to automatically identify DGA-bots, even in the absence of the corresponding
malware. We built a prototype implementation of Pleiades, and evaluated its DGA
identification accuracy over a large labeled dataset consisting of a mix of NXDomains
generated by four di"erent known DGA-based botnets and NXDomains “acciden-
tally” generated by typos or mis-configurations. Our experiments demonstrate that
Pleiades can accurately detect DGA-bots. Finally, we deployed and evaluated our
Pleiades prototype in a large production ISP network for a period of 15 months. Our
experiments discovered twelve new DGA-based botnets and enumerated the compro-
mised machines. Half of these new DGAs have never been reported before.
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5.2 A Detector for DGA-Based Botnets
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of our DGA-bot detection system
Pleiades. As shown in Figure 34, Pleiades consists of two main modules: a DGA
Discovery module, and a DGA Classification and C&C Detection module. We discuss
the roles of these two main modules and their components, and how they are used in
coordination to actively learn and update DGA-bot detection models. We describe
these components in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
5.2.1 DGA Discovery
The DGA Discovery module analyzes streams of unsuccessful DNS resolutions, as
seen from “below” a local DNS server (see Figure 34). All NXDomains generated
by network users are collected during a given epoch (e.g., one day). Then, the col-
lected NXDomains are clustered according to the following two similarity criteria: (1)
the domain name strings have similar statistical characteristics (e.g., similar length,
similar level of “randomness”, similar character frequency distribution, etc.) and (2)
the domains have been queried by overlapping sets of hosts. The main objective of
this NXDomain clustering process is to group together domain names that likely are
automatically generated by the same algorithm running on multiple machines within
the monitored network.
Naturally, because this clustering step is unsupervised, some of the output NX-
Domain clusters may contain groups of domains that happen to be similar by chance
(e.g., NXDomains due to common typos or to mis-configured applications). There-
fore, we apply a subsequent filtering step. We use a supervised DGA Classifier to
prune NXDomain clusters that appear to be generated by DGAs that we have pre-
viously discovered and modeled, or that contain domain names that are similar to
popular legitimate domains. The final output of the DGA Discovery module is a set
of NXDomain clusters, each of which likely represents the NXDomains generated by
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previously unknown or not yet modeled DGA-bots.
5.2.2 DGA Classification and C&C Detection
Every time a new DGA is discovered, we use a supervised learning approach to build
models of what the domains generated by this new DGA “look like”. In particular, we
build two di"erent statistical models: (1) a statistical multi-class classifier that focuses
on assigning a specific DGA label (e.g., DGA-Conficker.C ) to the set of NXDomains
generated by a host hi and (2) a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) that focuses on
finding single active domain names queried by hi that are likely generated by a DGA
(e.g., DGA-Conficker.C ) running on the host, and are therefore good candidate C&C
domains.
The DGA Modeling component receives di"erent sets of domains labeled as Le-
gitimate (i.e., “non-DGA”), DGA-Bobax, DGA-Torpig/Sinowal, DGA-Conficker.C,
New-DGA-v1, New-DGA-v2, etc., and performs the training of the multi-class DGA
Classifier and the HMM-based C&C Detection module.
The DGA Classification module works as follows. Similar to the DGA Discovery
module, we monitor the stream of NXDomains generated by each client machine
“below” the local recursive DNS server.
Given a subset of NXDomains generated by a machine, we extract a number of
statistical features related to the NXDomain strings. Then, we ask the DGA Classifier
to identify whether this subset of NXDomains resembles the NXDomains generated
by previously discovered DGAs. That is, the classifier will either label the subset of
NXDomains as generated by a known DGA, or tell us that it does not fit any model. If
the subset of NXDomains is assigned a specific DGA label (e.g., DGA-Conficker.C ),
the host that generated the NXDomains is deemed to be compromised by the related
DGA-bot.
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Once we obtain the list of machines that appear to be compromised with DGA-
based bots, we take detection one step further. While all previous steps focused on
NXDomains, we now turn our attention to domain names for which we observe valid
resolutions. Our goal is to identify which domain names, among the ones generated
by the discovered DGA-based bots, actually resolve into a valid IP address. In other
words, we aim to identify the botnet’s active C&C server.
To achieve this goal, we consider all domain names that are successfully resolved
by a host which have been classified as running a given DGA, say New-DGA-vX,
by the DGA Classifier. Then, we test these successfully resolved domains against
the HMM specifically trained to recognize domains generated by New-DGA-vX. The
HMM analyzes the sequence of characters that compose a domain name d, and com-
putes the likelihood that d is generated by New-DGA-vX.
We use an HMM, rather than the DGA Classifier, because for the C&C detection
phase we need to classify single domain names. The DGA Classifier is not suitable
for this task because it expects as input sets of NXDomains generated by a given host
to assign a label to the DGA-bot running on that host. Some of the features used by
the DGA Classifier cannot be reliably extracted from a single domain name, which
we discuss further in Sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.4.2.
5.3 DGA Discovery
The DGA Discovery module analyzes sequences of NXDomains generated by hosts
in a monitored network, and in a completely unsupervised way, clusters NXDomains
that are being automatically generated by a DGA. We achieve this goal in multiple
steps (see Figure 34). First (Step 1 ), we collect sequences of NXDomains generated
by each host during an epoch E. Afterwards (Step 2 ), we split the overall set of
NXDomains generated by all monitored hosts into small subsets, and translate each
set into a statistical feature vector (see Section 5.3.1.1 for details). We then apply the
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X-means clustering algorithm [61] to group these domain subsets into larger clusters
of domain names that have similar string-based characteristics.
Separately (Step 3 ), we cluster the NXDomains based on a completely di"erent
approach that takes into account whether two NXDomains are being queried by over-
lapping sets of hosts. First, we build a bipartite host association graph in which the
two sets of vertices represent distinct hosts and distinct NXDomains, respectively. A
host vertex Vhi is connected to an NXDomain vertex Vnj if host hi queried NXDomain
nj. This allows us to identify di"erent NXDomains that have been queried by over-
lapping sets of hosts. Intuitively, if two NXDomains are queried by multiple common
hosts, this indicates that the querying hosts may be running the same DGA. We can
then leverage this definition of similarity between NXDomains to cluster them (see
Section 5.3.1.3 for details).
These two distinct views of similarities among NXDomains are then reconciled
in a cluster correlation phase (Step 4 ). This step improves the quality of the final
NXDomains clusters by combining the clustering results obtained in Step 2 and Step
3, and to eliminate possible noise introduced by clusters of domains that may appear
similar purely by chance, for example, similar typos originating from di"erent network
users.
The final clusters represent di"erent groups of NXDomains, each containing do-
main names that are highly likely to be generated by the same DGA. For each of the
obtained NXDomain clusters, the question remains if they belong to a known DGA,
or a newly discovered one. To answer this question (Step 5 ), we use the DGA Classi-
fier described in Section 5.4.2, which is specifically trained to distinguish between sets
of NXDomains generated by currently known DGAs. Clusters that match previously
modeled DGAs are discarded. On the other hand, if a cluster of NXDomains does
not resemble any previously seen DGAs, we identify the cluster of NXDomains as
having been generated by a new, previously unknown DGA. These NXDomains will
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then be sent (Step 6 ) to the DGA Modeling module, which will update (i.e., re-train)
the DGA Classifier component.
5.3.1 NXDomain Clustering
We now describe the NXDomain Clustering module in detail. First, we introduce
the statistical features Pleiades uses to translate small sets of NXDomains into fea-
ture vectors, and then discuss how these feature vectors are clustered to find similar
NXDomains.
5.3.1.1 Statistical Features
To ease the presentation of how the statistical features are computed, we first intro-
duce some notation that we will be using throughout this section.
Definitions and Notation A domain name d consists of a set of labels separated
by dots, e.g., www.example.com. The rightmost label is called the top-level domain
(TLD or TLD(d)), e.g., com. The second-level domain (2LD or 2LD(d)) represents
the two rightmost labels separated by a period, e.g., example.com. The third-level
domain (3LD or 3LD(d)) contains the three rightmost labels, e.g., www.example.com,
and so on.
We will often refer to splitting a sequence NX = {d1, d2, ..., dm} of NXDomains
into a number of subsequences (or subsets) of length !, NXk = {dr, dr+1, ..., dr+""1},
where r = !(k'1)+1 and k = 1, 2, ..., -m
"
.. Subscript k indicates the k-th subsequence
of length ! in the sequence ofm NXDomainsNX. Each of theNXk domain sequences
can be translated into a feature vector, as described below.
n-gram Features Given a subsequence NXk of ! NXDomains, we measure the
frequency distribution of n-grams across the domain name strings, with n = 1, .., 4.
For example, for n = 2, we compute the frequency of each 2-gram. At this point, we
can compute the median, average and standard deviation of the obtained distribution
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of 2-gram frequency values, thus obtaining three features. We do this for each value
of n = 1, ..., 4, producing 12 statistical features in total. By measuring the median,
average and standard deviation, we are trying to capture the shape of the frequency
distribution of the n-grams.
Entropy-based Features This group of features computes the entropy of the char-
acter distribution for separate domain levels. For example, we separately compute
the character entropy for the 2LDs and 3LDs extracted from the domains in NXk. To
better understand how these features are measured, consider a set NXk of ! domains.
We first extract the 2LD of each domain di " NXk, and for each domain we compute
the entropy H(2LD(di)) of the characters of its 2LD. Then, we compute the average
and standard deviation of the set of values {H(2LD(di))}i=1...". We repeat this for
3LDs and for the overall domain name strings. We measure a total of six features,
which capture the “level of randomness” in the domains. The intuition is that most
DGAs produce random-looking domain name strings, and we want to account for this
characteristic of the DGAs.
Structural Domain Features This group of features is used to summarize in-
formation about the structure of the NXDomains in NXk, such as their length, the
number of unique TLDs, and the number of domain levels. In total, we compute 14
features. Specifically, given NXk, we compute the average, median, standard devi-
ation, and variance of the length of the domain names (four features), and of the
number of domain levels (four features). Also, we compute the number of distinct
characters that appear in these NXDomains (one feature), the number of distinct
TLDs, and the ratio between the number of domains under the .com TLD and the
number of domains that use other TLDs (two features). The remaining features
measure the average, median, and standard deviation of the occurrence frequency
distribution for the di"erent TLDs (three features).
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5.3.1.2 Clustering using Statistical Features
To find clusters of similar NXDomains, we proceed as follows. Given the set NX of all
NXDomains that we observed from all hosts in the monitored network, we split NX
into subsets of size !, as mentioned in Section 5.3.1.1. Assuming m is the number of
distinct NXDomains in NX, we split the set NX into -m
"
. di"erent subsets where
! = 10. We motivate this choice for ! in Appendix A.1.
For each of the obtained subsets NXk of NX, we compute the aforementioned
33 statistical features. After we have translated each NXk into its corresponding
feature vector, we apply the X-means clustering algorithm [61]. X-means will group
the NXk into X clusters, where X is automatically computed by an optimization
process internal to X-means itself. At this point, given a cluster C = {NXk}k=1..l of
l NXDomain subsets, we simply take the union of the NXk in C as an NXDomain
cluster.
5.3.1.3 Clustering using Bipartite Graphs
Hosts that are compromised with the same DGA-based malware naturally tend to
generate (with high probability) partially overlapping sets of NXDomains. On the
other hand, other “non-DGA” NXDomains are unlikely to be queried by multiple
hosts. For example, it is unlikely that multiple distinct users make identical typos
in a given epoch. This motivates us to consider NXDomains that are queried by
several common hosts as similar, and in turn use this similarity measure to cluster
NXDomains that are likely generated by the same DGA.
To this end, we build a sparse association matrix M , where columns represent
NXDomains and rows represent hosts that query more than two of the column NXDo-
mains over the course of an epoch. We discard hosts that query only one NXDomain
to reduce the dimensionality of the matrix, since they are extremely unlikely to be
running a DGA given the low volume of NXDomains they produce. Let a matrix
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INPUT : Sparse matrix M " /l"k, in which the rows represent l hosts and the columns
represent k NXDomains.





[2] : Compute the similarity matrix S from M : S = MT ·M
[3] : Compute the first " eigenvectors from S by eigen-decomposition.
Let U " /!"k be the matrix containing k vectors u1, ..., uk of size " resulting from the
eigen-decomposition of S
(a vector ui is a reduced "-dimensional representation of the i-th NXDomain).
[4] : Cluster the vectors (i.e., the NXDomains) {ui}i=1,..,k using the X-means algorithm
OUTPUT: Clusters of NXDomains
Algorithm 1: Spectral clustering of NXDomains.
element Mi,j = 0, if host hi did not query NXDomain nj. Conversely, let Mi,j = wi
if hi did query nj , where wi is a weight.




where ki is the number of NXDomains queried by host hi. Clearly, M can be seen as
a representation of a bipartite graph, in which a host vertex Vhi is connected to an
NXDomains vertex Vnj with an edge of weight wi if host hi queried NXDomain nj
during the epoch under consideration. The intuition behind the particular method
we use to compute the weights wi is that we expect that the higher the number of
unique NXDomains queried by a host hi (i.e., the higher ki) the less likely the host
is “representative” of the NXDomains it queries. This is in a way analogous to the
inverse document frequency used in the text mining domain [1, 26].
Once M is computed, we apply a graph partitioning strategy based on spectral
clustering [57, 58], as summarized in Algorithm 1. As a first step, we compute the
first # eigenvectors of M (we use # = 15 in our experiments), and then we map each
NXDomain (each column of M) into a #-dimensional vector. In e"ect, this mapping
greatly reduces the dimensionality of the NXDomain vectors from the total number
of hosts (the number of rows in M) to #. We then used the obtained #-dimensional
NXDomain representations and apply X-means to cluster the NXDomains based on
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their “host associations”. Namely, NXDomains are grouped together if they have
been queried by a similar set of hosts.
5.3.1.4 Cluster Correlation
We now have two complementary views of how the NXDomains should be grouped
based on two di"erent definitions of similarity between domain names. Neither view
is perfect, and the produced clusters may still contain noise. Correlating the two
results helps filter the noise and output clusters of NXDomains that are more likely
to be generated by a DGA. Cluster correlation is performed in the following way.
Let A = {A1, .., An} be the set of NXDomain clusters obtained by using statis-
tical features, as described in Section 5.3.1.2, and B = {B1, .., Bm} be the set of
NXDomain clusters derived from the bipartite graph partitioning approach discussed
in Section 5.3.1.3. We compute the intersection between all possible pairs of clusters
Ii,j = Ai # Bj, for i = 1, .., n and j = 1, ..,m. All correlated clusters Ii,j that contain
less than a predefined number $ of NXDomains (i.e., |Ii,j| < $) are discarded, while
the remaining correlated clusters are passed to the DGA filtering module described
in Section 5.3.2. Clusters that are not su!ciently agreed upon by the two clustering
approaches are not considered for further processing. We empirically set $ = 40 in
preliminary experiments.
5.3.2 DGA Filtering
The DGA filtering module receives the NXDomain clusters from the clustering mod-
ule. This filtering step compares the newly discovered NXDomain clusters to domains
generated by known DGAs that we have already discovered and modeled. If the NX-
Domains in a correlated cluster Ii,j are classified as being generated by a known DGA,
we discard the cluster Ii,j. The reason is that the purpose of the DGA Discovery mod-
ule is to find clusters of NXDomains that are generated (with high probability) by a
new, never before seen DGA. At the same time, this filtering step is responsible for
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determining if a cluster of NXDomains is too noisy, i.e., if it likely contains a mix of
DGA and “non-DGA” domains.
To this end, we leverage the DGA Classifier described in detail in Section 5.4.
At a high level, we can treat the DGA Classifier as a function that takes as input a
set NXk of NXDomains, and outputs a set of tuples {(lt, st)}t=1..c, where li is a label
(e.g., DGA-Conficker.C ), and si is a score that indicates how confident the classifier
is on attributing label li to NXk, and c is the number of di"erent classes (and labels)
that the DGA Classifier can recognize.
When the DGA filtering module receives a new correlated cluster of NXDomains
Ii,j, it splits the cluster into subsets of ! NXDomains, and then passes each of these
subsets to the DGA Classifier. Assume Ii,j is divided into n di"erent subsets. From





t=1..c, ..., {(lt, st)}
(n)
t=1..c}.
First, we consider for each set of tuples {(lt, st)}
(k)
t=1..c with k = 1, .., n, the label
l̂(k) that was assigned the maximum score. We consider a cluster Ii,j as too noisy if
the related labels l̂(k) are too diverse. Specifically, a cluster is too noisy when the
majority label among the l̂(k), k = 1, ..n was assigned to less than "maj = 75% of the
n domain subsets. The clusters that do not pass the "maj “purity” threshold will be
discarded. Furthermore, NXDomain clusters whose majority label is the Legitimate
label will also be discarded.
For each remaining cluster, we perform an additional “purity” check. Let the
majority label for a given cluster Ii,j be l#. Among the set {{(lt, st)}
(k)
t=1..c}k=1..n we
take all the scores st whose related lt = l#. That is, we take the confidence score
assigned by the classifier to the domain subsets that have been labeled as l#, and
then we compute the average µ(st) and the variance %2(st) of these scores (notice
that the scores st are in [0, 1]). We discard clusters whose %2(st) is greater than a
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predefined threshold "! = 0.001, because we consider the domains in the cluster as
not being su"ciently similar to the majority label class.
At this point, if µ(st) < "µ, with "µ = 0.98, we deem the NXDomain cluster to
be not similar enough to the majority label class, and instead we label it as “new
DGA” and pass it to the DGA Modeling module. On the other hand, if µ(st) 0 "µ,
we confirm the majority label class (e.g., DGA-Conficker.C ) and do not consider it
further.
The particular choice for the values of the above mentioned thresholds are moti-
vated in Section 5.6.2.
5.4 DGA Classification and C&C Detection
Once a new DGA is reported by the DGA Discovery module, we use a supervised
learning approach to learn how to identify hosts that are infected with the related
DGA-based malware by analyzing the set of NXDomains they generate. To identify
compromised hosts, we collect the set of NXDomains NXhi generated by a host, hi,
and we ask the DGA Classifier whether NXhi likely “belongs” to a previously seen
DGA or not. If the answer is yes, hi is considered to be compromised and will be
labeled with the name of the (suspected) DGA-bot that it is running.
In addition, we aim to build a classifier that can analyze the set of active domain
names, say ADhi , resolved by a compromised host hi and reduce it to a smaller
subset CChi 1 ADhi of likely C&C domains generated by the DGA running on hi.
Finally, the set CChi may be manually inspected to confirm the identification of C&C
domain(s) and related IPs. In turn, the list of C&C IPs may be used to maintain an
IP blacklist, which can be employed to block C&C communications and mitigate the
e"ects of the malware infection.
We now describe the components of the DGA classification and C&C detection
module in more detail.
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5.4.1 DGA Modeling
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, the NXDomain clusters that pass the DGA Filtering
and do not fit any known DGA model are assigned a New-DGA-vX label, where X is
a unique identifier. At this point, we build two di"erent statical models representative
of New-DGA-vX : (1) a statistical multi-class classifier that can assign a specific DGA
label to the set of NXDomains generated by a host hi and (2) a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) that can compute the probability that a single active domain queried by hi
was generated by the DGA running on the host, thus producing a list of candidate
C&C domains.
The DGA Modeling module takes as input the following information: (1) a list of
popular legitimate domain names extracted from the top 10,000 domains according
to alexa.com; (2) the list of NXDomains generated by running known DGA-bots in
a controlled environment (see Section 5.5); (3) the clusters of NXDomains received
from the DGA Discovery module. Let NX be one such newly discovered cluster
of NXDomains. Because in some cases NX may contain relatively few domains, we
attempt to extend the setNX to a larger setNX ! that can help build better statistical
models for the new DGA. To this end, we identify all hosts that “contributed” to the
NXDomains clustered in NX from our sparse association matrix M and we gather all
the NXDomains they generated during an epoch. For example, for a given host hi that
generated some of the domains clustered in NX, we gather all the other NXDomains







dataset (marked with the appropriate new DGA label). The reader may at this
point notice that the set NX !hi may contain not only NXDomains generated by a
host hi due to running a DGA, but it may also include NXDomains “accidentally’
generated by hi. Therefore, this may introduce some noisy instances into the training
dataset. However, the number of “accidental” NXDomains is typically very small,
compared to the number of NXDomains generated by a DGA. Therefore, we rely on
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the generalization ability of the statistical learning algorithms we use to smooth away
the e"ects of this potential source of noise. This approach works well in practice, as
we will show in Section 5.6.
5.4.2 DGA Classifier
The DGA Classifier is based on a multi-class version of the Alternating Decision
Trees (ADT) learning algorithm [32]. ADT leverages the high classification accuracy
obtained by Boosting [50], while producing compact classification rules that can be
more easily interpreted.
To detect hosts that are compromised with DGA-based malware, we monitor all
NXDomains generated by each host in the monitored network and periodically send
this information to the DGA Classifier. Given a set NXhi of NXDomains generated
by host hi, we split NXhi into subsets of length !, and from each of these subsets
we extract a number of statistical features, as described in Section 5.3.1.1 If one of
these subsets of NXDomains is labeled by the DGA Classifier as being generated by
a given DGA, we mark host hi as compromised and we add its IP address and the
assigned DGA label to a malware detection report.
5.4.3 C&C Detection
The C&C Detection module is based on Hidden Markov Models (HMM) [71]. We use
one distinct HMM per DGA. Given the set NXD of domains generated by a DGA D,
we consider each domain d " NXD separately, and feed these domains to an HMM
for training. The HMM sees the domain names simply as a sequence of characters,
and the result of the training is a model HMMD that given a new domain name s in
input will output the likelihood that s was generated by D.
We use left-to-right HMM as they are used in practice to decrease the complexity
of the model, e"ectively mitigating problems related to under-fitting. The HMM’s
emission symbols are represented by the set of characters allowed in valid domain
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names (i.e., alphabetic characters, digits, ‘ ’, ‘-’, and ‘.’). We set the number of
hidden states to be equal to the average length of the domain names in the training
dataset.
During operation, the C&C Detection module receives active domain names queried
by hosts that have been previously classified by the DGA Classifier as being com-
promised with a DGA-based malware. Let hi be one such host, and D be the DGA
running on hi. The C&C Detection module will send every domain s resolved by hi
to HMMD, which will compute a likelihood score f(s). If f(s) > "D, s is flagged as
a good candidate C&C domain for DGA D.
The threshold "D can be learned during the training phase. First, we train the
HMM with the set NXD. Then, we use a set L of legitimate “non-DGA” domains
from Alexa. For each domain l " L, we compute the likelihood f(l) and set the
threshold "D so to obtain a maximum target false positive rate (e.g., max FPs=1%).
5.5 Data Collection
In this section we provide an overview of the amount of NXDomain tra!c we ob-
served during a period of fifteen consecutive months (our evaluation period), starting
on November 1st, 2010 and ending on January 15th, 2012. Afterwards, we discuss
how we collected the domain names used to train and test our DGA Classifier (see
Section 5.4).
5.5.1 NXDomain Tra!c
We evaluated Pleiades over a 15-month period against DNS tra!c obtained by mon-
itoring DNS messages to/from a set of recursive DNS resolvers operated by a large
North American ISP. These servers were physically located in the US, and served (in
average) over 2 million client hosts per day1. Our monitoring point was “below” the
1We estimated the number of hosts by computing the average number of distinct client IPs seen
per day.
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Figure 35: Observations from NXDomain tra!c collected below a set of ISP recursive
DNS servers over a 439 day window.
DNS servers, thus providing visibility on the NXDomains generated by the individual
client hosts.
Figure 35(a) reports, per each day, (1) the number of NXDomains as seen in the
raw DNS tra!c, (2) the number of distinct hosts that in the considered day query
at least one NXDomains, and (3) the number of distinct (de-duplicated) NXDomains
(we also filter out domain names that do not have a valid e"ective TLD [42,55, 56]).
The abrupt drop in the number of NXDomains and hosts (roughly a 30% reduction)
experienced between 2011-03-24 and 2011-06-17 was due to a configuration change at
the ISP network.
On average, we observed about 5 millions “raw” NXDomains, 187,600 distinct
hosts that queried at least one NXDomains, and 360,700 distinct NXDomains over-
all, per each day. Therefore, the average size of the association matrix M used to
perform spectral clustering (see Section 5.3.1.3) was 187,600 + 360,700. However, it
is worth noting that M is sparse and can be e!ciently stored in memory. In fact,
the vast majority (about 90%) of hosts query less than 10 NXDomains per day, and
therefore most rows in M will contain only a few non-zero elements. This is shown
in Figure 35(b), which reports the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
volume of NXDomains queried by a host in the monitored network. On the other
hand, Figure 35(c) shows the CDF for the number of hosts that query an NXDomain
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Table 9: Detection results (in %) using 10-fold cross validation for di"erent values
of !.
# = 5 NXDomains # = 10 NXDomains
Class TPrate FPrate AUC TPrate FPrate AUC
Bobax 95 0.4 97 99 0 99
Conficker 98 1.4 98 99 0.1 99
Sinowal 99 0.1 98 100 0 100
Murofet 98 0.7 98 99 0.2 99
Benign 96 0.7 97 99 0.1 99
(this relates directly to the sparseness of M according to its columns).
5.5.2 Ground Truth
In order to generate the ground truth to train and evaluate the DGA Classifier (Sec-
tion 5.4), we used a simple approach. To collect the NXDomains generated by known
DGA-based malware we used two di"erent methods. First, because the DGA used by
di"erent variants of Conficker and by Murofet are known (derived through reverse-
engineering), we simply used the respective algorithms to generate a set of domain
names from each of these botnets. To obtain a sample set of domains generated by
Bobax and Sinowal, whose exact DGA algorithm is not known (at least not to us), we
simply executed two malware samples (one per botnet) in a VM-based malware anal-
ysis framework that only allows DNS tra!c2, while denying any other type of tra!c.
Overall we collected 30,000 domains generated by Conficker, 26,078 from Murofet,
1,283 from Bobax and, 1,783 from Sinowal.
Finally, we used the top 10,000 most popular domains according to alexa.com,
with and without the www. prefix. Therefore, overall we used 20,000 domain names
to represent the “negative” (i.e., “non-DGA”) class during the training and testing
of the DGA Classifier.
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5.6 Evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental results of our system. We begin by
demonstrating Pleiades’ modeling accuracy with respect to known DGAs like Con-
ficker, Sinowal, Bobax and Murofet. Then, we elaborate on the DGAs we discovered
throughout the fifteen month NXDomain monitoring period. We conclude the sec-
tion by summarizing the most interesting findings from the twelve DGAs we detected.
Half of them use a DGA algorithm from a known malware family. The other half, to
the best of our knowledge, have no known malware association.
5.6.1 DGA Classifier’s Detection Results
In this section, we present the accuracy of the DGA classifier. We bootstrap the clas-
sifier with NXDomains from Bobax, Sinowal, Conficker-A, Conficker-B, Conficker-C
and Murofet. We test the classifier in two modes. The first mode is bootstrapped with
a “super” Conficker class composed of an equal number of samples from Conficker-A,
Conficker-B and Conficker-C classes and another with each Conficker variant as its
own class. As we mentioned in Section 5.4.2, the DGA classifier is based on a multi-
class version of the Alternating Decision Trees (ADT) learning algorithm [32]. We
build the vectors for each class by collecting NXDomains from one day of Honeypot
tra!c (in the case of Sinowal and Bobax) and one day of NXDomains produced by
the DGAs for Conficker-A, Conficker-B, Conficker-C and Murofet. Finally, the do-
main names that were used to represent the benign class were the first 10,000 Alexa
domain names with and without the www. child labels.
From the raw domain names in each of the classes, we randomly selected 3,000
sets of cardinality !. As a reminder, the values of ! that we used were two, five, ten
and 30. This was to build di"erent training datasets in order to empirically decide
which value of ! would provide the best separation between the DGA models.
2We only allowed UDP port 53.
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We generated additional testing datasets. The domain names we used in this
case were from each class as in the case of the training dataset but we used di"erent
days. We do that so we get the minimum possible domain name overlap between the
training and testing datasets. We evaluate the training datasets using two methods:
10-fold cross validation on the training dataset and by using the testing datasets
computed from domains collected on di"erent days. Both methods gave us very
similar results. Our system performed the worst in the case of the 10-fold cross
validation, therefore we chose to present this worst-case scenario.
In Table 9, we can see the detection results using two values for !, five and ten.
We omit the results for the other values due to space limitations. The main confusion
between the classes was observed in the datasets that contained separate Conficker
classes, specifically between the classes of Conficker-A and Conficker-B. To address
this problem, we created a generic Conficker class that had an equal number of vectors
from each Conficker variant. This merging of the Conficker variants into a single
“super” class allowed the DGA classifier to correctly classify 99.72% (Table 9) of the
instances (7,986 correctly classified vs 22 incorrectly classified). Using the datasets
with the five classes of DGAs, the weighted average of the TPrates and FPrates were
99.7% and 0.1%, respectively. As we see in Table 9, ! = 5 performs reasonably well,
but with a higher rate of FPs.
5.6.2 NXDomain Clustering Results
In this section, we will discuss results from the DGA discovery module. In particular,
we elaborate on the selection of the thresholds used, the unique clusters identified and
the false alerts the DGA discovery module produced over the duration of our study.
5.6.2.1 Correlation Thresholds
In order to set the thresholds "maj and "! defined in Section 5.3.2, we spent the
first five days of November 2010 labeling the 213 produced clusters as DGA related
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Figure 36: Thresholds "maj and "! from the first five days of November 2010.
(Positive) or noisy (Negative). For this experiment, we included all produced clusters
without filtering out those with "µ=98% (or higher) “similarity” to an already known
one (see Section 5.3.2). In Figure 36, we can see in the Y-axis the percentage values
for the dominant (non-benign) class in every cluster produced during these five days.
In the X-axis we can see the variance that each dominant class had within each
cluster. The results show that the Positive and Negative assignments had a clear cut,
which we can achieve by setting the thresholds as "maj = 75% and "! = 0.001. These
thresholds gave us very good results throughout the duration of the experiments. As
we will discuss in Section 5.6.2.3, the DGA discovery module falsely reported only five
benign clusters over a period of 15 months. All falsely reported clusters had variance
very close to 0.001.
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5.6.2.2 New DGAs
Pleiades began clustering NXDomain tra!c on the first day of November 2010. We
bootstrapped the DGA modeler with domain names from already known DGAs but
also a set of Alexa domain names as the benign class. In Table 10, we present all
unique clusters we discovered throughout the evaluation period. The “Malware Fam-
ily” column simply maps the variant to a known malware family if possible. We dis-
cover the malware family by checking the NXDomains that overlap with NXDomains
we extracted from tra!c obtained from a malware repository. Also, we manually
inspected the clusters with the help of a security company’s threat team. The “First
Seen” column denotes the first time we saw tra!c from each DGA variant. Finally,
the “Population on Discovery” column shows the variant population on the discovery
day. We can see that we can detect each DGA variant with an average number of 32
“infected hosts” across the entire statewide ISP network coverage.
Table 10: DGAs Detected by Pleiades.
Population
Malware Family First Seen on Discovery
Shiz/Simda-C [80] 03/20/11 37
Bamital [35] 04/01/11 175
BankPatch [10] 04/01/11 28
Expiro.Z [30] 04/30/11 7
Bonnana [100] 08/03/11 24







As we see in Table 10, Pleiades reported six variants that belong to known DGA-
enabled malware families [10, 30, 35, 64, 80, 100]. Six more variants of NXDomains
were reported and modeled by Pleiades but for these, to the best of our knowledge,




































































Figure 37: A sample of ten NXDomain for each DGA cluster that we could not
associate with a known malware family.
for each one of these variants can be seen in Figure 37.
In the 15 months of our observations we observed an average population of 742
Conficker infected hosts in the ISP network. Murofet had the second largest popu-
lation of infected hosts at 92 per day, while the Bonnana DGA comes third with an
average population of 84 infected hosts per day. The fastest growing DGA is Zeus.v3
with an average population of 50 hosts per day, however, during the last four days
of the experiments the Zeus.v3 DGA had an average number of 134 infected hosts.
It is worth noting the New-DGA-v1 had an average of 19 hosts per day, the most
populous of the newly identified DGAs.
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5.6.2.3 False Reports on New DGAs
During our evaluation period we came across five categories of clusters falsely reported
as new DGAs. In all of the cases, we modeled these classes in the DGA modeler as
variants of the benign class. We now discuss each case in detail.
The first cluster of NXDomains falsely reported by Pleiades were random domain
names generated by Chrome [49,107]. Each time the Google Chrome browser starts,
it will query three “random looking” domain names. These domain names are issued
as a DNS check, so the browser can determine if NXDomain rewriting is enabled.
The “Chrome DGA” was reported as a variant of Bobax from Pleiades. We trained
a class for this DGA and flagged it as benign. One more case of testing for NXDo-
main rewriting was identified in a brand of wireless access points. Connectify3, o"ers
wireless hot-spot functionality and one of their configuration option enables the user
to hijack the ISP’s default NXDomain rewriting service. The device generates a fixed
number of NXDomains to test for rewriting.
Two additional cases of false reports were triggered by domain names from the
.it and .edu TLDs. These domain names contained minor variations on common
words (i.e. repubblica, gazzetta, computer, etc.). Domain names that matched these
clusters appeared only for two days in our traces and never again. The very short
lived presence of these two clusters could be explained if the domain names were part
of a spam-campaign that was remediated by authorities before it became live.
The fifth case of false report originated from domain names under a US government
zone and contained the string wpdhsmp. Our best guess is that these are internal
domain names that were accidentally leaked to the recursive DNS server of our ISP.
Domain names from this cluster appeared only for one day. This class of NXDomains
was also modeled as a benign variant. It is worth noting that all falsely reported DGA
3www.connectify.me
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Table 11: TPs (%) for C&C detection (1,000 training sequences).
FPs (%)
botnet 0.1 0.5 1 3 5 10
Zeus.v3 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
Expiro.Z 33.03 64.56 78.23 91.77 95.23 98.67
Bamital 100 100 100 100 100 100
Shiz 0 1.64 21.02 96.58 100 100
Bonnana 3.8 10.69 15.59 27.67 35.05 48.43
BankPatch 56.21 70.77 93.18 99.9 99.91 99.94
clusters, excluding the Chrome cluster, were short lived. If operators are willing to
wait a few days until a new DGA cluster is reported by Pleiades, these false alarms
would not have been raised.
5.6.3 C&C Detection
To evaluate the e"ectiveness of the C&C Detection, we proceeded as follows. We
considered the six new DGAs which we were able to attribute to specific malware, as
shown in Table 11. LetNXi be the set of NXDomains collected by the DGA Discovery
(Section 5.3) and DGA Modeling (Section 5.4.1) modules for the i-th DGA. For each
DGA, we set aside a subset NX traini 1 NXi of NXDomains to train an HMMi
model. Then we use the remaining NX testi = NXi ' NX
train
i to compute the true
positive (TP) rate of HMMi, and a set A that consists of 602,969 unique domain
names related to the consistently popular domain names according to alexa.com to
compute the false positive (FP) rate. To obtain A we first consider all domain names
that have been consistently ranked in the top 100,000 popular domains by alexa.com
for approximately one year. This gave us a set T of about 60,000 “stable” popular
domain names, which we consider as legitimate domains. Then, we monitored the
stream of successful DNS queries in a large live network for a few hours, and we added
to A all the domain names whose e"ective 2LD is in T .
We performed experiments with a varying number c = |NX traini | of training sam-
ples. Specifically, we set c equal to 100, 200, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, and 10,000. We
then computed the trade-o" between TPs and FPs for di"erent detection thresholds.
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In the interest of space, we report only the results for c=1,000 in Table 11. In general,
the results improve for increasing numbers of training instances. We set the detection
threshold so as to obtain an FP rate equal to 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%.
As we can see, at FP=1% we obtained a high (> 93%) TP rate for three out of six
DGAs, and relatively good results (> 78%) in five out of six cases. At FP=3% we
have high TP rate (> 91%) in five out of six cases.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the C&C Detection module reduces the set of do-
main names successfully resolved by a host h that have been labeled as compromised
with DGA-malware to a smaller set of good candidate C&C domains generated by
the DGA. The results in Table 11 show that if we rank the domains resolved by h
according to the likelihood assigned by the HMM, in most cases we will only need to




In September 2011, Pleiades detected a new DGA that we linked to the Zeus.v3 vari-
ant a few weeks later. The domain names collected from the machines compromised
by this DGA-malware are hosted in six di"erent TLDs: .biz,.com,.info ,.net ,.org
and .ru. Excluding the top level domains, the length of the domain names generated
by this DGA are between 33 and 45 alphanumeric characters. By analyzing one sam-
ple of the malware4 we observed that its primary C&C infrastructure is P2P-based.
If the malware fails to reach its P2P C&C network, it follows a contingency plan,
where a DGA-based component is used to try to recover from the loss of C&C com-
munication. The malware will then resolve pseudo-random domain names, until an
active C&C domain name is found.
4Sample MD5s: 8f60afa9ea1e761edd49dfe012c22cbf and ccec69613c71d66f98abe9cc7e2e20ef.
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To date, we have discovered 12 such C&C domains. Over time, these 12 domains
resolved to five di"erent C&C IPs hosted in four di"erent networks, three in the
US (AS6245, AS16626 and AS3595) and one in the United Kingdom (AS24931).
Interestingly, we observed that the UK-based C&C IP address remained active for a
very short period of time of only a few minutes, from Jan 25, 2012 12:14:04 EST to
Jan 25, 2012 12:22:37 EST. The C&C moved from a US IP (AS16626) to the UK
(AS24931), and then almost immediately back to the US (AS3595).
5.6.4.2 BankPatch
We picked the BankPatch DGA cluster as a sample case for analysis since this botnet
had been active for several months during our experiments and the infected population
continues to be significant. The C&C infrastructure that supports this botnet is
impressive. Twenty six di"erent clusters of servers acted as the C&Cs for this botnet.
The botnet operators not only made use of a DGA and also moved the active C&Cs to
di"erent networks every few weeks (on average). During our C&C discovery process,
we observed IP addresses controlled by a European CERT. This CERT has been
taking over domain names from this botnet for several months. We managed to cross-
validate with them the completeness and correctness of the C&C infrastructure. The
complete information about the C&C infrastructure can be found in Table 12.
The actual structure of the domain name used by this DGA can be separated
into a four byte prefix and a su!x string argument. The su!x string arguments we
observed were:
seapollo.com, tomvader.com, aulmala.com, apontis.com, fnomosk.com,
erhogeld.com, erobots.com, ndsontex.com, rtehedel.com, nconnect.com,
edsafe.com, berhogeld.com, musallied.com, newnacion.com, susaname.com,
tvolveras.com and dminmont.com.
The four bytes of entropy for the DGA were provided by the prefix. We observe
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collisions between NXDomains from di"erent days, especially when only one su!x
argument was active. Therefore, we registered a small sample of ten domain names
at the beginning of 2012 in an e"ort to obtain a glimpse of the overall distribution of
this botnet. Over a period of one month of monitoring the sink-holed data from the
domain name of this DGA, this botnet has infected hosts in 270 di"erent networks
distributed across 25 di"erent countries. By observing the recursive DNS servers from
the domain names we sinkholed, we determined 4,295 were located in the US. The
recursives we monitored were part of this list and we were able to measure 86 infected
hosts (on average) in the network we were monitoring. The five countries that had
the most DNS resolution requests for the sinkholed domain names (besides the US)
were Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and Singapore. The average number of
recursive DNS servers from these countries that contacted our authorities was 22 —
significantly smaller that the volume of recursive DNS servers within the US.
5.7 Summary
Given a known botnet command and control (C&C) domain, botnet tra!c can be
trivially detected and blocked. Indeed, many botnet detection systems employ a
blacklist of known command and control (C&C) domains to detect bots and block
their tra!c. Similar to signature-based virus detection, such botnet detection ap-
proach is static because the blacklist is updated only after an external (and often
manual) process of domain discovery.
As a response, botmasters have begun employing domain generation algorithms
(DGAs) to dynamically produce a large number of random domain names and select
a small subset for actual C&C use. That is, a C&C domain is randomly generated
and used for a very short period of time, thus rendering detection approaches that
rely on static domain lists ine"ective. Naturally, if we know how a domain genera-
tion algorithm works, we can generate the domains ahead of time and still identify
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Table 12: C&C Infrastructure for BankPatch.
IP addresses CC Owner
146.185.250.{89-92} RU Petersburg Int.
31.11.43.{25-26} RO SC EQUILIBRIUM
31.11.43.{191-194} RO SC EQUILIBRIUM
46.16.240.{11-15} UA iNet Colocation
62.122.73.{11-14,18} UA “Leksim” Ltd.
87.229.126.{11-16} HU Webenlet Kft.
94.63.240.{11-14} RO Com Frecatei
94.199.51.{25-18} HU NET23-AS 23VNET
94.61.247.{188-193} RO Vatra Luminoasa
88.80.13.{111-116} SE PRQ-AS PeRiQuito
109.163.226.{3-5} RO VOXILITY-AS
94.63.149.{105-106} RO SC CORAL IT
94.63.149.{171-175} RO SC CORAL IT
176.53.17.{211-212} TR Radore Hosting
176.53.17.{51-56} TR Radore Hosting
31.210.125.{5-8} TR Radore Hosting
31.131.4.{117-123} UA LEVEL7-AS IM
91.228.111.{26-29} UA LEVEL7-AS IM
94.177.51.{24-25} UA LEVEL7-AS IM
95.64.55.{15-16} RO NETSERV-AS
95.64.61.{51-54} RO NETSERV-AS
194.11.16.133 RU PIN-AS Petersburg
46.161.10.{34-37} RU PIN-AS Petersburg
46.161.29.102 RU PIN-AS Petersburg
95.215.{0-1}.29 RU PIN-AS Petersburg




and block botnet C&C tra!c. The existing solutions are largely based on reverse
engineering of the bot malware executables, which is not always feasible.
The research presented in this Chapter introduced a new technique to detect
randomly generated domains without reversing malware. Our insight is that most
of the DGA-generated (random) domains that a bot queries would result in Non-
Existent Domain (NXDomain) responses, and that bots from the same botnet (with
the same DGA algorithm) would generate similar NXDomain tra!c.
Our approach uses a combination of clustering and classification algorithms. The
clustering algorithm clusters domains based on the similarity in the make-ups of
domain names as well as the groups of machines that queried these domains. The
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classification algorithm is used to assign the generated clusters to models of known
DGAs. If a cluster cannot be assigned to a known model, then a new model is
produced, indicating a new DGA variant or family.
We implemented a prototype system and evaluated it on real-world DNS tra!c
obtained from large ISPs in North America. We reported the discovery of twelve
DGAs. Half of them are variants of known (botnet) DGAs, and the other half are




6.1 Overall Contributions and Summary
The goal of this thesis has been the delivery of methods and algorithms that could
make an early warning system for DNS-based illicit operations feasible. To achieve
this goal we had to address the following three research problems:
• Dynamically assign reputation scores to domain names according to their suc-
cessful DNS resolutions.
• Dynamically detect new malware-related domains in various parts of the DNS
hierarchy.
• Dynamically identify the rise of “Domain name Generation Algorithm”-based
(or DGA) botnets, using properties of the DGA-based botnets communication
cycle observable at the local recursive DNS level.
To address the limitation of static domain name black lists we introduced Notos [7],
a dynamic reputation system for DNS. The system uses passive DNS evidence from
recursive DNS servers to statistically identify benign and malicious domain names.
Notos can statistically correlate the two planes in DNS: the name space and the
address space. The primary goal of Notos is to automatically assign a low reputation
score to a domain that is involved in malicious activities, such as malware spreading,
“phishing”, and spam campaigns. Conversely, we want to assign a high reputation
score to domains that are used for legitimate purposes.
Given the nature of emerging Internet threats, it is important that we develop
global monitoring capabilities to stop impending attacks on our networks. To address
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the need of an early warning system across the DNS hierarchy we split this task into
two steps. Firstly, the timely detection of malware-related domain names at the
higher levels of the DNS hierarchy. Secondly, the detection of DGA-enabled malware
domain names at the recursive level.
To that extent we proposed Kopis [8], which operates in the upper layers of the
DNS hierarchy and is capable of detecting malware-related domain names “on-the
rise”. Kopis is the first component of our early warning system, which can be operated
independently by the TLD and ANS operators and report on malicious domain names.
Kopis enables DNS operators to independently deploy the system and detect malware-
related domains from within their authority zones without the need for external data
from other networks or other inter-organizational coordination.
The second component of our early warning system enables the detection of new
emerging DGA-based botnets. Such detection systems should be able to operate at
the DNS recursive level or at the edge of a network, so operators can independently
identify DGA-based compromised machines. To that extent we proposed Pleiades [9],
a detection system that is capable of reporting the rise of DGA botnets in a local
network. This is made possible by statistical modeling of the unsuccessful DNS reso-
lutions at the recursive DNS level of the monitored network. Additionally, Pleiades,
is also able to learn models from tra!c generated from already known DGA-based
malware and detect active DGA-based infections in the local network.
In summary, this thesis is able to provide answers to all three research problems
noted in the beginning of this Section. In detail, with Notos (Chapter 3) we proposed
methods to quantify and track dynamically changing reputations for DNS [7] based on
passive network measurements. In order to address the need of early warning systems
for DNS, we proposed two novel detection systems, Kopis [8] and Pleiades [9] — in
Chapter 4 and 5 respectively. These two early warning systems for DNS enable the
security community to identify emerging threats (e.g., new botnets), across the DNS
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hierarchy (i.e., at the recursive and at the TLD/ANS levels) in a timelier manner.
6.2 Considerations and Limitations
In this section we discuss key considerations for the detection systems presented in
this thesis.
6.2.1 Limitation of Notos
This section discusses the limits of Notos, and the potential for evasion in real net-
works.
6.2.1.1 Passive DNS Data Collection and IPv6 Considerations
One of the main limitations is the fact that Notos is unable to assign reputation scores
to domain names in resource records that have no historic (passive DNS) information
at the host and BGP prefix levels. We should also note that su!cient time (i.e., for an
ISP a few weeks) is necessary for data collection and a diverse passive DNS monitoring
capability is also mandatory to create a passive DNS data collection repository.
This passive DNS repository is critical for Notos, since the statistical vectors are
computed based on resource records associations within the repository. Therefore, if
an attacker purchases new domain names and new address space (in new BGP pre-
fixes), and never reuses old domain names or old IP addresses for his illicit operations,
Notos will not be able to accurately assign a low reputation score to the new domains.
However, in the IPv4 address space, such a scenario is very unlikely to happen
due to the impending exhaustion of the available address space. This claim will not
hold when we move for IPv4 to IPv6. Such a transition will cause problems for the
reputation assignment process for Notos. This will be a direct artifact of the statistical
features we extract with the proposed systems, which are based on IP granularity.
However, we believe that the features based on BGP prefixes and AS numbers, which
we also introduce in our system, would still be able to capture some of the attacker’s
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DNS agility, which is typical now and should be also part of the malicious DNS hosting
behavior in the IPv6 era. These BGP and AS based statistical features should be
considered as the bases of new feature sets that would be able to statistically describe
the DNS abuse in IPv6.
Summarizing, as long as newly generated domain names share some network prop-
erties (e.g., IPs or BGP prefixes) with already labeled RRs, Notos will be able to
assign an accurate reputation score. In particular, since network resources are finite
and more expensive to renew or change, even if the domain properties change, Notos
can still identify whether a domain name may be associated with malicious behavior.
In addition, if a given domain name for which we want to know the reputation is
not present in the passive DNS DB, we can actively probe it, thus forcing a related
passive DNS entry. However, this is possible only when the domain successfully maps
to a non-empty set of IP addresses.
6.2.1.2 DNS Spoofing/Poisoning Considerations
The passive DNS data collection methodology that feed data to the passive DNS
database can potentially be an evasion vector for our system. The positioning of the
DNS sensor and avoidance of DNS poisoning is very important to maintain consistent
passive DNS information for all zones in the database. More specifically, if the passive
DNS sensor is placed above the recursive DNS server, it is prone to poisoning attacks
especially if the sensor does not validate each DNS transaction for correctness. On
the other hand, placing the passive DNS sensor above the recursive will add extra
merit to the passive DNS information that can be collected since all authority related
information (Name Server information) blended within the authority section of the
DNS resolution, which then can be easily mined. This is not the case if the passive
DNS sensor is placed below that recursive DNS server. It is up to the configuration
of the recursive DNS software (e.g., BIND) to include authoritative information in
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the DNS resolution returned to the stub resolver (or initiator of the DNS query).
Monitoring the DNS tra!c below the recursive makes DNS poisoning significantly
harder due to ingress filtering [28, 29] in the routers between the recursive and the
internal attacker who tries to poison the passive DNS monitoring.
6.2.1.3 False Positives Considerations
Our experimental results using the top 10,000 Alexa domain names as known good
domains, report a false positive fate of 0.4%. While low in percentage, the absolute
number of false positives may become significant in those cases in which very large
numbers of new domain names are fed to Notos on a daily basis (e.g., in case of
deployment in a large ISP network). However, we envision our Notos reputation
system to be used not as a stand-alone system, but rather in cooperation with other
defense mechanisms. For example, Notos may be used in collaboration with spam-
filtering systems [73], systems that classify URL/URI information [62] or systems that
examine binary downloads [79] and other type of Internet abuse that also use DNS
(e.g., search poisoning [53] or malicious ad-networks [76]).
For example, if an email contains a link to a website whose domain name has a low
reputation score according to Notos, the spam filter can increase the total spam-score
of the email. However, if the rest of the email appears to be benign, the spam filter
may still decide to accept the email. The same analogy can be made when someone
examines unknown URLs/URIs. In order to further reduce FPs from such system,
someone may use reputation score on the domain names part of the URL.
During manual analysis of false positives encountered in our evaluations and dur-
ing operational deployment in Damballa Inc., we were able to draw some interesting
observations. We found that a number of legitimate sites (e.g., goldsgym.com, black-
hat.com) are being hosted in networks that historically have been linked with signifi-
cant number of malicious domain names. In these cases, Notos, will tend to penalize
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the reputation of such legitimate domains because they simply reside in a historically
bad Internet neighborhood. In time, the reputation score assigned to these domains
may change, if the administrators of the network in which the benign domain names
are hosted take actions to “clean up” their networks.
Sinkholes and Parking sites: The second category of false positives that have
been seen during the operational deployment of Notos is related to parking sites and
sinkholes. Briefly, a parking site is an IP address that is used to “park” domain
names after they are expired or taken-over by the registrars. Unfortunately, in the
case of malware-related domain names, once a malicious domain name is taken-over,
the malware will still try to “phone-home” to what the malware still considers as the
active C&C domain. Clearly, from the passive evidence point of view, the parking
Internet host will now be directly associated with a large volume of malware. This will
cause its reputation to decrease and penalize the remaining domain names pointing
to the same parking host. Fortunately, such parking hosts are trivially detectable,
due to the abnormally high volume of domain names that point into them. Therefore,
this hand-full of hosts could simply be excluded from the RHIP list during the vector
computation process.
In the case of sinkholes, a similar problem arises. Briefly, a sinkhole is an Internet
host in which malicious domain names are delegated after a domain take over action
is performed. Typically, sinkholes are hosted in networks operated by “white-hats”.
As in the case of parking sites, sinkholes will attract an abnormally high volume of
malware reaching out to them. In some cases this might degrade the reputation of
the entire network. For example, if the sinkhole resides in an academic network (e.g.,
Georgia Institute of Technology), the probability of coming across more malware
reaching out to hosts within the same BGP prefix or the AS that Georgia Tech oper-
ates is very small. Therefore, when we compute a reputation vector of other domain
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names in the same BGP prefix or AS, the sinkhole infrastructure will not negatively
bias the reputation vector simply because the standard deviation and variance on the
evidence vectors both on the host, BGP and AS levels would not resemble a typi-
cal evidence vector from a low reputation network. However, if the sinkhole resides
in a“white-hat” hosting provider that happens to occasionally experience sporadic
cases of Internet abuse, in that case the sinkhole infrastructure will negatively impact
the reputation of the entire BGP prefix and perhaps that AS as well in which the
hosting provider resides in. Maybe the easiest way around this problem is for the
few sinkhole operators to clearly separate their infrastructure from the rest of the
“white-hats” hosting infrastructure.
6.2.2 Limitation of Kopis
In this section, we elaborate on possible evasion techniques and discuss some opera-
tional issues of Kopis.
6.2.2.1 Evasion techniques
Kopis relies significantly on the Requester Diversity (RD) and Requester Profile fea-
tures. An attacker may attempt to dilute the information provided by the RP and
RD features to evade Kopis. This could be achieved by resolving domain names from
a diverse set of open recursive DNS servers or even from random IPs acting as stub
resolver (e.g., using infected machines). This will not be as easy as it sounds, due
to the RP feature family. This is because even if the adversary looks up domain
names from various di"erent IP addresses, the adversary will still have to look up a
large number of domain names under the same authority to make the weight of each
requester large enough to alter the RP features. Additionally, the adversary will have
to repeatedly (for a long enough period of time) ask for di"erent domain names served
by the same authority in order to influence/dilute the RDNS weighing function.
In order to be able to artificially create the necessary signal that may dilute
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or even disturb the modeling of legitimate and malware-related domain names, the
adversary would have to obtain access to tra!c at the authority name or TLD servers.
Furthermore, the adversary would need a full list of statistical feature values used from
Kopis. Such an attack would be similar in spirit to polymorphic blending attacks [31].
We note here that reliable and systematic access to DNS tra!c at the authoritative
or TLD level is extremely hard to obtain, since it would require the collaboration of
the registrar that controls the AuthNS or the TLD servers.
Domain name generation algorithms (DGAs) have been used by malware families
(i.e., Conficker [65], Zeus/Murofet [77], Bobax [83], Torpig [84] etc.) in the last few
years. The new seed of these DGAs typically has the periodicity of a day. This implies
that domain names generated by DGAs (and under the zones Kopis monitors) will
be active only for a small period of time (e.g., a day). Due to the daily observation
period mandatory for Kopis to provide detection results, such malware-related domain
names will be potentially inactive by the time they are reported by our detection
system. Perhaps, operating Kopis with smaller epochs (i.e., hourly granularity) could
potentially solve this problem, however we leave the validation of this claim as part
of our future work.
6.2.2.2 TLDs and Domain Registrars
As we have already discussed, just observing the DNS resolution requests at the
TLD level will not provide su!cient information for the system to reconstruct the IP
addresses mapped with the queried domain names. There are several ways to resolve
this issue. The simplest way to reconstruct the IP addresses for a given domain name
is to check a large passive DNS database. For the domains that are not replicated
in the passive DNS database, we can use an active probing strategy to retrieve the
resolved IP addresses with little overhead.
Several TLDs are anycasted. This implies that by just monitoring one of potential
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several TLDs physical servers will not be su!cient to capture the full network and
geographical diversity of the requesters. In cases where TLD servers are anycasted we
need to assume that the TLD operator will have the ability to reconstruct the traces
from the vast majority of those anycasted servers in order to formulate an accurate
enough RP and RD statistical features for each domain name.
As a final classification heuristic, especially in the case of domain registrars, they
can potentially combine Kopis with domain name registration information. Classi-
fication results from Kopis can be combined with domain name registration infor-
mation (trivially accessible to domain registrars) in order to further reduce FPs but
also provide an additional correlation between domain registration accounts that own
domains with suspicious resolution behavior according to Kopis.
A di"erent evasion approach may be that the adversary randomly looks up domain
names that has nothing to do with the malware (i.e., C&C communication). In this
case the adversary will manage to introduce some additional tra!c towards these
domain names. The final goal would be to evade the signal that corresponds to the
real C&C communication domain(s). In reality such a goal is hard to be achieved
for a couple of reasons. Firstly, even if the non-C&C domain names were under the
same ANS, the adversary needs to mimic all RD and RP classification signal that
corresponds to benign domain name resolutions. In practice, the adversary controls
only the machines that were infected, so it’s hard to decide a priori the exact levels of
noise signal necessary, so the adversary can successfully blend the new C&C domain
name resolutions into the artificially created noise.
Secondly, in order for the adversary to be able to artificially create the necessary
signal that may dilute or even disturb the modeling of legitimate and malicious do-
main names, the adversary would have to obtain access to tra!c at the authority
name or TLD servers. Furthermore, the adversary would need a full list of statistical
feature values used from Kopis.
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6.2.3 Limitation of Pleiades
Pleiades has some limitations. For example, once a new DGA is discovered, Pleiades
can build fairly accurate statistical models of how the domains generated by the
DGA “look like”, but it is unable to learn or reconstruct the exact domain generation
algorithm. Therefore, Pleiades will generate a certain number of false positives and
false negatives. However, the results we presented in Table 9 show that Pleiades is
able to construct a very accurate DGA Classifier module, which produces very few
false positives and false negatives for ! = 10. At the same time, Table 11 shows
that the C&C Detection module, which attributes single active domain names to a
given DGA, also works fairly well in a majority of cases. Unfortunately, there are
some scenarios in which the HMM-based classification has di!culties. We believe this
is because our HMM considers domain names simply to be sequences of individual
characters. In our future work, we plan to experiment with 2-grams, whereby a
domain name will be seen as a sequence of pairs of characters, which may achieve
better classification accuracy for the harder to model DGAs.
As we mentioned in Section 5.2, detecting active DGA-generated C&C domains is
valuable because their resolved IP addresses can be used to update a C&C IP blacklist.
In turn, this IP blacklist can be used to block C&C communications at the network
edge, thus providing a way to mitigate the botnet’s malicious activities. Clearly, for
this strategy to be successful, the frequency with which the C&C IP addresses change
should be lower than the rate with which new pseudo-random C&C domain names are
generated by the DGA. This assumption holds for all practical cases of DGA-based
malware we encountered. After all, the generation of pseudo-random domains mainly
serves the purpose of making the takedown of loosely centralized botnets harder.
However, one could imagine “hybrid” botnets that use DGA-generated domains to
identify a set of peer IPs to bootstrap into a P2P-based C&C infrastructure. Al-
ternatively, the DGA-generated C&C domains may be flux domains, namely domain
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names that point to an IP fluxing network. It is worth noting that such sophisticated
“hybrid” botnets may be quite complex to develop, di!cult to deploy, and hard to
manage successfully.
Another potential limitation is due to the fact that Pleiades is not able to distin-
guish between di"erent botnets whose bot-malware use the same DGA algorithm. In
this case, while the two botnets may be controlled by di"erent entities, Pleiades will
attribute the compromised hosts within the monitored network to a single DGA-based
botnet.
6.3 Open Research Problems
With the research presented in this thesis, researchers can now make use of a variety
of classification signals in the context of DNS abuse. All three detection systems
presented here make use of those classification signals to e"ectively improve the state
of the art of classification systems that have to address DNS abuse. After concep-
tualizing, implementing and deploying these classifications system in an operational
environment we are able to derive a few fundamental observations regarding malicious
activities and their passive footprint:
• Professionally-operated DNS zones have a unique passive network signal.
• Human-driven vs. automata-driven network actions are observable and di!er,
both at local and a global network level.
These observations should be used in the next line of research projects that would
utilize the research presented in this thesis. These new projects will e"ectively aim to
propagate the signal obtained from the DNS abuse context, to address abuse in other
services that make use of DNS or share the hosting infrastructure also used by the
DNS resolutions. In the next few paragraphs, I will try to outline the most promising
research directions for extending the research presented in this thesis.
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Abuse in Social and Advertisement Networks: Social networks are growing
rapidly in popularity. This viral growth of users makes them a very lucrative attack
target. Attacks using the social networking platform could prove the most e"ective
way of malware distribution. However new the attack vector may be, it will still
have to rely upon the existing Internet infrastructure. As we saw from the research
presented in Chapter 3, we have the methods to characterize as reputable or not hosts
that facilitate resolution in our networks. The same signal can be used as a basic
building block, along with features extracted from the problem domain (i.e., Twitter
spam abuse [103]), to e!ciently address abuse in social networking sites.
The same analogy can be made for advertisement networks in the mobile space.
Almost every web page and application designed for mobile devices is serving some
form of advertisement. Attackers are already taking advantage of ads and they are
using them as an e"ective way to spread malware to the end users (malvertising).
As in the case of abuse in social networks, the malicious ad will have to rely upon
an existing Internet infrastructure. DNS reputation should be able to assist domain
specific features, obtained from properties of the known malicious ad networks, toward
the automatic identification of new malicious ad networks.
Abuse in Cloud Based Environments: Not surprisingly “cloud based” infras-
tructures are being utilized in a variety of scenarios from single users or big companies.
Due to the reliability and scalability that cloud based platforms provide to users, at-
tackers also have begun making use of cloud networks. Handling abuse in cloud
networks is extremely critical for the reputation of the cloud provider and the other
users of the cloud service. For example, if a cloud BGP prefix start facilitating a sig-
nificant volume of illicit operation, this will most certainly a"ect the legitimate users
of the same cloud BGP prefix (i.e., problem with email delivery and service reputa-
tion etc.). Furthermore, beside bad reputation, the cloud operators may have to deal
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with extensive bandwidth costs if the malicious hosts are used for certain categories
of fraudulent activities that require substantial bandwidth usage (i.e., spamming,
malware distribution, etc.).
Since the abuse in a cloud environment needs to be dealt with in a proactive
manner and at the edge of the cloud environment, a new generation of detection
systems are required that will be able to model the patterns which Internet hosts
are using to access the cloud services. As we saw in Chapter 4, the properties of
the malware generated access patterns significantly di"ers from the human generated
ones. As in the case of DNS, malware-related abuse in the cloud environments could
be distinguishable by the access properties of Internet hosts observed over temporal
windows.
Network Attribution: To this date, network level attribution is an unsolved prob-
lem in network security. The problem of network attribution is quite complex since
the attribution methodology needs to take under consideration a variety of di"erent
signals regarding the reputation of a network. Among others, such signals should
include; malware volumes reaching into the network (i.e., C&Cs), the duration the
malicious hosts are active in the network, the di"erent types of malicious activities
the network facilitates, the BGP/passive DNS connections with other fraudulent net-
works and the average DNS reputation on the domain names facilitated by the hosts
in the network. This research would be extremely valuable both to the operational
community and to law enforcement for better coordinating actions against criminal
organizations that facilitate consistency illicit operations.
Basic Security Metrics for Network Security: As we saw already in this thesis,
by passively observing DNS we can systematically associate domain names’ zone
structures with the IP address space. However, if we aim to generically describe
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network level events, new research is necessary that will be able to quantify network-
protocol agnostic security measures. In both Chapters 4 and 5, we observed two
main things about network access events. Firstly, DNS resolution patterns could
be used to di"erentiate between benign and malicious behaviors. Secondly, spectral
clustering could be used to identify groups of hosts that have similarities in their
resolution requests (i.e., NXDomain resolution request patterns). To that extent we
could leverage DNS reputation and access patterns to quantify basic metrics around
the “security entropy” of the communication observed in networks. It appears that
DNS — as a core infrastructure protocol for the Internet — could be a good first
building block for devising basic metrics that could measure the security state of
network devices.
6.4 Closing Remarks
This thesis explored the use of machine learning on passive DNS observation in order
to devise systems that can preemptively detect DNS abuse. The three key contri-
butions are the architecture of the first dynamic reputation system for DNS, and an
early warning system for DNS — divided into two components. The first component
enables DNS operators to preemptively detect malware-related domain names at the
upper layers of the DNS hierarchy — in the absence of a related (to the domain name)
malware sample. The second component of the early warning system enables DNS
operators to preemptively detect the rise of DGA-botnets at the local recursive DNS
or at the edge of the network — again in the absence of a related (to the domain
name) malware sample and the corresponding DGA algorithm.
The systems presented in this thesis solve the DNS reputation problem at a basic
level. The next generation of research should use the systems and classification signals
introduced with this thesis, in order to address Internet abuse in other contexts (as
described in Section 6.3), as long as the Internet abuse can be projected back to the
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A.1 NXDomain Graph Analysis
As discussed in Section 5.3.1.3 we create a bipartite graph between NXDomains and
hosts. Our interest is in the relationships between the NXDomains in the bipartite
graph. Therefore, we have to convert the bipartite graph in a regular graph between
NXDomains.
Spectral clustering requires the computation of the first p eigenvectors of S and
then X-means clustering on them (see Algorithm 1). However, we do not need to
compute S directly. The complexity for computing S = MT · M is quadratic with
respect to the number NXDomains, which will be prohibitive for scaling with very
large datasets (i.e., across multiple DNS sensors in the same ISP). The eigenvalues of




Also the left singular vectors ofM are the same with the eigenvectors of S. Making
use of this property is important since it avoids the O(n2) complexity step, without
diluting the quality of the derived clusters.
A.2 Probabilistic Analysis of the DGA process
The botmaster that crafts a DGA malware can control three parameters that directly
a"ect the life cycle of the DGA-enabled malware: (a) the number of generated domain
names N by the DGA, (b) the number of domain names queried by the malware
per epoch (i.e., one day) k, (c) the number of domain names q that the botmaster
registers every day as C&Cs, in order to retain control of the botnet. Given the three
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parameters (N, k, q) the probability P (N, k, q) of a domain name resolution request
x actually resolves to a registered (non-NXDomain) C&C can be computed as:








In Figures 38, 39 and 40, we can observe the e"ect of every parameter with the
respect of the others. It is logical to assume that the botmaster wants to register
very few domain names every day because of the cost. Now, given a constant number
of generated domain names N and a constant number of requests k we observe in
Figure 38 that decreasing q will also decrease the probability of contacting the active
C&C domain name. However, for constant values of k and q, decreasing N will
increase the probability of contacting one of the active C&C domains, but as we see
in Figure 39 (and we elaborate further in Section A.2.2) it also makes the behavior
of the DNS request pattern less random and more predictable. Finally, for constant
values of q and N , increasing k, also increases the probability of contacting the active
C&C (Figure 40), but at the same time increases the DNS resolution activity for the
infected hosts — which inevitably will also cause more unsuccessful resolutions.
A.2.1 Selecting the parameters of the DGA classifier
In Section 5.4.2 we discussed the hosts classification properties of the DGA classifier.
We compile vectors using set of NXDomains with cardinality ! = 10 NXDomains.
Given the probabilistic analysis of the Section A.2 we can further motivate our choice
of using sets of 10 NXDomains. For known DGA’s like Conficker-C the parameters
(N, k, q) are known. Conficker-C generates 1000 domain names per day. In Figure 40
we see the probability for a host infected by Conficker-C of reaching a hypothetical
active C&C domain. In particular, if we set k = 10, the probability of reaching the
active C&C within the first 10 resolution attempt is only 0.01%.
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Figure 38: Using N = 1000, k = 10 and q varying.
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Figure 39: Using q = 100, k = 10 and N varying.
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Figure 40: Using N = 1000, q = 10 and k varying.
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A.2.2 The e"ect of DGA parameters on the graph clustering performance
In this section we investigate the e"ect of the three parameters (N, k, q) in the graph
clustering module (Section 5.3). We will show that if botmasters intend to evade
Pleiades graph clustering process, they will have to either increase the operating
cost of their botnet infrastructure or significantly raise the number of NXDomains
they generate every day — making the botnet DGA easier to track. Lets assume
that a DGA-based malware generates N , 104 domain names but only queries k
(i.e., Conficker-C). In this case, the probability of a domain name being queried by
an infected host is p(nx) , k
N
. Because the query events on two hosts infected by
the same DGA are independent, the probability that the NXDomain is queried by l







. The same is the probability that l
hosts that belong to the same botnet form a connected graph.
This probability pk monotonically decreases with respect to k. So the adversary
wants to keep k as low as possible to break down the connectivity of the graph.
As we have already seen in Section A.2, in order to increase the probability of an
infected host successful reaching the active C&C domain name, the adversary has
to increase either m or k. Increasing m is costly, since the adversary will have to
register a significant number of domain names per day. However, by increasing k,
the cost is less, but comes with the cost of creating a significant higher number of
NXDomains. Such an act from the botmaster will increase the connectivity of the
NXDomain bipartite graph and thus the quality of our clusters.
154
REFERENCES
[1] Aas, K. and Eikvil, L., “Text categorisation: A survey.,” 1999.
[2] Abu Rajab, M., Zarfoss, J., Monrose, F., and Terzis, A., “A multi-
faceted approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon,” in Proceedings of
the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, IMC ’06, 2006.
[3] abuse.ch, “ZeuS Gets More Sophisticated Using P2P Techniques.” http://
www.abuse.ch/?p=3499, 2011.
[4] Aha, D. W.,Kibler, D., andAlbert, M. K., “Instance-based learning algo-
rithms,” Machine Learning, vol. 6, pp. 37–66, 1991. 10.1023/A:1022689900470.
[5] Alexa, “The web information company.” http://www.alexa.com/, 2007.
[6] Anderson, D., Fleizach, C., Savage, S., and Voelker, G., “Spamscat-
ter: Characterizing internet scam hosting infrastructure,” in Proceedings of the
USENIX Security Symposium, 2007.
[7] Antonakakis, M., Perdisci, R., Dagon, D., Lee, W., and Feamster,
N., “Building a dynamic reputation system for DNS,” in the Proceedings of
19th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security ’10), 2010.
[8] Antonakakis, M., Perdisci, R., Lee, W., Dagon, D., and Vasiloglou,
N., “Detecting Malware Domains at the Upper DNS Hierarchy,” in the Pro-
ceedings of 20th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security ’11), 2011.
[9] Antonakakis, M., Perdisci, R., Nadji, Y., Vasiloglou, N., Abu-
Nimeh, S., Lee, W., andDagon, D., “From Throw-Away Tra!c to Bots: De-
tecting the Rise of DGA-Based Malware,” in the Proceedings of 21th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security ’12), 2012.
[10] BankPatch, “Trojan.Bankpatch.C.” http://www.symantec.com/security_
response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-081817-1808-99&tabid=2, 2009.
[11] Bilge, L., Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., and Balduzzi, M., “Exposure: Find-
ing malicious domains using passive dns analysis,” in Proceedings of NDSS,
2011.
[12] Bishop, C. M., Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning (Information Sci-
ence and Statistics). Secaucus, NJ, USA: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2006.
[13] Breiman, L., “Bagging predictors,” Machine learning, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 123–
140, 1996.
155
[14] Caballero, J., Grier, C., Kreibich, C., and Paxson, V., “Measuring
pay-per-install: The commoditization of malware distribution,” in USENIX
Security Symposium, 2011.
[15] Chang, C.-C. and Lin, C.-J., “LIBSVM: A library for support vector ma-
chines,” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, vol. 2,
pp. 27:1–27:27, 2011. Software available at http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/
~cjlin/libsvm.
[16] Collins, M. P., Shimeall, T. J., Faber, S., Janies, J., Weaver, R.,
De Shon, M., and Kadane, J., “Using uncleanliness to predict future botnet
addresses,” in Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement, IMC ’07, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 93–104, ACM, 2007.
[17] Consortium, I. S., “SIE@ISC : Security Information Exchange.” https://
sie.isc.org/, 2004.
[18] Cova, M., Leita, C., Thonnard, O., Keromytis, A. D., and Dacier,
M., “An analysis of rogue av campaigns,” in RAID, pp. 442–463, 2010.
[19] Dagon, D., Gu, G., and Lee, C. P., “A taxonomy of botnet structures,” in
Botnet Detection, pp. 143–164, 2008.
[20] Dagon, D., Zou, C., and Lee, W., “Modeling botnet propagation using time
zones,” in In Proceedings of the 13 th Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium NDSS, 2006.
[21] dihe’s IP-Index Browser, “DIHE.” http://ipindex.homelinux.net/
index.php, 2008.
[22] Dinaburg, A., Royal, R., Sharif, M., and Lee, W., “Ether: malware
analysis via hardware virtualization extensions,” in ACM CCS, 2008.
[23] DNS Whitelist – Protect against false positives, “DNSWL.”
http://www.dnswl.org, 2008.
[24] DNSBL, S., “Fighting spam by finding and listing Exploitable Servers..”
http://www.us.sorbs.net/, 2007.
[25] Duda, R., Hart, P., and Stork, D., Pattern Classification. Wiley-
Interscience, 2nd ed., 2000.
[26] Feldman, R. and Sanger, J., The text mining handbook: advanced ap-
proaches in analyzing unstructured data. Cambridge Univ Pr, 2007.
[27] Felegyhazi, M., Keibich, C., and Paxson, V., “On the potential of proac-
tive domain blacklisting,” in Third USENIX LEET Workshop, 2010.
156
[28] Ferguson, P. and Senie, D., “Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of
Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing (BCP38).” http://
www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp/bcp38.txt, 2000.
[29] Ferguson, P., “Network ingress filtering: Defeating denial of service attacks
which employ ip source address spoofing extension mechanisms for dns (edns0),
rfc 2671,” 2000.
[30] Finones, R., “Virus:Win32/Expiro.Z.” http://www.microsoft.
com/security/portal/Threat/Encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?
Name=Virus%3AWin32%2FExpiro.Z, 2011.
[31] Fogla, P., Sharif, M., Perdisci, R., Kolesnikov, O., and Lee, W.,
“Polymorphic blending attacks,” in In Proceedings of the 15 th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium, pp. 241–256, 2006.
[32] Freund, Y. and Mason, L., “The alternating decision tree learning algo-
rithm,” in Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Machine
Learning, ICML ’99, 1999.
[33] G. Gu, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, and W. Lee, “BotH-
unter: Detecting malware infection through IDS-driven dialog correlation,” in
Proc. USENIX Security, 2007.
[34] Garera, S., Provos, N., Chew, M., and Rubin, A., “A framework for
detection and measurement of phishing attacks,” in Proceedings of the ACM
WORM, ACM, 2007.
[35] Geide, M., “Another trojan bamital pattern.” http://research.zscaler.
com/2011/05/another-trojan-bamital-pattern.html, 2011.
[36] Golovanov, S. and Soumenkov, I., “TDL4 top bot.” http://www.
securelist.com/en/analysis/204792180/TDL4_Top_Bot, 2011.
[37] Gross, B., Cova, M., Cavallaro, L., Gilbert, B., Szydlowski, M.,
Kemmerer, R., Kruegel, C., and Vigna, G., “Your botnet is my botnet:
analysis of a botnet takeover,” in ACM CCS 09, (New York, NY, USA), ACM,
2009.
[38] Gu, G., Perdisci, R., Zhang, J., and Lee, W., “BotMiner: clustering
analysis of network tra!c for protocol- and structure-independent botnet de-
tection,” in USENIX Security, 2008.
[39] Gu, G., Zhang, J., and Lee, W., “BotSni"er: Detecting botnet command
and control channels in network tra!c,” in Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), 2008.
157
[40] Hao, S., Feamster, N., and Pandrangi, R., “An Internet Wide
View into DNS Lookup Patterns.” http://labs.verisign.com/projects/
malicious-domain-names/white-paper/dns-imc2010.pdf, 2010.
[41] Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., and Friedman, J., The Elements of Statistical
Learning. Springer Series in Statistics, New York, NY, USA: Springer New York
Inc., 2001.
[42] Hermans, J., “MozillaWiki TLD List.” https://wiki.mozilla.org/TLD_
List, 2006.
[43] Holz, T., Gorecki, C., Rieck, K., and Freiling, F., “Measuring and
detecting fast-flux service networks,” in Proceedings of NDSS, 2008.
[44] Hothorn, T. and Lausen, B., “Double-bagging: Combining classifiers by
bootstrap aggregation,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 1303–1309,
2003.
[45] John, G. and Langley, P., “Estimating continuous distributions in bayesian
classifiers,” in In Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence, pp. 338–345, Morgan Kaufmann, 1995.
[46] Jung, J., Krishnamurthy, B., and Rabinovich, M., “Flash crowds and
denial of service attacks: characterization and implications for cdns and web
sites,” in Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web,
WWW ’02, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 293–304, ACM, 2002.
[47] Jung, J., Sit, E., Balakrishnan, H., and Morris, R., “DNS performance
and the e"ectiveness of caching,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 10, pp. 589–
603, October 2002.
[48] Kanich, C., Weaver, N., McCoy, D., Halvorson, T., Kreibich, C.,
Levchenko, K., Paxson, V., Voelker, G. M., and Savage, S., “Show
me the money: Characterizing spam-advertised revenue,” in USENIX Security
Symposium, 2011.
[49] Krishnan, S. and Monrose, F., “Dns prefetching and its privacy implica-
tions: when good things go bad,” in Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference
on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets, spyware, worms, and
more, LEET’10, (Berkeley, CA, USA), pp. 10–10, USENIX Association, 2010.
[50] Kuncheva, L. I., Combining Pattern Classifiers: Methods and Algorithms.
Wiley-Interscience, 2004.
[51] Levchenko, K., Pitsillidis, A., Chachra, N., Enright, B.,
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